The counter-revolutionary path: South Vietnam, the United

States, and the global allure of development, 1968-1973 by Toner, Simon
1 
 
The London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Counter-Revolutionary Path: South Vietnam, the United 
States, and the Global Allure of Development, 1968-1973 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Simon Toner 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted to the Department of International History of 
the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy, October 2015. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
Declaration 
 
I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of 
the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other 
than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent 
of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it). 
 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, 
provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without 
my prior written consent. 
I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe on the rights 
of any third party. 
I declare that my thesis consists of 90,215 words. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
Abstract 
 
This dissertation examines the theory and practice of development in South 
Vietnam’s Second Republic from the aftermath of the 1968 Tet Offensive to the signing 
of the Paris Peace Accords in 1973. Based on Vietnamese and American archival 
material, it explores the development approaches of both the South Vietnamese and 
United States governments. In particular, it examines the ways in which South 
Vietnamese elites and U.S. officials in Washington and Saigon responded to the various 
development paradigms on offer to postcolonial states between the 1950s and 1970s, 
namely modernization theory, community development, land reform, and an emerging 
neoliberal economics. 
In doing so the dissertation makes three primary arguments. In contrast to much 
of the literature on the final years of the American War in Vietnam, this dissertation 
argues that development remained a crucial component of the United States’ and South 
Vietnamese strategy after the Tet Offensive. It highlights both the continuities and 
changes in U.S. approaches to international development between the Johnson and 
Nixon years as well as arguing that debates about development strategies in Vietnam 
during this time presaged larger shifts in international development later in the 1970s. 
Secondly, it argues that South Vietnamese elites had a transnational development 
vision. They not only employed U.S. theories of development but also drew on the 
lessons offered by other states in the Global South, particularly Taiwan and South 
Korea. Finally, the dissertation argues that the South Vietnamese government employed 
development to earn domestic legitimacy and shore up its authoritarian governance. 
The dissertation makes three historiographical interventions. Firstly, it 
illuminates U.S. development practice in the Nixon era. Secondly, the dissertation 
shows that South Vietnamese officials shaped development outcomes, thus granting 
agency that is largely absent from accounts of this period. Finally, it demonstrates that 
historians must place South Vietnam within the larger framework of decolonization and 
East Asian anti-Communism.  
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A Note on the Text: 
 
While Vietnamese documents obviously include diacritics, U.S. documents do not 
include diacritics for Vietnamese personal names and place names. Therefore, I have 
included Vietnamese diacritics in my translations of Vietnamese documents in the 
footnotes but for the sake of consistency I have chosen not to include them in the main 
body of the text. 
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Introduction 
____________________________________________________________ 
 
As he assumed the office of the presidency in 1969, Richard Nixon believed the 
United States faced a dramatically changed international environment which called for a 
new approach to the problems of postcolonial development. In the face of the costly, 
unending war in Vietnam and the failure of reform at home, the consensus around U.S. 
overseas development efforts had unravelled. The post-war development enterprise, 
whereby the United States provided bilateral aid for state-led projects in the 
postcolonial world, had proved a disappointment. It seemed to serve only short-term 
political objectives and achieved little economic growth. The United States faced a 
growing balance of payments problem and Congressional and public opinion had turned 
hostile to development assistance. Nixon therefore announced that the United States 
would no longer “seek to dominate the international development process” but would 
encourage initiatives from other industrialized nations and channel more U.S. aid 
through multilateral institutions like the World Bank. Moreover, Nixon looked to the 
postcolonial success stories such as Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore, and saw 
nations which had “discovered and applied the lessons of America’s own economic 
success”. In response to these lessons, Nixon decided that the United States would 
encourage private investment, population planning, and export-led growth. This new 
model of development would serve the Nixon administration’s broader national security 
goals by allowing “a number of lower income countries to mobilize manpower and 
resources to defend themselves”.1 
                                                
1 Action Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to 
President Nixon, ‘The New U.S. Foreign Aid Program’, 14 July 1970, document no. 134, Foreign 
Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, vol. IV, Foreign Assistance, International Development, Trade 
Policies, 1969-1972; ‘Special Message to the Congress Proposing Reform of the Foreign Assistance 
Program’, 15 September 1970, The American Presidency Project (available at 
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South Vietnam became the major site where the contest between new and old 
ideas about postcolonial development played out. Nixon’s new strategy aimed to reduce 
the United States’ global commitments and there was no more important place to begin 
this process than in Vietnam. During Nixon’s first term the United States encouraged 
the South Vietnamese regime to implement an export-led growth strategy, stimulate 
private investment, institute a population planning programme, and mobilize 
international aid. Each measure aimed to increase the self-sufficiency of the regime as 
the United States’ withdrew. Yet the breakdown of the post-war consensus was uneven 
and these new strategies did not immediately eclipse older methods of postcolonial 
development. At the same time as the Nixon administration and the government of 
South Vietnam (GVN) pursued new goals, they also implemented state-led 
modernization, land reform, and community development schemes which bore close 
resemblance to the postcolonial projects of the 1950s and 1960s.  
This dissertation examines the theory and practice of development in South 
Vietnam from the aftermath of the 1968 Tet Offensive to the signing of the Paris 
Agreements in 1973. It examines the development approaches of both the South 
Vietnamese and United States governments. In particular, it explores the ways in which 
South Vietnamese political elites and United States policymakers and development 
practitioners responded to the various development paradigms on offer to postcolonial 
states from the 1950s to the 1970s, including modernization, community development, 
land reform, and an emerging neoliberal economics. The dissertation also seeks to 
uncover what U.S. development policies in Vietnam during the Nixon years can tell us 
about the United States’ approach to the problems of postcolonial development on a 
global scale in the 1970s. 
                                                                                                                                          
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=2661; retrieved 15 August 2015); Richard Nixon, 
‘Asia after Viet Nam’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 46, no. 1, (1967), 118-119. 
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In doing so the dissertation makes three primary arguments. Firstly, it argues 
that development remained a crucial component of the United States’ and South 
Vietnamese strategy after the Tet Offensive. Previous studies have argued that the 
United States abandoned efforts at development and nation-building in Vietnam after 
the Tet Offensive, focusing instead on high diplomacy and conventional warfare. No 
study has considered GVN policies and programmes in this area during this time.2   
In its exploration of U.S. approaches to development after the Tet Offensive this 
dissertation highlights both the continuities and changes between the Johnson and 
Nixon years. On the one hand, the Nixon years saw the culmination of post-war U.S. 
involvement in land reform in Asia as well as the climax of the “Green Revolution” in 
South Vietnam which began during the final years of the Johnson administration. On 
the other hand, Vietnam offers a window on the United States’ new development 
priorities in the 1970s including a focus on urban development and a turn toward more 
market-driven economic policies. The dissertation demonstrates how, after the Tet 
Offensive, U.S. officials implemented projects which drew on community development, 
modernization theory, land reform and neoliberal economics. In this sense, the 
dissertation challenges the historiographical trend which periodizes the Cold War into 
neat eras in which one development paradigm or another dominated. Examining the 
politics of development in South Vietnam in the late 1960s and 1970s one can see how 
                                                
2 See for example James Carter, Inventing Vietnam: the United States and State Building, 1954-1968, 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008). David Biggs dedicates some attention to the post-Tet 
period in his wonderful study of nation-building but focuses little of this discussion on the goals and 
meaning of development for the GVN and U.S. government at this time. David Biggs, Quagmire: Nation-
Building and Nature in the Mekong Delta, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2010), 210-225. Key 
studies of the Nixon administration’s Vietnam policy that make no mention of development include 
Jeffrey P. Kimball, Nixon’s Vietnam War, (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1998) and Larry 
Berman, No Peace, No Honor: Nixon, Kissinger, and Betrayal in Vietnam, (New York: Free Press, 2001). 
Part of the reason for the neglect of development issues has been the focus instead on counterinsurgency 
in the final years of the war. Counterinsurgency was essentially one aspect of development but even those 
scholars who examine it fail to understand it in these terms. See for example Lewis Sorley, A Better War: 
the Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America’s Last Years in Vietnam, (New York: Harcourt 
Brace and Co., 1999); Richard Hunt, Pacification: the American Struggle for Vietnam’s Hearts and 
Minds, (Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1995); Thomas L. Ahern, The CIA and Rural Pacification in 
South Vietnam, CIA History, available at 
http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/48/3_CIA_AND_RURAL_PACIFICA
TION.pdf.  
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U.S. theories of development co-occurred, interacted and competed with one another in 
one arena of the Cold War. The discussions among U.S. officials and development 
practitioners on the problems of development in Vietnam both reflected old debates and 
presaged new ones that would come to the fore in international development later in the 
1970s. 
Secondly, the dissertation shows that South Vietnamese elites had a 
transnational vision which not only employed U.S. development theories but also drew 
on the lessons offered by other states in the Global South. In particular, South 
Vietnam’s leaders and technocrats were drawn to the East Asian anti-Communist, 
authoritarian states of Taiwan and South Korea. Contrary to much of the orthodox 
literature which characterises the South Vietnamese regime as passive and inward-
looking, this dissertation demonstrates that Saigon’s development programmes were the 
result of an active engagement with the anti-Communist Third World and shows that the 
influence of these models proved equally as important to development during the final 
years of the war as did U.S.-South Vietnamese exchanges. South Vietnam’s relationship 
with the United States was of course crucial, but the Thieu regime’s development 
efforts must be placed within a global framework of Cold War anti-Communism. In 
macroeconomics, Saigon borrowed ideas from the South Korean, Taiwanese and 
Singaporean “developmental states”. In the field of agriculture the regime seized on 
“miracle rice” developed at the International Rice Research Institute in the Philippines 
and sought to learn from the land reform experiences of Taiwan, Iran, and other anti-
Communist states. In public health, a group of South Vietnamese government and non-
government actors, supported by the International Planned Parenthood Foundation, 
lobbied for a population planning program along South Korean and Taiwanese lines. 
Of course, the RVN’s transnational vision would have been irrelevant if, as so 
many historians suggest, its leaders were simply puppets of the United States. Contrary 
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to many accounts which marginalize South Vietnamese actors, this dissertation argues 
that they played important roles in shaping counter-insurgency, development and 
economic reform during the final years of the war. It demonstrates that development and 
counter-insurgency in particular were contested and that policies were the outcome of a 
negotiated process between South Vietnamese and U.S. actors. While South Vietnamese 
and U.S. officials saw eye-to-eye on some issues, other aspects of development were the 
source of disagreement both within and between the U.S. and South Vietnamese 
governments, as well as within both country’s legislatures. Occasionally, the South 
Vietnamese view triumphed and at other times U.S. preferences carried the day. 
Finally, the dissertation explains why, in a country wracked by violent conflict, 
the Saigon regime attempted development. As the prospect of political competition with 
the National Liberation Front increased in the aftermath of the 1968 Tet Offensive and 
the initiation of the Paris peace talks, the GVN saw counterinsurgency and development 
as powerful tools for extending the state’s authority into the countryside and urban 
slums, for earning legitimacy in the eyes of the people, and for bulwarking its 
authoritarian rule. 
At a June 1969 meeting of the Central Pacification and Construction Council 
[Hội Đồng Bình Định và Xây Dựng Trung Ương], South Vietnam’s President Nguyen 
Van Thieu outlined his thinking in these terms. Thieu told his generals and ministers 
that if the government firmly controlled enough populated territory it could guarantee 
victory in the forthcoming electoral contest with the NLF. But votes would not be 
secured through coercion alone. Development projects would enhance the legitimacy of 
the regime and pay dividends at the ballot box. Speaking of the country’s peasantry in 
typically paternalistic tones, Thieu said “we control them, we preserve their security, we 
nurture them, we develop them. We only ask that they vote for us, and that they don’t 
vote for the Communists. We do a hundred things for them”, Thieu went on, “we 
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request that they do just one thing for us, that they have affection for the National 
Government, that they like nationalism and that they vote for the nationalists”.3 
Three weeks later, Thieu would make his most expansive peace proposal of the 
entire war. On July 11 1969 he announced that all political parties that renounced 
violence, including the NLF, could participate in nationwide elections. An electoral 
commission, in which the NLF could also participate, would oversee the elections and 
an international body would also supervise the process. The South Vietnamese 
government (GVN) would discuss the modalities of the election with the NLF and 
promised to abide by the results. Implicit in this proposal was the requirement that 
North Vietnamese troops withdraw from the South prior to the elections. “The other 
side claims that it controls 80% of the population of South Vietnam”, Thieu said. “We 
say that they dominate by force only a small portion of the population. Let these claims 
be put to the test of elections”.4  
Thieu was no peacemaker and certainly no democrat. He had ascended to power 
through the ranks of the military and had a clear preference for authoritarian 
governance. He was a staunch anti-Communist and at one time believed that the only 
way to defeat the insurgency in South Vietnam was through military power. But by the 
middle of 1969, the character of the American War in Vietnam had changed. During the 
Tet Offensive in early 1968, the NLF and North Vietnamese had attacked most of South 
Vietnam’s towns and cities, delivering a massive psychological blow, if not a military 
defeat to the United States and GVN. In the wake of the offensive, the Johnson 
administration had initiated peace talks with North Vietnam and a political settlement, 
                                                
3 ‘Pacification and Construction Seminar at Independence Palace, 20 June 1969, [Khóa hội thảo Bình 
Định Xây Dựng tại Dinh Đọc Lập ngày 20.6.1969], folder 95, Phủ Tổng Thống Đệ Nhị Cộng Hòa (Office 
of the President of the Second Republic) (hereafter PTTDNCH), Trung Tâm Lưu Trữ Quốc Gia II 
(National Archives Centre II) (hereafter TTLTQGII), Ho Chi Minh City. 
4 ‘Text of President Thieu’s Speech on Restoration of Peace in Vietnam’, 11 July 1969, Folder 12, Box 
10, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 04- Political Settlement, Texas Tech University, Vietnam Virtual 
Archive, (hereafter TTU-VVA), Item no.: 2301012006. 
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rather than a decisive military victory, now appeared the most likely resolution to the 
war.  
The Nixon administration, coming to office in January 1969, continued to move 
in this direction. Although Nixon harboured fantasies of military dominance, the new 
administration instead began the process of “Vietnamization”, whereby U.S. troops 
would be withdrawn as the South Vietnamese military grew and assumed a larger share 
of the fighting. Nixon combined this apparent de-escalation of the war with escalation 
beyond South Vietnam’s borders, secretly bombing communist sanctuaries in Cambodia 
and Laos, and launching invasions into those countries in 1970 and 1971 respectively. 
These escalatory moves were supposed to strengthen National Security Adviser Henry 
Kissinger’s negotiating position in secret talks with Hanoi’s representatives which 
began in August 1969. For the Nixon administration, Vietnamization offered a way for 
the United States to disengage from Vietnam, buying time on the home front to continue 
the war while building up Saigon’s military strength. It offered the possibility that South 
Vietnam might survive the U.S. withdrawal, leaving U.S. credibility intact.  
Although long hostile to any dealings with the NLF, by late 1968 Thieu had 
come around to the idea and started working to bring his compatriots along with him. 
Not only was the United States searching for a political solution, but the NLF had 
suffered massive losses during the Tet Offensive and the RVN had made substantial 
security gains during the Accelerated Pacification Campaign which began in November 
1968. For RVN leaders, the principal weapons in the political contest with the NLF 
were security and development. If the regime could control enough populated territory, 
organize the people, and deliver the fruits of development, it could create a viable 
political community in both the countryside and the cities that would turn its back on 
the NLF and support the GVN. Meanwhile, economic reform and development would 
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strengthen the RVN economy and gradually reduce South Vietnam’s critical 
dependence on U.S. aid.  
In addition to offering an incentive for the South Vietnamese people to support 
and vote for the GVN, bottom-up community development and counterinsurgency 
schemes were at the centre of Thieu’s vision of governance. After the Tet Offensive, the 
GVN expanded the village and hamlet elections it had re-established in 1967, devolved 
power to the villages, made funds available for popularly-elected and locally 
implemented community development projects, and redistributed land to tenant farmers. 
In 1970, the government extended some of these policies into South Vietnam’s urban 
areas. Villagers and urban dwellers were also compelled to join a citizens’ militia, the 
People’s Self-Defence Forces (PSDF), to defend their communities against Communist 
penetration. Each of these programmes was intended to draw peasant farmers and the 
urban poor to the side of the GVN. The goal was to create self-governing, self-
developing, and self-defending local communities which would not place a demand on 
overstretched national resources. 
Mobilizing the people in the villages and urban neighbourhoods to participate in 
self-defence and self-development projects, and granting peasant farmers land, aimed to 
foster links between Thieu at the centre of Vietnamese politics and the villages and 
urban wards at periphery. By decentralizing counterinsurgency and development 
responsibilities to local communities, Thieu hoped to undermine other intermediate 
power brokers such as political parties, Corps Commanders and province and district 
chiefs. Village level political participation, in the form of elections, self-defence, and 
community development, would therefore to serve as a substitute for national-level 
politics. 
The GVN also employed top-down, modernization projects including economic 
reform and planning, population control, and the high-yield rice varieties of the Green 
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Revolution. These projects aimed to generate economic growth and contribute to both 
village and national self-sufficiency. But even if they were unsuccessful in this regard, 
they had considerable psychological value in the war against the Communists. 
Modernization projects demonstrated the GVN’s technological edge over the NLF or 
signaled to the people that the government’s development vision was more compelling 
than that of the revolutionary forces arrayed against it. Modern rice varieties, GVN 
planners hoped, would return the country to rice self-sufficiency but would also have a 
profound psychological effect on peasant farmers, convincing them that the 
technologically-endowed GVN was the wave of the future. Economic reform and 
national planning aimed to reduce the RVN’s dependence on U.S. aid. But economic 
policy was just as important for what it represented as what it achieved. The GVN’s 
economic policymakers pointed to reforms to convince the people that the RVN was a 
developmental regime just like the other, more prosperous, anti-Communist East Asian 
nations. 
Some scholars have dismissed Thieu’s July 1969 peace proposal as a publicity 
stunt, while others believe it demanded so much of the NLF that the revolutionaries 
were hardly likely to accept it. Certainly, it fell far short of the NLF’s May 1969 “Ten 
Point Peace Plan” and even Nixon’s May 14 peace proposal.5 Yet between 1969 and 
1972, Thieu genuinely believed that it might be possible convince North Vietnam to 
withdraw its troops from the South and have a political contest with the NLF as part of a 
                                                
5 Pierre Asselin, A Bitter Peace: Washington, Hanoi, and the Making of the Paris Agreement, (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 18-19; John Prados argues that because the RVN 
constitution prohibited Communism, the NLF would have had to renounce its political beliefs in order to 
participate in elections. John Prados, ‘The Shape of the Table: Nguyen Van Thieu and Negotiations to 
End the Conflict’ in Lloyd C. Gardner and Ted Gittinger, The Search for Peace in Vietnam 1964-1968 
(College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2004), 360; George Veith takes Thieu’s proposal 
more seriously though is certainly too generous, noting “the Communists seemed allergic to a concept 
that most Westerners and the democratically inclined Vietnamese Nationalists had long accepted: 
political compromise that offered power sharing through free and fair elections”. George J. Veith, ‘“A 
Short Road to Hell”: Thieu, South Vietnam, and the Paris Peace Accords’ in Natalie Huynh Chau Nguyen 
ed. New Perspectives of the Vietnam War: Essays on War, the Diaspora, the South Vietnamese 
Experience and the Continuing Impact, (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland and Company, 2015), 24; on the 
May 1969 peace proposals see Lien-Hang T. Nguyen, Hanoi’s War: An International History of the War 
for Peace in Vietnam, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012), 139. 
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settlement. A more valid condemnation of his proposal is that he hardly planned for the 
elections to be fair. In any case, the NLF and its patrons in the Vietnamese Workers’ 
Party in North Vietnam rejected Thieu’s proposal, demanding that he step down and 
that a coalition government take his place.  
Thieu’s belief in the possibility of GVN-NLF political competition continued to 
inform his method of governance until late 1972. Two events changed Thieu’s 
approach. In response to North Vietnam’s 1972 Spring Offensive Thieu cancelled 
hamlet and village elections, backtracking on the process of devolution which had 
begun in 1967. In October, Thieu was presented with a draft peace agreement worked 
out by the United States and North Vietnam. The draft contained no provision for the 
withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops from the South. Thieu demanded revisions but 
was unable to secure this crucial change. The Paris Agreements also assigned an 
important role to the “Third Force” in the post-agreement political process. Composed 
of neutralists, the “Third Force” would occupy the space between the GVN and the NLF 
on the body overseeing the ceasefire and subsequent election. Thieu believed that 
“Third Force” elements were Communist lackeys.6 Under these conditions, after 1973 
Thieu moved against any neutralist sentiment and his rule became even more arbitrary 
and authoritarian. Prior to the Paris Peace Agreement development served as a tool of 
governance and a means of fostering popular loyalty in the struggle against the NLF. It 
also aimed to enhance the economic and political viability of the regime. After January 
1973, in the face of declining U.S. aid and an unworkable peace agreement, 
development was merely a matter of survival.  
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Historiography 
This dissertation engages with and contributes to two areas of historiography: 
the history of development and the American War in Vietnam. Since Nick Cullather’s 
call in Diplomatic History in 2000 for historians to treat “development as history” rather 
than as a methodology, the historiography of U.S. foreign relations has seen an 
outpouring of literature on development. This explosion has been further encouraged by 
an increasing tendency for historians to frame the Cold War as a contest of competing 
models of development in the Global South.7 While development is a contested and 
subjective term, this literature focuses on the efforts of the United States, the Soviet 
Union, international and non-governmental organisations, and postcolonial states to 
accelerate the process of economic, social, and political change in the postcolonial 
world. In the field of U.S. foreign relations history, the formulation and implementation 
of modernization theory has held a privileged place in this scholarship.8 
 Historians have highlighted the roots of post-war theories, particularly 
modernization, in earlier discourses of development. With its Eurocentrism and its faith 
in science and technology as the engines of human progress, modernization theory owed 
a good deal to Enlightenment philosophy. It also shared many principles with 
development discourses of the late colonial era, particularly those that eulogised about 
the potential for technology to “uplift” and “improve” non-Western societies. The work 
of U.S. non-government organizations in China in the interwar years and New Deal 
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Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
8 Nils Gilman, Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America, (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University, 2003); Michael E. Latham, Modernization as Ideology: Nation-Building in the 
Kennedy Era, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002); Michael E. Latham, The Right 
Kind of Revolution: Modernization, Development, and U.S. Foreign Policy from the Cold War to the 
Present, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011); David Engerman et al eds., Staging Growth: 
Modernization, Development, and the Global Cold War, (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 
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programmes in the United States in the 1930s also helped shape Cold War era 
development.9  
Despite its pre-war roots, modernization theory was a direct response to 
decolonization and the Cold War. Aware that patronage was readily available for 
physical scientists who could produce research that would assist the United States’ Cold 
War goals, many social scientists began to reorient their focus and methodologies to 
serve the same ends.10 Research on the problems of developing peasant societies, which 
many American leaders felt the United States did not understand, appeared a promising 
arena of study. In the 1950s and 1960s, as the focus of the Cold War shifted from 
Europe to the new nation-states in Asia and Africa, social scientists sought to develop a 
theoretical framework that would help American policymakers as well as Third World 
elites understand and guide postcolonial development. These modernization theorists 
took the nation-state as their unit of analysis as a response to decolonization and the 
post-war global order, as well as the only recent emergence in 1930s social science 
research on the concept of the “national economy”.11 In another important shift from the 
Enlightenment and colonial eras, modernization theorists saw “underdevelopment” as a 
cultural, rather than biological deficiency on the part of Third World peoples.12   
Modernization theorists argued that all states passed along a linear path from 
tradition to modernity. Although they claimed their theory to be universal, they based 
                                                
9 Michael Adas, Dominance by Design: Technological Imperatives and America’s Civilizing Mission, 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), 33-184; Emily Rosenberg, Spreading the American 
Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890-1945, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982); 
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34, no. 3, 421-448; Timothy Mitchell, ‘Economists and the Economy in the Twentieth Century’, in 
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Others, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), 126. 
12 Adas, Dominance by Design, 160-161. Nonetheless, in dealing with Third World leaders and peoples, 
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their vision of modernity on the United States at mid-century. All the “new nations” 
were “traditional”: economically unsophisticated, fearful of change and passive toward 
nature. Modern society, sociologist Edward Shils elucidated, meant an economy based 
on “rational technology”, education, urbanization, and industrialisation. Modernization 
theorists overlooked each nation’s different experience with colonialism and historic 
role in the world economy. Despite its ahistoricism, modernization theory was itself 
situated in a particular historical moment. The post-war economic order or Bretton 
Woods system, one scholar suggests, “underlay the whole idea of development as it was 
conceived from the 1950s onwards”. This system encouraged states to manage their 
economies and engage in national economic planning. Under Bretton Woods “the goal 
of development was growth; the agent of development was the state and the means of 
development were… macroeconomic policy instruments”.13 For modernization 
theorists, the development process required planning by technocrats, statisticians and 
engineers. The new governments would have to intervene in the economy, control the 
rate of savings and investment, and build factories, roads, and irrigation systems. These 
projects would transform the psychology of the peasant, compelling him to identify with 
the state. Modernization was thus an elite experiment, as urban technocrats devised 
social engineering projects and imposed them on supposedly malleable peasant 
societies.14 
In this literature, the periodization of development paradigms has occupied a 
good deal of scholars’ attention. Modernization theorists found favour with and 
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powerful positions within the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.15 Several studies 
have examined the influence of modernization on United States development efforts in 
the Third World in these years.16 Michael Latham, in one of the earliest histories of 
modernization theory, argues that modernization became an “ideology” in the 1960s in 
large part because it was a synthesis of older ways of American thinking about progress 
and development. There was no strict correlation between academic modernization 
theory and modernization-as-policy, Latham argues. Rather the kind of thinking 
associated with modernization theory became a lens through which U.S. policymakers 
viewed the Third World.17 
Subsequent scholarship has teased out and complicated the rise of 
modernization-style thinking and traced it back further. David Ekbladh sees the era of 
modernization beginning in the 1930s and extending to the late 1960s. In response to 
the twin threats of Communism and Fascism, “a vital new formulation crystallized” in 
U.S. liberalism in the 1930s and manifested itself in “the big plan”. The “grand 
synecdoche” of modernization, Ekbladh argues, was dam construction, modelled on the 
United States’ Tennessee Valley Authority. Over the course of the next 30 years private 
citizens, philanthropic organizations, and the U.S. government exported this model to 
the Third World.18 Nick Cullather and Matthew Connelly have shown that it was NGOs 
and the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations who paved the way in the fields of 
agriculture, public health, and population control prior to 1945.19 After World War 
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Two, however, development acquired a new strategic rationale. Stephen Macekura and 
Amanda McVety show that President Harry Truman’s Point IV programme, beginning 
in 1949 and based on the notion that technical assistance would lead to economic and 
political development in a direction favourable to U.S. interests, laid the ground for the 
acceptance of modernization projects later on.20 
Particularly useful for the purposes of this dissertation are those studies which 
have examined the ways in which Third World actors received and reinterpreted U.S. 
ideas about modernization.21 These historians have shown that postcolonial elites may 
have shared modernization theorists’ faith in science, technology, and planning, but 
social scientists and American policymakers frequently found these elites did not follow 
their prescriptions to the letter. For the new leaders, development was much more about 
charting the quickest route from “underdevelopment” to modernity than it was a means 
of showing ideological commitment in the Cold War. Leaders in non-aligned India were 
as likely to adopt Soviet-style central planning as military leaders in U.S.-aligned 
Indonesia. Theorists and policymakers believed that economic convergence with the 
American model would lead to cultural convergence but found that modernizing nations 
often built on their historical, cultural and local particularities. Rather than simply 
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imposing their plans, U.S. policymakers had to achieve development goals by working 
through and negotiating projects with local power brokers.22 
Scholars have argued that the military corollary to modernization theory was 
counterinsurgency. Rather than focusing on the destruction of the enemy’s main forces, 
counterinsurgency operated at the village level and sought to eradicate the enemy’s 
political operatives, and win peasants over to the side of the government through 
political, social and economic reforms. For the Kennedy administration modernization 
and counterinsurgency seemed a promising formula for fighting the brushfire wars in 
the Global South.23 
In practice, the United States used modernization projects less for economic 
development and more for short-term political goals, including destabilizing moderate 
regimes and strengthening or facilitating the emergence of more authoritarian ones. 
Although modernization theorists had always demonstrated a fascination with the 
military as a modernizing institution, as the 1960s progressed the military appeared to 
some policymakers to be the only institution capable of conducting modernization 
projects, which in turn became increasingly violent and coercive. For Third World 
governments, modernization and counterinsurgency would allow them to project their 
power into the country’s interior. As such these projects channelled money to Third 
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World militaries, strengthening their role in national politics and paving the way for 
military-led coups.24 
 In general, studies of modernization have argued that these projects failed 
because of hubris. Taking James Scott’s critique of “high modernism” as their starting 
point, many of these scholars argue that those who designed modernization projects had 
faith in technocratic solutions that bore little applicability to local social, political, 
economic or cultural realities.25 
One critique of studies privileging modernization is that they conflate all 
development efforts with modernization theory, when recent scholarship has 
demonstrated U.S. approaches to development were considerably more pluralistic. 
Modernization theory was just one approach to the problem of postcolonial 
development.26 In the 1950s and 1960s, Edward Miller argues, U.S. development 
practitioners could be divided into “high” and “low modernists”. “High modernists” 
advocated large-scale, top-down projects that would transform the physical 
environment, inspiring awe in peasant societies. On the other hand, “low modernists” 
endorsed small-scale, bottom-up, participatory and, low-tech approaches such as land 
reform and community development. Miller highlights that these approaches often co-
existed. 
Daniel Immerwahr calls Miller’s low modernists “communitarians”. They saw 
community development as “development without modernization”. Whereas 
modernization schemes tended to be imposed by central institutions, community 
development decentralized decision-making. Such projects empowered local 
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communities to select and carry out their own development projects. This approach 
never dominated, Immerwahr concedes, but it helped shape the development plans of 
several postcolonial states. The attraction of community development for leaders in the 
global south was that it was economical and less dependent imports of Western 
technology and capital. Community development’s emphasis on self-help and self-
sufficiency allowed the new states to mobilize surplus rural labour at little cost. It also 
appealed to those Third World leaders who idealized village life and objected to the 
erasure of local cultures through urbanization and industrialization. Community 
development’s greatest failing, however, was that it often most benefitted local elites 
and never addressed unequal distributions of wealth and power. Most importantly for 
the purposes of this study, Immerwahr demonstrates that community development could 
become a tool for authoritarian governance. Advocates of community development saw 
such projects as a means of strengthening social solidarities at the village level. But in 
the Philippines, President Ferdinand Marcos inverted this, using community 
development to bypass provincial and municipal power holders and to reach directly 
into the villages. Community development, it seems, could be used to strengthen the 
centre, just as much as it could strengthen the periphery.27   
Modernization theory came under attack in the U.S. social sciences in the late 
1960s and foreign aid fell out of favour with the U.S. Congress.28 Yet, as one scholar 
argues, development in the late sixties and seventies only saw a shift away from large 
infrastructural projects to population control and Green Revolution technologies. The 
central tenets of “modernization theory-cum policy” continued to inform these efforts, 
and were backed by development institutions such as the United States’ Agency for 
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International Development (USAID), the World Bank, and philanthropic foundations.29 
Indeed, Nick Cullather argues that by the late 1960s the high modernism of the Green 
Revolution triumphed over community development and land reform. Immerwahr, on 
the other hand, shows that community development projects continued alongside 
modernization schemes in the late 1960s and early 1970s. This dissertation 
demonstrates that community development, modernization, and land reform could co-
occur as part of the same development package.  
Studies of the politics of nation-building and development in Vietnam have 
focused overwhelmingly on Ngo Dinh Diem’s First Republic (1955-1963). The 
orthodox interpretation argues that the United States “invented” South Vietnam and 
installed Ngo Dinh Diem as president. As such, Diem’s regime had no popular support 
and South Vietnam was not a viable political entity. In this reading Diem was a 
tradition-bound mandarin and his appeal to Americans lay largely in his Catholicism. 
George Herring argues that Diem “had no blueprint for building a modern nation or 
mobilizing his people”. The seeming political stability under Diem, David Anderson 
argues, convinced the Eisenhower administration that nation-building was working and 
such readings overlooked fundamental flaws in Diem’s regime including dependency, 
illegitimacy, and repression.30 
In recent years the historiography of the Vietnam War has undergone what one 
scholar has referred to as a “South Vietnamese turn”.31 Previously marginalised from 
the study of the war, historians are attempting to restore agency to the South 
Vietnamese state and society, viewing both as important players in shaping the course 
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and outcome of the conflict.32 The politics of nation-building and development has 
occupied a central place in this post-revisionist scholarship. Rather than viewing 
development as something American officials did to South Vietnam, as much of the 
orthodox literature on the war does, work employing Vietnamese archives has shown 
the importance of Vietnamese actors in these processes.  
In restoring agency to the South Vietnamese regime, these scholars have 
accepted many of the conclusions of orthodox historians about the failings of South 
Vietnam and the United States involvements but have provided a much richer and more 
nuanced account of the war. These scholars have challenged the orthodox view of Diem 
and have shown that his emergence as leader of South Vietnam was largely his own 
doing. Miller and Catton in particular argue that Diem was a conservative modernizer 
with a unique vision for South Vietnam, one which clashed with that of his American 
patrons. Although Diem appropriated and reinterpreted some aspects of community 
development and modernization theory, he melded these with the philosophies of 
Personalism and Confucianism, as well as his understanding of Vietnamese culture, 
conditions, and needs.  
The single greatest threat to the accomplishment of Diem’s nation-building 
goals was the growing insurgency within the South. During the First Indochina War 
(1946-1954), the Viet Minh, a communist-led nationalist group had built a broad anti-
colonial front. They assassinated landlords and French colonial officials, reduced rents, 
and redistributed land. This secured widespread support among the peasantry. Under the 
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terms of the 1954 Geneva Accords, Viet Minh cadres had been required to regroup 
north of the 17th parallel though many remained behind in the south. As Diem 
consolidated his rule in the late 1950s, these cadres began taking limited military 
actions against ARVN forces. But leaders in Hanoi were divided as to whether to focus 
on nation-building and development in the North or violent revolution in the South to 
unify the country. Under pressure from militant North-firsters as well as cadres in the 
south, and fearful that these might soon be wiped out, in January 1959 Hanoi endorsed 
the limited actions already underway in the South and began to send cadres down the 
Ho Chi Minh trail. At the Third Party Congress of the Vietnam Workers’ Party in 1960, 
Hanoi paved the way for the creation of the National Liberation Front, a resurrection of 
the Viet Minh strategy. The NLF developed a political and guerrilla infrastructure in the 
villages and once land tenure problems had been resolved, encouraged the adaptation of 
policy to local conditions. By incorporating villagers into various liberation 
associations, the NLF encouraged self-rule in the hamlets and consciousness about the 
struggle movement.33 
Diem’s development goals envisioned the mobilization of manpower by 
fostering a “spirit of voluntarism and self-sacrifice” among the population. Through a 
series of rural programmes- land development, Agrovilles, and Strategic Hamlets – 
Diem hoped to establish the GVN’s presence in the countryside, increase agricultural 
output, cement political loyalty to the Saigon regime, and gain strategic advantage 
against the communists.34 Diem’s preference for villagers’ self-sufficiency, however, 
meant that development projects were often under-resourced. As such, the burden of 
development projects fell on the peasantry, who did not always respond with 
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enthusiasm.35 Other scholars have highlighted the considerable pluralism of South 
Vietnamese society as a barrier to Diem’s goals. Jessica Chapman has shown that 
several politico-religious groups besides communists contested Diem’s rule. It was in 
opposition to these groups, she contends, that Diem established his authoritarian state.36 
The post-revisionists agree that Saigon’s development policies, particularly the regime’s 
exacting and coercive demands on peasants’ labour, and the suppression of political 
opposition played a significant role in the escalation of the war. Diem’s policies created 
a great deal of rural resentment and proved a boon to the insurgency.  
Writing in 1990, George Herring noted that “in much of the writing on the war, 
the South Vietnamese are conspicuous by their absence”. While this is no longer the 
case for the Diem years, the South Vietnamese continue to be side lined from the 
historical narrative after 1963 and, in particular, we have little knowledge of domestic 
politics and nation-building during the Second Republic.37 What we are left with is a 
rather flat caricature. Some histories acknowledge that some competent Vietnamese 
existed such as Kien Hoa Province Chief Tran Ngoc Chau, head of the National 
Training Centre Colonel Nguyen Be, and first Minister for Revolutionary Development 
Nguyen Duc Thang.38 Other scholars are divided as to whether the South Vietnamese 
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leaders were puppets, with one historian going so far as to say RVN leaders were 
merely “pawns” in the United States’ Cold War game, or whether their resistance, 
obstructionism, or incompetence were responsible for the United States’ failure in 
Vietnam.39 For some scholars, it was the absence of political leadership in Saigon that 
frustrated American attempts to build a nation in South Vietnam. The RVN, Jefferson 
Marquis tells us, “lacked strong, like-minded leaders with whom U.S. managers could 
collaborate in shaping a new, American-inspired political reality”. Fredrik Logevall says 
that there were some dedicated anti-Communist nationalists in South Vietnam, though 
never in sufficient numbers. “Overall, incompetence, corruption, and infighting 
characterized the political leadership in Saigon”. Others note that the U.S. struggled to 
achieve its goals in part because, as Herring says, “the United States could not get the 
South Vietnamese to do what they wanted… as their commitment increased, their 
leverage diminished”.40 Richard Hunt, in one of the most thorough studies of 
counterinsurgency in Vietnam, essentially concludes that the United States did not have 
enough leverage over the GVN.41 If the GVN leaders really were puppets, then it is 
understandable that they should be marginalized from the story. But if it is the case that 
the United States could not get RVN officials to do what they wanted them to do, then 
RVN agency, ideas, plans, and policies matter.  
In the years after 1963, the joint U.S.-South Vietnamese effort suffered from two 
critical flaws: the absence of a coherent counterinsurgency strategy and a crisis of 
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political legitimacy in Saigon. Not only was the GVN unable to stamp its authority on 
the countryside but it faced persistent opposition in the cities. Some scholars have 
identified this lack of legitimacy as one of the principle shortcomings of the U.S. war 
effort.42  
Between 1964 and 1968, one of the shortcomings of pacification was that it 
meant different things to different people and there was a never an overarching 
conceptual idea for how it should operate, nor could the United States and GVN even 
agree on a preferred term. U.S. and GVN officials disagreed as to the level at which to 
fight the war, whether it should focus on political operatives and guerrillas in the 
villages or main forces in the jungles and highlands. They also disagreed about the level 
of government through which policy should be executed, whether the Corps, province, 
district, or village. But broadly speaking pacification was a combination of counter-
insurgency and development. Generally, it meant concentrating on the villages rather 
than fighting the NLF and North Vietnamese main force troops by surrounding the 
population with government forces, rooting out communist political operatives, holding 
elections, delivering goods and services to the population, and carrying out development 
projects. All this sought to eliminate the grievances which encouraged peasants to take 
up arms, integrate these areas into the political and economic life of South Vietnam and 
to secure the loyalty of the population. The goal of pacification was therefore to 
establish the writ and legitimacy of the government in rural areas. The hope was that 
this would strengthen South Vietnam so much that the NLF and Hanoi would have to 
abandon their goals. Part of the resistance to this effort was that many ARVN and U.S. 
military leaders believed in military victory, whereas pacification could only offer a 
political victory or, more likely, a political stalemate. 
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Following Diem’s overthrow by his generals in November 1963, the Military 
Revolutionary Council abandoned the Strategic Hamlet Program but failed to replace it 
with a new counterinsurgency concept. Rural pacification largely came to a standstill as 
military leaders conspired against one another in as many as twenty coups and 
countercoups, with brief periods of civilian rule followed by military takeovers. Even 
those ARVN officers interested in pacification believed that it was a pointless 
endeavour as long as there was no meaningful government in Saigon. In late 1963, 
Hanoi endorsed the strategy of “General Offensive, General Uprising” which sought a 
rapid build-up of conventional military forces to precipitate the collapse of the Saigon 
regime prior to U.S. intervention.43 The GVN lost control of hundreds of villages in 
1964. In the autumn of that year, Hanoi began sending units of the People’s Army of 
Vietnam (PAVN), down the Ho Chi Minh Trail.44 By the following spring the GVN 
was close to collapse. In the absence of any leadership in Saigon the United States 
intervened and took control of the war. Fredrik Logevall and Andrew Preston show that 
the Johnson administration did this despite ambivalent domestic and allied opinion and 
many administration policymakers’ own reservations about the chances for success.45  
Orthodox historians maintain that U.S. military commander William 
Westmoreland did not understand counterinsurgency and as such fought the wrong war 
in Vietnam. Rather than seeking out the NLF’s operatives and establishing the GVN’s 
rule in the villages, Westmoreland launched “search and destroy” missions against NLF 
and PAVN main force units in the hope that he could generate a ‘body count’ so high 
that the U.S. and GVN would reach a “crossover point” where they killed more troops 
than the enemy could put into battle. These historians often cite the “Program for the 
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Long-Term Development and Pacification of Vietnam”, a 1966 study which was at least 
an implicit criticism of Westmoreland’s strategy and argued for a shift in priorities from 
the main force war to the villages, as well as social and political reform.46 More 
recently, historians Gregory Daddis and Andrew Birtle have argued that Westmoreland 
developed a much more comprehensive strategy than has ordinarily been accepted 
which included aspects of counterinsurgency, civic action, and attempts to win over the 
South Vietnamese population. Both Daddis and Birtle argue that Westmoreland’s 
strategy was in keeping with the main tenets of PROVN and that no strategy could 
focus exclusively on counterinsurgency without first taking on the major units of the 
NLF and PAVN. Daddis concludes it is possible to devise a sound strategy and still 
lose.47  
Pacification received something of a boost in the second half of 1965 with the 
return of a semblance of political stability in Saigon. In June 1965, a faction of “Young 
Turks” came to power, with Air Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky and General Nguyen Van 
Thieu at the helm as Prime Minister and Chief of State respectively. Ky and Thieu 
showed more interest in pacification than any GVN leaders since Diem. Ky appointed 
Nguyen Duc Thang as Minister of Rural Construction, who one scholar says was the 
only ARVN general that U.S. officials “universally recognized to be exceptional”. In 
January 1966, Thang formed the Rural Development (RD) cadre which became the 
cornerstone of Vietnamese pacification efforts until the Tet Offensive. Based on a 
concept developed by Kien Hoa province chief Tran Ngoc Chau and the CIA’s Political 
Action Teams, RD consisted of armed and mobile 59 person teams trained in nationalist 
ideology at the National Cadre Training Centre in Vung Tau.48 The RD cadres’ goal 
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was to win the rural population over to the side of the government. Once an area had 
been secured, RD cadres carried out “a staggering array of tasks” including restoring 
local government, enlisting the participation of the villagers in community self-help 
projects, providing medical assistance, and increasing access to agricultural credit. 
However, RD teams suffered from poor political education and from high attrition and 
desertion rates. By the end of 1966 the government could claim to have secured only 
one third of the country’s hamlets.49 Senior ARVN officers continued to show little 
interest in pacification while South Vietnam’s four Corps commanders ran their areas 
like personal fiefdoms and controlled the appointment of province and district chiefs. 
Thang, in particular, believed that only by decreasing the power of the Corps 
Commanders could Saigon “exert control throughout the country”.50 
At the Honolulu Conference in February 1966, Johnson demanded that U.S. 
officials and the GVN pay greater attention to pacification. For Johnson, development 
might legitimise his war and offered a means of directly countering the insurgency in 
the southern countryside. U.S. officials tended to respond to such exhortations by 
focusing on the organizational mechanisms of pacification. Each U.S. agency involved 
in pacification jealously guarded its sphere of influence and there was almost a total 
lack of coordination among them. But the focus on management meant little critical 
reflection on the underlying premises and assumptions of pacification. Following three 
conferences - at Honolulu in February 1966, Manila in October 1966, and Guam in 
March 1967- pacification received renewed emphasis as the GVN made promises to 
dedicate more resources to the effort and the U.S. managerial machinery was 
reorganized. This culminated with the establishment of Civil Operations and 
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Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) in May 1967. CORDS was integrated 
into the U.S. military command with Robert Komer, serving as Westmoreland’s civilian 
deputy, taking responsibility for the overall management of pacification. CORDS 
placed U.S. military and civilian advisers alongside their South Vietnamese 
counterparts down to the district level. USAID continued to run economic stabilization, 
public works and public health. This remained the way the U.S. pacification and 
development machinery was organized until 1973.51  
The managerial machinery was just one shortcoming of pacification, however. 
The U.S. and GVN failed to develop an overarching strategic concept for pacification. 
Equally as problematic, between 1965 and 1968 pacification projects continued to suffer 
from a lack of GVN and ARVN interest. Where GVN officials did show interest, 
projects designed in Saigon or in the province and district capitals were imposed on 
rural villages and lacked popular participation. Unlike the redistributive policies of the 
NLF, these projects at best focused on boosting rural incomes but left the social 
relations of rural South Vietnam unchanged. Furthermore, so much of the countryside 
was either firmly in the NLF’s hands or was so heavily contested that RD cadres could 
only operate in about 40% of the country and in many areas pacification and 
development were not possible at all. 
With increased rural security after the Tet Offensive, pacification would assume 
a different character as South Vietnamese leaders took greater interest in the subject and 
developed a more coherent conceptual approach. Rather than simply pumping money 
into the country’s villages this new approach sought to purposely undermine the power 
of the Corps Commanders and the province and district chiefs, and instead emphasised 
popular mobilization, decentralization and socio-economic reform at the village level. 
The key change after Tet was the prospect of political competition with the NLF. This 
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compelled Saigon’s leaders to take pacification more seriously as a means of 
maintaining the regime in power, establish the authority of the government across the 
country, and increasing its popular legitimacy and a base of support in the countryside. 
 
While the ARVN and U.S. military tried to get to grips with counterinsurgency 
and development in the countryside, the GVN’s political position in the cities remained 
fragile. In the years after Diem’s overthrow, successive governments faced vocal 
student and Buddhist opposition. Much of this popular opposition to the government 
was based on its illegitimacy. Certainly, many objected to the government’s stance on 
the war, but conflict also centred on the transition to legal and constitutional 
government as well as the distribution of political power among different civilian and 
military groups, with the religious and regional identities they carried.52  
The clearest indication of the GVN’s difficulty establishing its authority and 
legitimacy in urban areas prior to the Tet Offensive was the 1966 Buddhist “Struggle 
Movement” in the northern provinces of the country. In response to the military’s 
continued monopoly on power, these protesters demanded the return of legal and 
constitutional government and the participation of the NLF in political life. Further 
illustrating Saigon’s difficulties in asserting its power throughout the country, the local 
Corps Commander Nguyen Chanh Thi, sided with the protesters, as did his replacement, 
and dissident ARVN units soon promised to resist any effort by Saigon to reassert its 
control in the north.53 
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 Although the GVN soon moved against the dissident units and crushed the 
protest movement, the combination of U.S. and civilian Vietnamese demands for the 
return of a legal government compelled the regime to hold elections for a constituent 
assembly. Despite CIA meddling and a Buddhist boycott, the September 1966 election 
had a respectable turn out and returned a mix of regional and religious representation. 
Many politically active Vietnamese saw the election as positive manifestation of the 
military’s willingness to return to legitimate rule. Nonetheless, the Military Directorate 
made it clear that it would not tolerate a challenge to the military’s role in politics and 
the Constituent Assembly considerably scaled back proposals which would have 
endowed the legislature with greater powers. Even so, the proposed National Assembly 
would still have some real authority if the executive branch proved unable to capture 
it.54 
 The Constitution of the Second Republic of Vietnam was promulgated on 1 
April 1967. It called for presidential elections and, problematically for the United 
States, both Ky and Thieu planned to run. If there was to be a military victory, Ky was 
the preferred candidate for most U.S. officials. A Thieu victory, two State Department 
staffers noted, “would be considered a victory for the status quo… and for conservatism 
in the political, economic, and social fields”. On the other hand, one scholar argues, 
U.S. officials were virtually unanimous that a joint Ky-Thieu ticket would be disastrous 
because it would make the electoral competition impossible for civilian candidates and 
would play extremely badly in South Vietnam and internationally. But despite the 
exhortations of Ky’s supporters and U.S. officials, Thieu refused to step aside.55 
 The senior generals met at an Armed Forces Council meeting in June and came 
to an agreement that U.S. officials had feared: Thieu would head the military ticket with 
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Ky as his Vice Presidential candidate. The generals agreed that as president Thieu 
would be a “figurehead” and Vice President Ky would be “de facto in command”. As a 
result of his refusal to step aside in the interest of military unity, Thieu had suffered a 
loss of prestige among the generals for “his total preoccupation with and concentration 
of his own personal ambitions”.56 The generals also drew up a plan for a “Secret 
Military Committee” to maintain control of government after the election, described as 
“a scheme for ‘guided democracy’ in which half a dozen generals would decide finally 
what is good and bad for the country”.57 
Thieu and Ky used the GVN machinery to get out the vote and barred some 
potentially popular candidates from running. The remaining 17 civilian candidates had 
few campaign funds and the GVN deliberately obstructed their campaigning.58 On 
election day the Thieu-Ky ticket won 35% of the vote, much less than U.S. officials 
expected and much to the despair of several candidates who condemned the military 
regime’s fraudulent practices.59 The military victory was somewhat ameliorated by the 
promulgation of the constitution and the return of a legal government. Phan Quang Dan, 
imprisoned by Diem’s regime for three years in the early 1960s, might have spoken for 
many civilian non-Communists when he said that Thieu “must recognize that we are all 
behind him, that this is a time for bold leadership and that if such leadership is provided 
there would be few genuine nationalists who oppose him”.60 Many of the civilians who 
would join the government in subsequent years, Dan included, had resigned themselves 
to a permanent military regime with a veneer of civilian participation.  
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There was, therefore, some cause for optimism in Washington in the autumn of 
1967. The United States had finally reorganized its pacification management machinery 
under a single civilian authority and integrated it into the military chain of command. 
Even if the election had been of questionable transparency, it did appear to herald the 
return to constitutional and stable government in Saigon after years of coups and 
outright illegitimate rule. Worryingly, however, it appeared that the Thieu-Ky rivalry 
would continue to grow. Almost immediately after the election Thieu moved to isolate 
his Vice President from decision-making. The U.S. administration was acutely aware of 
the continued problems of public perception of its ally and the war effort in the United 
States. Washington therefore passed a message to Saigon from Johnson requesting that 
Bunker, Komer and Westmoreland “search urgently for occasions to present sound 
evidence of progress in Vietnam”. Joining the public relations campaign back in 
Washington, on November 21 Westmoreland told an audience at the National Press 
Club that the United States had reached a point “where the end begins to come into 
view”.61  
The Tet Offensive shattered these illusions, compelling the Johnson 
administration to reassess its strategy and to abandon hope of military victory. Facing 
sharp divisions within his administration, a huge erosion of public support, and 
Democrat challengers to his presidency, on March 31 Johnson announced a partial 
bombing halt and reiterated his previous offers for peace, as well as announcing that he 
would not run in the 1968 election. Exploratory peace talks began between U.S. and 
North Vietnamese representatives in Paris in May but made no progress as neither side 
had any intention of offering substantive concessions.62 
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The beginning of the talks raised the possibility of a cease-fire and political 
settlement to the war. With this in mind, each side geared up for political competition. 
The NLF began to establish “liberation committees” in the countryside to enhance its 
claim to represent the South Vietnamese people.63 Another NLF front group, the 
Alliance for National, Democratic and Peace Forces sent operatives to urban centres to 
mobilize support for a coalition government. Each of these moves provoked 
considerable anxiety in Saigon. The GVN feared that NLF participation in the peace 
talks would confer legitimacy on an illegal organization and constitute the first step 
toward a coalition. When the United States and North Vietnam agreed to expanded four 
party talks in October 1968, Saigon therefore refused to send representatives to Paris.64 
Robert Komer and his deputy William Colby believed that they had the best 
strategy for the political contest with the NLF. Following the Tet Offensive, Hanoi 
ordered NLF forces to continue their assaults against South Vietnam’s cities, resulting 
in devastating casualties. As they retreated after the failed “mini-Tet” offensives in May 
and August, the United States subjected them to massive B52 bombings. U.S. and 
ARVN forces then leapfrogged NLF units, attacking them from the rear as well as 
assassinating NLF political operatives who had surfaced during the offensives.65 This 
devastating violence created a political vacuum in many parts of the countryside and 
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with the prospect of a ceasefire in place, Komer and Colby wanted the GVN to fill this 
vacuum by rapidly extending its control into the countryside. 
Both Colby and Komer were concerned, however, that the U.S. military did not 
understand the fundamental ways in which the war had changed since Tet and with the 
initiation of negotiations. In mid-September, Colby therefore briefed U.S. military 
leaders that the purpose of the Liberation Committees was to support Communist claims 
of political legitimacy and authority in the countryside during the peace talks. The 
solution was “a vigorous extension of security and political presence by the 
government, with American support” in order “to meet any VC political challenge to 
[the GVN’s] sovereignty”. This would be achieved by local security forces, while the 
GVN would establish “democratic legitimacy in the villages” to counter the claims of 
the Liberation Committees. Westmoreland’s successor, General Creighton Abrams, 
endorsed Colby’s reasoning.66 
If some U.S. officials like Colby believed that the GVN had to extend its 
authority into the villages, they believed that building a strong, nationwide, anti-
Communist political party was the other side of the same coin. Much of the time this 
effort received the priority attention of the U.S. embassy, the CIA station, and Colby 
himself. Indeed, far from the neat picture of village-based pacification that Colby paints 
in his memoirs, his initial reaction to the Tet Offensive was very different. In the days 
immediately after the offensive, a group of CIA officers known as “the brethren”, 
including Colby, composed a memo known as “Operation Shock” in which condemned 
the GVN as incompetent, corrupt, and uncommitted to the war effort. They 
recommended that Thieu be given 100 days to get the GVN house in order and if he 
failed to do so the United States should replace him and reserve its position on further 
aid. During the hundred day period Ky would be charged with organizing a political 
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front uniting all anti-Communists ‘‘to develop the country and free it of Viet Cong 
terror”.67  
The question of how to organize non-Communist political forces in South 
Vietnam for political competition with the Communists was one of the main points of 
contention between Thieu and the United States, and an area in which U.S. officials 
found they had little leverage and little success. CIA analysts had long complained that 
there was a lack of national political cohesion in South Vietnam, with a multiplicity of 
urban-based political groups each seeking only to further their narrow goals.68 U.S. 
embassy and CIA officials repeatedly pressured Thieu to unite South Vietnam’s non-
Communist elites. The preferred method was anti-Communist fronts, coalitions of 
fragmented political parties and trade unions which might become the foundation for a 
broad-based nationwide political party that could get behind the GVN. Thieu’s office, 
on the other hand, was sceptical of the unity, representation and leadership abilities of 
such groups.69 So while Thieu showed some interest in such fronts, it was largely to 
please the United States. In May 1968 he launched the Lien Minh, an umbrella group 
comprised of a labour union and two anti-Communist fronts which had formed just after 
the Tet Offensive. Bunker complained that Thieu offered no leadership to the group. 
When the ambassador asked Thieu to use the GVN machinery to support the group, 
Thieu deflected, telling Bunker he would prefer to see the Lien Minh grow naturally and 
that he wanted people to view it as independent of the government.70  
No doubt, Thieu squandered chances for anti-Communist unity. The return to 
constitutional government in 1967 combined with the shocks of the Tet Offensive in 
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1968 offered a much greater reason for anti-Communists to unite. Certainly, he viewed 
strong political parties and front groups in Saigon as threats to his authority but he also 
doubted that these factions could be united. Instead, Thieu had a very different vision of 
governance, one that he believed was more fitting for Vietnamese society than Western 
concepts of political organization and more appropriate in the contest against the 
Communists. Thieu wanted to bypass elite Saigon politics, strengthen the executive and 
devolve limited authority down to the village level. Development was a crucial 
component of this vision of governance because popular participation in development 
projects would create a sense of community, offering the peasantry an alternative to 
participation in national and pluralistic party politics. The goal was a mobilized but 
depoliticised population.  
Thieu repeatedly made clear to his U.S. patrons what his intentions were for 
political organization. In a meeting with Secretary of Defence Melvin Laird in March 
1969, Thieu said South Vietnam had more politicians than businessmen and they 
refused to work together. Thieu said he would try to unite them but first, and more 
importantly, he believed that “building a base in the countryside” through hamlet and 
village elections and development projects was more important than uniting politicians 
in Saigon, many of whom had no popular following. “I have called for a revolution in 
the countryside to win popular support” Thieu told Laird.71  
U.S. officials continued to push for non-Communist fronts even after Thieu had 
elaborated and had begun to implement his vision of governance. In May 1970, Bunker 
again asked Thieu about the prospects that the parties of his anti-Communist front might 
finally cooperate. Thieu was not enthusiastic about “the old political leaders… the old 
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trees have to die away and new trees grow up in their place”.  Instead, Thieu told 
Bunker: 
 
the way to develop political organization and support for the government 
was to begin at the village level through the development of village government, 
giving villages autonomy, getting the people involved in their own development 
efforts; through the Land to the Tiller program; through the organization of 
cooperatives of various kinds; getting the people to feel that they need each 
other and need the government; in turn the government should support them.72  
 
Bunker appears to have gotten the message, reporting to Nixon shortly after that 
“Thieu has taken the position that the politicians must first demonstrate their ability to 
work together and to mobilize the masses at the village and hamlet level for the political 
competition to come”.73 
For Thieu, this kind of village-based development could bulwark his 
authoritarian governance without encouraging genuine democracy or the nurturing of a 
political elite that might threaten the stability of his regime. In this respect there were 
valuable lessons to be learned from other authoritarian states. Many South Vietnamese 
political elites admired other anti-Communist governments because they believed 
authoritarianism was a preferable form of social organization and political decision-
making. These states appeared to achieve the goals of development more efficiently 
because of the absence of political pluralism. Pham Kim Ngoc, the South Vietnamese 
Minister of Economy noted his admiration for Singapore’s “authoritarian government” 
because it could “get things done without too much politicking”.74 In the middle of 1968 
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a group of prominent South Vietnamese calling themselves the National Anti-
Communist Forces wrote to Thieu, condemning his plan to appoint the supposedly too 
moderate Tran Van Huong as Prime Minister. “We believe”, they wrote, “the present 
situation of the country requires a Hitler (though he was a dictator) or a Mustapha 
Kemal (though he was licentious) in order to save the day”.75 Authoritarian leaders, it 
seemed, got results. 
South Vietnam’s leaders justified their authoritarianism by arguing that the 
Vietnamese people were not ready for Western-style, liberal democracy and that, in any 
case, the RVN was a democracy of sorts. Nguyen Phut Tan, author of a then widely 
cited history of modern Vietnam and an expert in the Office of the Special Assistant for 
Political and Cultural Research in the Presidential Palace, argued that the West had 
taken many centuries to reach “political maturity and active democratic freedoms”. 
“Freedom and political equality require the political maturity of the entire population”, 
Tan noted, “… in other words, the degree of freedom and equality goes with this level 
of maturity”.76 In an interview with journalist Oriana Fallaci in January 1973 Thieu said 
that “democracy as they have it in America, or as you have it in Europe, cannot exist 
here yet. We’re not ready for it”. Nonetheless he also claimed that South Vietnam was 
“the most democratic country” when compared to others in the region. “Maybe not as 
democratic as you would like”, Thieu said “but democracy is not a standard that can be 
applied in an identical way everywhere”. 77 
In some respects, Thieu was not being disingenuous. In the years after the Tet 
Offensive the GVN would implement its vision of governance through three pillars of 
rural development: “restoring village traditions, implementing the democratic rule of 
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law, and modernizing rural life”.78 In 1967 the GVN re-established hamlet and village 
elections restoring the tradition of village autonomy for the first time since Diem and 
Nhu, having abolished these elections in 1956, briefly reinstituted them in strategic 
hamlets.79 The idea was also to introduce limited democracy; peasants could usually 
only vote for one of two or three approved candidates. The government would greatly 
expand these elections in subsequent years. Modernizing rural life on the other hand 
included the introduction of new high-yield rice varieties, fertilizer, agricultural credit, 
and land reform to boost rural incomes, giving peasants another reason to support the 
government. In attempting to restore tradition and modernize life, the GVN shared with 
other postcolonial elites the tendency to both romanticise rural life and desire to reform 
it. 
As Colby and Komer were formulating their ideas for the post-Tet political 
competition, the GVN was doing the same. In a cabinet meeting in August 1968 GVN 
leaders discussed rural development plans for the following year. Rather than pouring 
resources into insecure areas as in the past, the government would focus on restoring 
security in these areas, applying only a light development touch. Elsewhere, the 
government would focus its development efforts on consolidating villages that had 
relatively good security and had held local elections. In these villages the GVN would 
encourage “the full participation of the people”, creating opportunities for self-
government and allowing villagers to select development projects through community 
consensus. This marked a significant departure from previous strategies whereby 
province officials imposed programs on distant villages; it also marked a shift from 
modernization to community development. But along with the “benefits” of 
“community development” was the “responsibility” of “community security”. Villagers 
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would be expected to join the People’s Self-Defence Forces to fight against the 
Communists, which along with the better equipped Popular Forces and government 
cadres were now placed under the authority of the popularly elected village chief.80 By 
restoring elections, encouraging community development projects, and forming PSDF 
units, Saigon sought to implement a model of decentralized governance that would 
allow peasants to participate in self-government, self-development and self-defence. 
In a series of seminars in each of South Vietnam’s four military regions in the 
late summer and early autumn of 1968 Thieu drove these points home. He told his 
commanders that if the Communists saw that they could not win militarily, they would 
turn to political war. The GVN’s pacification and development program would therefore 
decide “the survival of the nation in a time of war as well as peace”. The key elements 
were territorial security, strong local government, and development projects to improve 
rural living standards and to revive the rural economy. “We must base [social values]” 
Thieu told his province chiefs “on the following standard: community security and 
community prosperity within which the citizens voluntarily participate in programmes 
that bring benefits to their villages and their families”.81 Once these programmes had 
been satisfactorily completed, “one man, one vote” elections could occur. The people 
would vote for anti-Communist nationalists and South Vietnam “will have a strong, 
national government”.82 Thieu was evidently already thinking in terms of political 
competition even if he had not yet settled on the exact modalities.  
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Although the GVN had begun to outline a new vision for counterinsurgency and 
development in the countryside, as of the autumn of 1968 Thieu was still thinking in 
terms of consolidation. U.S. officials, on the other hand, wanted urgency. Pacification 
was placed on hold for months after Tet despite Komer’s attempts to persuade Thieu to 
take the offensive. In the face of continued NLF and North Vietnamese attacks against 
urban areas Thieu preferred to concentrate on reconstruction and defence of the cities. 
Having secured Abrams’ endorsement and aware of Thieu’s preference for 
consolidation, on October 1 Komer and Colby sought to convince the RVN president of 
the merits of an Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC). Based on the CORDS-
designed Hamlet Evaluation System, the goal of the APC would be to consolidate 
control in A, B, and C-rated hamlets and upgrade 1,000 less secure D and E hamlets to a 
minimum C rating by the end of January 1969.83 Although concerned that the APC 
might stretch development cadres thin and possibly lead to regression in secure areas, 
Thieu endorsed the campaign plan. Indeed, while the Americans emphasized local 
security and attacks on the NLF infrastructure, Thieu’s main focus was on the 
development aspects of the campaign. He recommended that in the more secure A, B 
and C hamlets territorial forces would provide security while the GVN pursued “a 
program of perfect administration and development”. In D and E hamlets, where there 
was to be no PSDF, ARVN regular forces would provide a screen for RF troops while 
RD cadres conducted “limited political organization and administration” and “limited 
development programs”. In the NLF controlled V hamlets the ARVN would continue to 
bombard the NLF and, aside from periodic civic action, there would be no political or 
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development efforts. This remained the pattern of development for the next several 
years.84  
U.S. and ARVN forces launched the APC on November 1. They established 
rural security posts in villages’ central hamlets and along roads and canals and regained 
control of many NLF areas in the countryside. In other areas outlying hamlets were 
bombed and shelled, forcing the population in hamlets previously controlled by the 
revolutionary forces to relocate around GVN posts.85 While historians have often 
written about South Vietnam’s urban refugee crisis it is quite likely that the majority of 
population displacement in these years, particularly in the Mekong Delta, actually 
occurred within individual villages as peasants were forced to abandon these outlying 
hamlets.86 In pacified hamlets 16-17 and 39-50 year old males were made to join the 
PSDF, while women and children served as medics and porters. The idea was to compel 
villagers to identify with the GVN but it placed everyone on the battle lines. Nineteen 
sixty-eight also saw the reinvigoration of the Phoenix programme, an effort to better 
coordinate South Vietnam’s disparate intelligence services and use this information to 
capture or kill the NLF’s political operatives and sympathisers. RVN citizens were 
expected to contribute to this intelligence gathering effort, further exposing non-
combatants to violence. It was no longer so easy to be a ‘fence-sitter’. 
Facing this onslaught, NLF and PAVN units strategically retreated over South 
Vietnam’s borders, losing contact with their support base. Other units disobeyed orders 
to retreat. Instead they broke down into village and hamlet sized units, operating in 
depopulated areas, focusing their attacks on the PSDF and the territorial forces, and 
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proselytizing among those villagers they could still reach. While the PAVN remained a 
formidable force, particularly in the northern provinces, for the moment the NLF was 
exhausted. This was especially true in the Delta, the most densely populated part of the 
country and its surplus rice-producing area. Historically restive Long An province was 
pacified by 1969 and Binh Duong in 1970. In 1971, David Elliott writes, “the revolution 
reached its lowest ebb in the conflict”.87 
While there were contradictions between rural violence and development, the 
GVN believed it could extend its reach down to the villages, gain peasant loyalty and 
encourage a sense of anti-Communist community and economic growth by 
concentrating development efforts on those areas of the country that Saigon controlled. 
Following the APC the government estimated that it controlled almost 80% of the 
population. In these areas projects would be carried out “in the spirit of community 
development” with the principle that “the people do, the government helps, and the 
cadres guide” [dân làm, chính phủ giúp và cán bộ hướng dẫn].88 With this goal in mind, 
in 1969 the GVN launched its major community development effort, the Village Self-
Development Program, which devolved VN$1,000,000 (about US$8,500) down to 
every village that had held elections. Villagers would meet at assemblies to discuss and 
vote on local development projects such as animal husbandry, sanitation, or classroom 
construction. They would then supplement central government funds with their own 
money and labour. The goal was to restore “the vitality and authority of the villages 
through democratic activities of the rural people”.89  
                                                
87 Long, ‘The Tet Offensive and its Aftermath’, 89-123; Elliott, The Vietnamese War, vol. 2, 1126, 1220-
1245. 
88 ‘Briefing summarising the Special Pacification Offensive and the 1969 Pacification and Construction 
Plan’ [Bản Thuyết trình về Tổng Kết kế hoạch Tấn Công Bình Định Đặc Biệt và Kế Hoạch Bình Định 
Xây Dựng năm 1969], 27 February 1969, folder 92, PTTDNCH-TTLTQGII; ‘Guidance on the 
Pacification and Construction Policy for 1969’ [Huấn thị chỉ đạo đường lối ‘Bình Định và Xây Dựng’ cho 
năm 1969], undated, folder 110, PTTDNCH-TTLTQGII. 
89 ‘Chương trình tự túc phát triển xã’ [Village Self-Development Program], 24 February 1969, folder 109, 
PTTDNCH-TTLTQGII. 
53 
 
Richard Nixon came to office in 1969 promising to end the war and achieve a 
“peace with honour” but his administration spent the first several months searching for a 
strategy. Civilian agencies, the U.S. military, and the embassy in Saigon were in general 
agreement that the South Vietnamese military could not, in the spring of 1969 or “in the 
foreseeable future”, stand up to a combined NLF/PAVN threat, but they were divided as 
to whether the ARVN could even handle the NLF threat without continued U.S. 
assistance. The gains that had been made in pacification were tenuous and partly the 
result of Hanoi’s strategic retrenchment. Building up the ARVN was necessary but a 
political settlement was now the most likely outcome and the United States’ focus 
“needs to be increasingly on political actions”. All agencies agreed that political 
mobilization on the anti-Communist side was “both the most crucial and weakest area” 
and its success would be based “primarily on the extent to which [the GVN] can provide 
security, an alternative to the NLF, and social and economic progress”.90 
By the autumn of 1969, Nixon had finally settled on the policy of 
“Vietnamization”, whereby the United States would withdraw troops as South 
Vietnamese forces grew and assumed a greater burden of the fighting. Nixon had asked 
for Thieu’s endorsement of Vietnamization when the two leaders met at Midway in 
June 1969. Aware of the complicated domestic political climate that the Nixon 
administration faced in the U.S., and having told Secretary of Defence Melvin Laird in 
March that he supported an American drawdown, Thieu agreed. The GVN found it 
easier to acquiesce in light of the military and pacification successes of 1968 and 1969. 
Furthermore, the GVN was willing to accept Vietnamization in the expectation that U.S. 
military and economic assistance would continue for some time to come and that 
withdrawals would not proceed at such a pace as to endanger the GVN.91  
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Despite continued U.S. aid, Vietnamization would place enormous demands on 
the RVN’s manpower and material resources, intensifying the need for self-sufficiency. 
Therefore, in the conviction that pacification in countryside was moving in the right 
direction, in 1969 and 1970 the GVN began to turn its attention to other areas of 
concern, including the economy, agricultural modernization and land reform, public 
health projects, and pacification and development in the cities. Each of these measures 
sought to win people over to the side of the government, generate economic growth, 
increase the self-sufficiency of villages and urban neighbourhoods, and contribute to the 
long-term viability of the RVN. It is to these issues that this dissertation now turns. 
Chapter one examines efforts at economic reform during the final years of the 
war. By the late 1960s South Vietnam was critically dependent on U.S. economic aid. 
Vietnamization would not only require the South Vietnamese to take over a larger 
burden of the fighting but also meant greater South Vietnamese self-financing. If the 
GVN could not generate more of its own resources and reduce its dependence on U.S. 
aid, then the state might face economic collapse and counterinsurgency projects at the 
village level would prove irrelevant. This chapter demonstrates the pluralism and 
contested nature of economic reform in South Vietnam during the final years of the war. 
Economic reform was a negotiated process both within and between the United States 
and South Vietnamese governments. U.S. policymakers were divided as to whether the 
United States’ goals were best served by long-term development or short-term 
stabilization. Saigon’s economic policymakers also disagreed among themselves, with 
some preferring the use of market mechanisms while others saw an important role for 
the state. Regardless of their stand, all South Vietnamese economic officials looked to 
Taiwan and South Korea as their key models for economic development. Despite these 
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contested visions, the GVN had some modest successes in this field up to 1972. But the 
economy was then badly hit by a combination of renewed enemy offensives, reductions 
in economic aid, and the shocks of the global economy in the early 1970s. Saigon 
weathered these storms but the record shows that the Thieu regime could not have 
remained in power after 1975 without large, though gradually declining, volumes of 
U.S. and international aid. 
 If the GVN were to win the war through security and development it had to do 
so in the country’s villages. The next two chapters demonstrate the regime’s agriculture 
and public health policies. In both fields, the GVN used bottom up and top-down 
strategies to transform the economic and social behaviour and political identities of 
Vietnamese peasants. Saigon’s agricultural development and public health policies were 
once again the result of an active engagement with other anti-Communist states in East 
Asia. Chapter two explores Saigon’s use of miracle rice, community development, 
agricultural credit, and land reform. It argues that each of these policies contributed to 
significant rural change including increased output, greater commercialization of 
agriculture, and rural prosperity. But Saigon struggled to transform this change into 
political support or economic growth. Chapter three explores the government’s public 
health policies. In particular, it focuses on the Sanitary Hamlet Programme, an attempt 
to reform the hygienic practices of peasant families, and a population planning 
programme, promoted by a South Vietnamese NGO and its GVN and international 
supporters. In its attempt to reform hygienic practices, the Sanitary Hamlet Programme 
highlights the continuities of colonial and postcolonial public health projects, while 
pointing to the ways in which postcolonial elites could both idealize and be repelled by 
village life. This programme also demonstrates the tensions between community 
development and modernization in the sense that it was both participatory and aimed to 
radically modernize rural practices. Population planning advocacy in the RVN 
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demonstrates the power of particular global development ideas regardless of local 
conditions and needs. Certain elites believed that population planning was simply 
something that postcolonial states did. They believed it was essential to the RVN’s 
economic survival because social science and the international population control 
movement said it was so. This was in spite of South Vietnam’s inadequate demographic 
data and much more immediate threats to the survival of the state.  
Chapter four examines the intersections of war and development in South 
Vietnam’s cities, particularly in Saigon. Following the Tet Offensive, the South 
Vietnamese-U.S. effort in the cities focused on reconstruction and security. By 1970, 
the GVN and U.S. team in South Vietnam believed that security in the countryside had 
so improved that it was time to turn attention to urban areas. At first, in a trend that 
mirrored the War on Poverty in the United States, the GVN imported its rural 
development strategy into the cities. This effort focused on neighbourhood militias and 
popularly-selected community development projects. GVN urban planners also 
preferred deurbanizing strategies, building new towns or encouraging the growth of 
smaller ones. By 1971 however, U.S. officials were convinced that neither community 
development nor deurbanization were likely to resolve South Vietnam’s urban crisis and 
began to advocate more comprehensive urban and regional planning as the solution. 
This shift in approach reflected global trends in urban development. 
 Macroeconomics, agriculture, public health, and urban development were four 
areas of key concern to social scientists and development practitioners in the middle 
decades of the 20th century. These cases studies allow us to examine development on a 
number of different levels. Firstly, there are few examinations of development in the 
Nixon years but these four case studies allow us to see how U.S. paradigms and 
priorities shifted in these particular fields. Secondly, examining these case studies in 
South Vietnam allows us to explore the ways in which the RVN and U.S. officials in 
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Vietnam responded to global development trends. Finally, each chapter casts light on 
agency in the U.S.-South Vietnamese relationship, explaining where the United States 
predominated and where South Vietnamese were able to implement their ideas. 
 This dissertation employs material from archives in Vietnam and the United 
States. It is based on research at the Johnson, Nixon and Ford Libraries as well as 
extensive research in the CORDS papers at the National Archives in College Park, 
Maryland. Documents from the Republic of Vietnam are housed in National Archives 
Center II in Ho Chi Minh City. I make use of the Office of the President of the Second 
Republic collection as well as the Office of the Prime Minister, the Security and 
Development Council, the Ministry of Public Works, and the Ministry of Public Health 
collections. The records of some ministries are not yet available to researchers but many 
of the most important documents produced by these ministries passed through the 
President and Prime Minister’s offices. Although the above-listed collections are open 
to researchers and finding aids are available, there are limitations to the amount material 
researchers can gather. These include total restrictions on photography, limits on 
photocopying and delays in processing requests. Given the differences in procedural 
arrangements between Vietnamese and U.S. archives, it is inevitable that researchers 
will end up with much larger quantities of material from the U.S. side than the 
Vietnamese. Still, combining these Vietnamese materials with those from the United 
States it is possible to see where U.S. and South Vietnamese officials agreed or 
disagreed about nation-building and development goals, and to see whose vision won 
out. 
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Chapter One 
Contested Visions: the Politics of Economic Reform in 
South Vietnam 
 
Writing to Gerald Ford in September 1974, Nguyen Van Thieu urged the U.S. 
president to convince the U.S. Congress to increase military and economic assistance to 
South Vietnam, so that it might achieve “an economic take-off”.92 Thieu’s use of 
modernization theorist Walt Rostow’s term for the point at which developing nations 
begin the transition to economic maturity must have seemed somewhat anachronistic to 
Ford. Not since 1968 had a man who believed in the efficacy of modernization theory 
occupied the White House. The theory had informed U.S. relations with the developing 
world during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations but by the time Nixon took 
office this was no longer the case. Economic modernization as a nation-building tool in 
the postcolonial world, which held such appeal in the highest levels of the Kennedy and 
Johnson administrations, was of little concern in the realpolitik-obsessed Nixon and 
Ford White House.93 This reflected a shift within the social sciences themselves. By 
1970, social scientists from all sides of the political spectrum were attacking 
modernization theory and, no longer confident in the discourse of development that they 
had championed in the early 1960s, modernization theorists were submitting their ideas 
to thorough re-examination. 
Thieu’s use of Rostow’s rhetoric was also misleading. In the 1970s the main 
tenets of modernization-as-development, if not academic modernization theory itself, 
continued to inform projects for many Third World states and international development 
institutions. But whereas modernization theorists in the 1950s and 1960s offered the 
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United States as the ultimate development model for postcolonial nations, by the late 
1960s, as the failures of early postcolonial development gave way to military 
modernizing regimes, Third World nations were as likely to look to one another as they 
were to the United States or the Soviet Union. Arne Westad has noted that Third World 
revolutionaries drew inspiration from the Cuban and Vietnamese communist examples 
but that this was often based on very superficial knowledge of the revolutions, or what 
might be called “creative misunderstandings”.94 In much the same way, authoritarian, 
counter-revolutionary regimes sought to borrow ideas from one another. Brad Simpson 
demonstrates that although the United States facilitated authoritarian development in 
Indonesia, U.S.-trained technocrats were as likely to look for inspiration from 
developmental states such as Japan, Taiwan, Korea and India as they were to look at 
U.S.–style liberal capitalism.95 Although South Vietnamese leaders did demonstrate 
interest in modernization theory and often adopted its idiom, they too were more 
interested in learning from other actors in the Global South. They explicitly referenced 
these countries’ development experiences when implementing policy. But the lessons 
learned were not always faithful to the historical evidence. The meaning of these models 
was up for debate; different actors deployed these states-as-models in intellectual and 
policies debates about South Vietnamese development. In addition, their applicability to 
South Vietnam was suspect. 
Despite South Vietnam’s dependence on the United States and its constrained 
agency in some fields, three factors created space for South Vietnamese to shape 
economic policy in the years after the Tet Offensive. Firstly, although the United States 
sought to direct the GVN’s economic policies measures through support, advice, or 
pressure, at every turn the Nixon administration subordinated economic reform to the 
stability of the Thieu regime and, equally as significantly, to what was acceptable to the 
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GVN. Secondly, there existed significant disagreement on the U.S. side on the purpose 
of economic reform. At a time when the United States was withdrawing from Vietnam, 
U.S. officials were divided as to whether economic policy should aim to stabilize the 
economy and therefore Thieu’s regime or whether it should lay the foundations for 
long-term economic development. Debates within the administration and between U.S. 
policymakers in Washington and Saigon reflected the breakdown in the post-war 
economic consensus, with some continuing to favour Keynesian methods of economic 
analysis and others who favoured greater reliance on market forces. Thirdly, the United 
States was only able to get the economic reforms it desired in South Vietnam because 
certain GVN officials who could influence Thieu broadly shared similar ideas about 
economic liberalization. 
Into this space, Saigon’s technocrats were able to project their vision of South 
Vietnam’s economic future. While many U.S. officials saw reforms as stabilization 
efforts, South Vietnamese policymakers thought of them in developmental terms and 
viewed them as complementary with Saigon’s overall development vision. Of course, 
the GVN had to do this for the purposes of legitimacy. No postcolonial regime in the era 
of decolonization could hope to command the support of its people if it failed to present 
a picture of a better tomorrow. GVN policymakers claimed that they were laying the 
groundwork for the kind of economic growth that more successful Asian anti-
Communist nations had experienced. In all of these discussions the image the East 
Asian developmental states- particularly Taiwan and South Korea- loomed large. 
Saigon officials attempted to draw on the lessons of Taiwan and Korea and to employ 
them in modernization efforts or use these models as rhetorical justification for their 
policies in bureaucratic battles. 
The Saigon regime’s economic goals after the Tet Offensive were calibrated, 
above all else, to maintaining Thieu in power. Already facing a major inflation problem 
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and a woeful balance of payments, the Nixon administration’s policy of Vietnamization 
presented Saigon with further economic challenges. The U.S. military presence in 
Vietnam provided the GVN with one of its main sources of revenue and as troops 
withdrew GVN revenues would decline. Meanwhile, the increase in South Vietnamese 
armed forces would require greater GVN spending. After the Tet Offensive the 
government therefore sought to raise revenues by increasing domestic production, 
boosting exports, and improving taxation, as well as reducing consumption through 
austerity measures. The government also sought to curb inflation to prevent domestic 
unrest. The GVN walked a careful line. If reforms proved too harsh, the regime’s 
support base might desert it or it might face urban, non-communist opposition. If 
reforms did not go far enough, the regime might face economic collapse. Up to 1972, 
the GVN’s economic policies achieved some encouraging results and many economic 
indicators markedly improved, although these gains often came at the expense of 
domestic support. Yet forces beyond the control of the GVN, including a recession 
caused by the U.S. withdrawal, North Vietnam’s 1972 offensive, the 1973 oil crisis and 
global rise in prices, placed the GVN in a dire economic position.  
 
Scholars have paid scant attention to economic issues in the final years of the 
American War in Vietnam. Despite its centrality in the thinking of both U.S. and South 
Vietnamese officials, we know little about the Second Republic’s macroeconomic 
policy and what role it played in the outcome of the war. While the works of Douglas 
Dacy and Nguyen Anh Tuan are useful for highlighting GVN reforms in the Nixon-
Ford years, both works are entirely devoid of human agency. We do not learn who made 
decisions and with what motivation.96 Gabriel Kolko, on the other hand, addressed these 
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issues in a rather overdetermined treatment of South Vietnam’s economic crisis in the 
final years of the war. Kolko argues that South Vietnam’s economic collapse was 
inevitable by the late 1960s. “To the degree that the magnitude of economic and social 
problems transcended the political mechanisms for dealing with them”, Kolko argues 
“the entire RVN system was foredoomed to fall into a potentially decisive impasse”.97 
The reality suggests that events were far more contingent than Kolko argues.  
While historians have highlighted the influence of modernization theory and 
community development in the early years of the South Vietnamese state, the First 
Republic’s macroeconomic model was arguably closer to the school of dependency 
theory. As a more nativist regime than Thieu’s, Diem’s technocrats were more 
interested in endogenous growth models and were more likely to be found quoting 
dependency theorist Hans Singer than modernization theorists like Walt Rostow.98 
Diem aimed to form domestic capital through the development of the agricultural 
sector, reducing dependence on foreign aid and laying the groundwork for future 
industrial development.99 Although he was less interested in using macroeconomic 
tools, Diem’s government also engaged in economic planning and launched its First 
Five Year Plan in 1957. One technocrat associated with the plan noted that this was a 
“semi-official program of action” rather than strict policy guidance in part because 
many of the most significant programs of the Diem era, such as the Strategic Hamlet 
Programme, existed outside the plan.100 Nonetheless, the first plan signalled the 
development impulses of the early South Vietnamese state and it assigned the state the 
central role in capital formation and the allocation of resources. In particular, and in 
marked contrast with what would occur in the early 1970s, planners during the Diem era 
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believed that the export-oriented economy during the colonial era had caused 
deprivation in Vietnam. Diem’s Director-General of the Budget Vu Van Thai said that 
rather than attempting to generate exports, development activities in South Vietnam 
should focus on meeting domestic demand for food, clothing, and housing through 
import-substitution industrialization.101  
 The interregnum between Diem’s overthrow in 1963 and Nguyen Van Thieu’s 
consolidation of power in 1967 was marked by political instability in Saigon and 
escalating violence in the countryside. Production and marketing of South Vietnam’s 
principal crops- rice and rubber- declined precipitously. As the government lost large 
areas of rural territory to the NLF, the U.S. aid program sought to prevent urban unrest 
by dampening inflation. The U.S. war effort in Vietnam required heavy in-country 
spending, generating full employment and a huge increase in Vietnamese purchasing 
power. The resultant rise in demand led to severe inflation. In an effort to soak up 
excess money, the Commodity Import Program (CIP) flooded South Vietnamese cities 
with American consumer goods. The CIP provided the GVN with counterpart funds and 
import duties, the principal sources of government revenue. The CIP also created an 
import-dependent economy, contributing to a terribly skewed balance of payments and a 
standard of consumption for some urban classes out of sync with the country’s level of 
economic development. Historians have noted that South Vietnam’s urban 
entrepreneurial class, rather than investing in productive enterprises, took advantage of 
these conditions. The CIP reduced rather than eliminated inflation, allowing importers 
to hoard goods until prices rose, reaping massive windfall profits.102  
In a bid to deny resources to the enemy, the GVN ran a highly regulated 
economy, with licenses and permits required for most transactions. This led to pervasive 
corruption in which civil servants and the military were heavily implicated. Imported, 
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government-subsidised rice deflated domestic production in favour of urban stability, 
while the grossly overvalued piaster proved a disincentive to investment in 
manufacturing and industry and created the conditions for a thriving currency black 
market.103 For all historians have written about Lyndon Johnson’s desire to export the 
Great Society to South Vietnam, prior to the Tet Offensive American aid and GVN 
policy was geared towards military objectives, privileging urban dwellers and short-
term stability over rural producers and long-term development.104 
Between January 1965 and December 1966 the cost of living rose by 125% and 
the CIA reported that inflation presented “the greatest threat to governmental security”. 
Inflation had “increased dissatisfaction with the government and has provided the Viet 
Cong and other opponents with an exploitable popular issue”. Indeed, among the 
protesters’ many criticisms of the government during the Buddhist struggle movement 
in the spring and summer of 1966, one of the principal complaints was the impact of 
rampant inflation on ordinary Vietnamese.105 In the middle of 1966, the GVN Minister 
of Economy noted, the stability of the economy was “seriously endangered”. 
Economic reforms including devaluation and import liberalization in June 1966 
failed to alleviate these problems in large part because of congestion in Saigon’s port. 
When it functioned as designed, CIP imports would absorb purchasing power and curb 
inflation. But in 1966, Saigon port proved incapable of handling the massive quantity of 
imports.106 It proved difficult for the GVN to get a handle on the economy in other ways 
too. The CIA reported that “through a highly organized economic system, the VC 
exercise considerable control over the production, processing, and movement of many 
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commodities essential to South Vietnam’s economy, including rice, salt, timber, 
charcoal, and rubber”. The NLF could therefore influence the supply and prices of basic 
commodities. “Covertly and overtly, militarily and economically, the VC can deny the 
GVN considerable financial and material resources”.107 Even rumours circulated among 
the merchant and banking communities about impending devaluation or commodity 
shortages created price spikes and influenced prices on the currency black market.108 
As with military and political issues, the latter half of 1967 saw some South 
Vietnamese official optimism about the economy. With the port congestion problem 
resolved, things appeared to be improving. Minister of Economy and concurrently 
Governor of the National Bank Nguyen Huu Hanh was pleased to report that prices had 
stabilized as a result of the GVN’s “crash import program” and its build-up of security 
stocks of basic commodities, while there had been a slight drop in the price of black 
market dollars and gold, indicating somewhat greater confidence in the piaster.109 On 
the eve of the Tet Offensive, however, USAID officials in Washington felt they still had 
not achieved some of their basic economic goals in Vietnam. They felt the government 
had to raise tax revenues, do more to combat corruption, and reduce subsidies, 
regulations and other inefficiencies in the economy. These steps were “a most important 
means of convincing the American people that the Vietnamese are taking on an 
increasing share of the burden of winning the war”.110 
Although the main thrust of economic and monetary policy between 1965 and 
1967 was aimed at stabilization, GVN economic officials never lost hope for the 
possibility of long-term economic development. Nor did U.S. officials, if only to 
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present the American war effort in constructive terms. In a bid to do just that, Johnson 
dispatched David Lilienthal, one of the pioneers of the Tennessee Valley Authority, to 
head up a Joint Development Group (JDG) with the GVN’s representative Vu Quoc 
Thuc. The JDG started its work in early 1967 and teams of Vietnamese and U.S. 
investigators began researching agriculture, industry, and regional development, among 
other topics. The idea was to explore areas for South Vietnam’s long-term development, 
in spite of the ongoing conflict. Lilienthal, drawing on his experience with the TVA, 
was particularly enthused about harnessing the power of the Mekong River. David 
Ekbladh argues that prior to the Tet Offensive this appeared a promising means to 
rescue South Vietnam and the rest of the region from its state of underdevelopment. 
After Tet, it seemed that river development might help salvage the United States’ 
reputation in Asia. But when the final plan was produced in 1969, it was greeted with 
derision from a Congress tired of the war and largely ignored by the Nixon 
administration.111 
With the Tet Offensive and the Congressional backlash against foreign aid 
beginning in the late 1960s, the orthodox story goes, the United States abandoned all 
hope for economic development in South Vietnam. But scholars have largely failed to 
examine the politics of economic reform in Vietnam during the final years of the war. 
This chapter addresses this gap in the historiography. During the Nixon administration’s 
first term of office, U.S. and GVN officials in Washington and Saigon debated the 
relative merits of stabilization and economic development as a means to handle the 
stress that Vietnamization placed on the RVN economy.  
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The Tet Offensive, Vietnamization and the South Vietnamese Economy 
The Tet Offensive presented the GVN with a number of new economic 
problems. By 1968 the United States was struggling to pay for the war in Vietnam and 
one of the key considerations for U.S. policymakers in the wake the Tet Offensive was 
whether the continued prosecution of the war at current or higher levels was 
economically feasible.112 Even shortly prior to the Tet Offensive, USAID administrator 
William Gaud had told Thieu that “much of the United States balance of payments 
difficulty is the result of U.S. support of the Vietnamese cause”. Gaud asked Thieu to 
undertake measures including spending more GVN foreign exchange in the United 
States and taxation to meet inflation. Congress and the American people now expected 
these measures of countries receiving financial assistance. Thieu said he would take 
such measures though he noted that he was reluctant to implement taxes that would 
increase the cost of living and that he now had a new legislature to deal with which 
would prove an obstacle. In an indication of how weak his plans were to remedy the 
situation, he told Gaud he would search for taxation measures that did not require 
legislative action and would not cause price rises.113 
The Tet Offensive changed the calculus. As a result of the first wave of attacks, 
the GVN Minister of Economy reported a decline in production and a likely VN$8bn 
drop in government revenues. Added to this, an estimated VN$5bn increase in GVN 
expenditure to reconstruct the cities and aid war victims was likely to generate serious 
inflation. The government estimated a US$322m budget deficit in 1968. To deal with 
this massive shortfall it was urgently necessary to reconstruct damaged industries, 
encourage a resumption of commerce and regularize supply.114  
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In the aftermath of the second wave of attacks in May, there was talk in Saigon 
of impending economic collapse. As a result of government deficit spending, there was 
a dramatic increase in the money supply but a relatively modest increase in prices. Hanh 
concluded that people must be hoarding cash in response to the offensives. The prospect 
of this money being injected into the economy once the people’s confidence was 
restored might, along with GVN spending, lead to critical levels of inflation. Given 
these difficulties, it is not surprising that some GVN technocrats, if not Thieu, had 
already begun to think in terms of austerity. The only solution, Hanh argued, was to 
reduce the government deficit by curbing expenditure and increasing revenues in order 
“to avoid serious disruptions in the economic as well as social fabric of our nation”. The 
alternative was for the GVN to continue deficit spending by borrowing from the 
National Bank and compounding inflation, a more arbitrary and less equitable way to 
finance government spending than increased taxation.115 
Hanh’s predictions proved overly pessimistic, however, and by late summer 
Saigon appeared to have weathered the storm. The economy had gradually recovered 
and inflation had remained relatively mild throughout 1968. As the Johnson 
administration passed responsibility for Vietnam to the Nixon White House, however, 
the CIA estimated that inflation would be much worse in 1969 and might reach levels of 
40-60% as the GVN increased its spending to pay for expanded defence costs.116 
South Vietnamese economic viability was a critical factor if Vietnamization was 
to succeed. It would convey a message to Hanoi and perhaps convince members of the 
U.S. Congress that South Vietnam was a going concern. Economic collapse, on the 
other hand, would put paid to U.S. efforts to Vietnamize the war. However, senior U.S. 
administration officials at first tended to overlook the economic requirements for and 
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consequences of any new strategy in South Vietnam. To develop such a strategy, the 
new administration issued National Security Study Memorandum 1 in January 1969, 
asking the foreign policy establishment to answer a series of questions about Hanoi’s 
intentions and capabilities, South Vietnamese military effectiveness, rural security, the 
political climate, and U.S. operations. The South Vietnamese economy was not 
considered.117  
USAID and the U.S. embassy in Saigon, on the other hand, spent much of the 
first half of 1969 trying to negotiate an economic stabilization package with the GVN. 
A growing budget deficit, the result of expanded spending on the armed forces, was 
having a dangerous inflationary impact. The United States withheld $40m in CIP funds 
as leverage in the stabilization negotiations but Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker secured 
the release of the funds, arguing that the United States could not afford a confrontation 
with the GVN at a time when it was asking Saigon to assume a greater burden of the 
fighting. But Bunker told Thieu that the GVN would have to increase tax revenue and 
consider devaluation to combat inflation before the end of the year.118 USAID also 
warned GVN leaders that given dwindling Congressional appropriations, they could not 
expect AID to continue bailing them out. USAID director John Hannah asked that 
Nixon raise these issues with Thieu at Midway while Kissinger asked the president to 
warn Thieu that “our ability to assist the GVN economically is dependent to a degree” 
on the conclusion of an agreement “which [Thieu] is reluctant to face for political 
reasons”.119 As the year progressed and no stabilization agreement emerged, others 
within the U.S. administration and the Federal Reserve voiced concern that inflation in 
                                                
117 National Security Study Memorandum 1, 21 January 1969, document no. 4, FRUS, 1969-1976, vol. 
VI, Vietnam, January 1969-July 1970. 
118 Pike ed., The Bunker Papers, vol. 3, 694. 
119 John A. Hannah Memorandum for the President, ‘Stabilization Negotiations in Vietnam’, 3 June 1969, 
National Security Council Files, Vietnam Subject Files, Box 71, Presidential Trip Vol. 1, Nixon Library; 
Henry A. Kissinger Memorandum for the President, ‘Your Meeting with President Thieu at Midway, June 
8’, 4 June 1969, NSC Files, Vietnam Subject Files, Box 71, Midway Meeting with President Thieu 
Briefing Book Vol. 1, Nixon Library. 
70 
 
Vietnam, if not addressed, risked undermining the United States’ military and political 
goals. Dean Moor of the National Security Council noted in July 1969 that inflation, a 
budget deficit, and economic mismanagement were “beginning to sap some of the 
government’s vitality in attempting to build a competitive position against [the] 
Communists in a future post-war environment”.120 
Thieu believed harsh economic reforms would undermine his ability to 
consolidate political control, crucial in any future political competition with the 
Communists. Previous experience with economic reform dragged up bitter memories. 
Devaluation in 1966 had, as Vice Minister for Finance Nguyen Anh Tuan put it, left “a 
nasty taste in the mouth”. It had been politically unpopular and had not appeared to 
solve the country’s economic problems.121 In 1969, Thieu faced challenges to his grip 
on the presidency and was yet to fully assert his control over the National Assembly. As 
such he was loath to undertake economic measures that would require legislative 
approval or result in political backlash.122  
 Still, Thieu and the GVN had little choice but to face the fundamental economic 
challenge that Vietnamization presented. Not only did hundreds of thousands of 
Vietnamese depend on the dwindling U.S. presence for employment but Vietnamization 
would also mean an increase in GVN spending to expand the armed forces as well as a 
dramatic decline in GVN earnings. Approximately half of U.S. economic aid to South 
Vietnam came from Department of Defense (DoD) purchases of local currency to pay 
for goods and services in Vietnam. The DoD bought this local currency at a rate of $1 to 
118 piasters, a level far below the real value of the South Vietnamese currency. The 
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GVN could use these dollars to buy untied imports, which it could also tax at higher 
levels than imports under the CIP. Therefore, devaluation would reduce GVN revenue 
from DoD purchases of local currency. This, in addition to price rises and their 
attendant political consequences, was the primary reason why South Vietnamese 
policymakers were opposed to devaluation. Although the DoD increased its in-country 
purchases as Vietnamization began, as U.S. troops levels dropped DoD procurements 
would too, making it difficult for the South Vietnamese to fund imports necessary to 
finance the budget and to dampen inflation. To deal with the economic problems created 
by the U.S. withdrawal, Washington would compensate for the loss of DoD purchases 
with additional economic assistance but Washington also expected the GVN to enact 
reforms to raise revenue.  
Facing these challenges and potential political dangers, the GVN moved slowly 
on the economic front. While economic development was subordinated to military goals 
and political stability up to 1975, the period also saw economic Vietnamization. By the 
middle of 1968, following a General Mobilization law, one in six adult males fought in 
the armed forces.123 Such a large defence establishment put a serious strain on the 
economy over the next several years. Nonetheless, for some technocrats in Saigon, 
increased rural security after Tet and the imperatives of Vietnamization had shifted the 
war to a different plane. As Tuan noted, the “lull in enemy aggression” meant that “the 
hurricane which previously assailed the political and military fronts has now turned it 
fury on the economic and financial front”.124 The period saw South Vietnamese efforts 
to remedy the economy with a view to long-term stability and growth. While the 
ultimate goal was economic independence, Saigon’s policymakers viewed this as a 
                                                
123 Robert K. Brigham, ‘Dreaming Different Dreams: The United States and the Army of the Republic of 
Vietnam’, in Marilyn B. Young and Robert Buzzanco eds., A Companion to the Vietnam War, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006), 150. 
124 Tuan, ‘The Financial Situation in Vietnam’. 
72 
 
long-term project and anticipated that the United States’ commitment would continue 
for many years to come.  
 
The Search for Models 
In discussions with representatives of the Task Force on Foreign Aid in the 
autumn of 1969, Nixon and Kissinger gave an indication of their preference for new 
approaches to economic development. The development “success stories to date” Nixon 
affirmed, “have occurred mainly in environments where the private sector played a 
major role”. Forget about “ideas of proper political organization” Nixon told the task 
force, military leaders “may be the most stabilizing force in most countries”. The United 
States should not focus on health and housing projects but on GNP growth and should 
help countries that “follow economic approaches, particularly reliance on the private 
sector, which we consider feasible in leading to real development”.125 Kissinger’s 
comments were even more striking. He told the task force members “we are near the 
end of the Marshall Plan period in which the rest of the world could be shaped by U.S. 
programs” and that the case made for aid in the 1950s and 1960s was “no longer 
relevant”. Kissinger believed that “other industrialized countries” should “take care of 
particular LDCs [Less Developed Countries] where they have strong historic interests”. 
The thrust of Nixon’s message on his recent world tour had been that “countries should 
assume more responsibility for shaping their own progress especially in terms of its 
intellectual foundations”.126 If post-war development theory was supposed to provide a 
guide for Third World elites as much as for U.S. policymakers, Nixon and Kissinger’s 
comments amounted to a disavowal of the entire post-war development enterprise. Not 
only did they foresee a smaller role for the postcolonial state in the process of economic 
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development, they also saw a diminished role for the United States. What was called for 
instead was a Nixon doctrine for development. In the future, regional powers and 
industrialized nations would offer more economic aid, while Third World nations could 
no longer expect U.S. social scientists and development professionals to conceive of 
and execute development plans.   
The GVN, as it turned out, was already looking beyond the United States, 
searching for both intellectual and substantive solutions to its economic woes in 
regional and even global terms. In a speech to the Japanese Federation of Economic 
Organizations (Keidanren) while on a goodwill tour of Japan in early 1969, Nguyen 
Xuan Oanh, a Harvard trained economics PhD and former South Vietnamese Prime 
Minister, called on Japan “to help provide security to the Southeast Asian community” 
through “Japan’s own Marshall Plan for post-war Southeast Asia”.127 Oanh’s plea was 
part of a larger effort by Saigon to establish better diplomatic and economic relations 
with regional anti-communist nations. As Lien- Hang Nguyen has noted, in the middle 
of 1969 Saigon’s Political Warfare Department reported that given their shared 
experience as divided anti-communist states, Saigon should align itself more closely 
with Taiwan, Korea and West Germany. Saigon needed to establish cultural and 
economic exchanges with the ultimate goal of an anti-communist economic bloc in 
Southeast Asia.128  
Efforts to forge closer ties with the non-communist nations of Southeast and 
East Asia had limited impact however. Japanese economic aid did increase after 1968, 
amounting to about $65 million by 1974.129 This was, in part, the result of the Nixon 
and Ford administrations’ efforts to encourage Japan and multilateral institutions to pull 
up the foreign aid slack in Asia. Southeast Asian nations, on the other hand, were cool 
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on the idea of South Vietnamese membership in ASEAN. Indonesia’s staunchly anti-
communist regime was even reluctant to establish formal diplomatic relations with 
Saigon. Despite South Vietnamese efforts on this front, the two countries went no 
further than establishing chambers of commerce in one another’s capitals.130  
On the other hand, the anti-Communist nations of Asia served as important 
models for governance, macroeconomic policy, and development projects. For Saigon, 
the examples of South Korea and Taiwan were particularly important. As truncated, 
anti-communist and authoritarian, military-led states facing communist adversaries, 
they were obvious allies. As states at a more advanced stage of development, they 
offered attractive models of authoritarian development. Both countries had sent troops 
and technical advisers to assist South Vietnam in the fight against Hanoi, albeit not for 
entirely altruistic reasons.131 Vietnam also hosted economic cooperation conferences 
with both Taiwan and South Korea, forging closer ties between South Vietnamese 
economists and policymakers and their Taiwanese and Korean counterparts.132  
GVN economist Nguyen Tien Hung claimed that Thieu had two framed portraits 
of his role models on his office wall, one of the South Korean leader Park Chung Hee 
and the other of the Taiwanese leader Chiang Kai Shek.133 Hung suggested Thieu was 
“a very traditional Asian leader” who viewed American relations with Asia in 
Confucian terms and admired Park and Chiang for their military prowess. However, 
both Park and Chiang had, by the late 1960s, presided over periods of sustained 
economic growth which had considerably strengthened their nations against their 
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enemies and Thieu was no doubt impressed by this. Prior to meeting Nixon at Midway 
in June 1969, Thieu visited Seoul and Taipei. Afterwards, Thieu wrote to both men, 
telling Park that he returned to Saigon with “a new sense of confidence in our common 
cause”, and Chiang that he benefited greatly from his “wise counsel”. He was deeply 
impressed by the economic achievements of both countries under Park and Chiang’s 
“inspiring leadership”.134  
By the late 1960s, both Taiwan and Korea had achieved, from Saigon’s 
perspective, enviable levels of growth. In 1965, USAID closed its mission in Taipei, in 
acknowledgement that Taiwan had “graduated” from economic assistance programs.135 
Taiwan had achieved remarkable progress in agriculture, so much so that in the late 
1950s it began to export its agricultural development model. The Sino-American Joint 
Commission for Rural Reconstruction sent teams of Chinese agricultural advisers to 
dozens of countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East, including 
Vietnam.136 In manufacturing, Taiwan had established three export-processing zones, 
which the RVN Ministry of Finance calculated employed almost 50,000 workers and 
exported approximately US$240m worth of manufactured goods per year by 1972.137 
Korea had also achieved modest manufacturing-based growth by the late 1960s before 
turning to heavy industry and electronics. Exports rose dramatically, from just $54.8m 
in 1962 to $250.3m in 1966.138  
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In looking to Taiwan and Korea, the GVN was not simply searching for an 
American model mediated through the experience of developing countries. Neither the 
Koreans under Park nor the Guomindang in Taiwan followed American advice when it 
suited them not to and American advisers often expressed frustration with Taiwanese 
and Korean policy. In addition, Taiwan and South Korea offered an alternative model of 
governance that appealed to the GVN: depoliticised masses, loyal to the authoritarian 
state and mobilized for economic development. For Saigon, as a regime suffering from 
a crisis of legitimacy, Taiwan and South Korea appeared legitimate, economically 
successful and authoritarian; an appealing combination. Although Taiwan and Korea 
had achieved much higher levels of economic growth, from their vantage point in 
Saigon, RVN officials could imagine South Vietnam charting the path to a similar 
economic future. But drawing on the lessons of Taiwan and Korea presented RVN 
officials with the tricky problem (experienced by scholars since) of establishing what 
those models actually were and as such there was considerable divergence of opinion. In 
addition, claiming their applicability to Vietnam required overlooking some 
inconvenient historical realities.  
While scholars debate the degree to which U.S. officials tolerated state 
intervention in the Taiwanese economy, most agree that significant intervention 
occurred. The Guomindang (GMD) state controlled the levers of the economy by 
encouraging growth in targeted sectors through tariffs and easy access to capital. Long-
range planning created rewards and penalties for certain economic behaviour. The state 
attempted to control consumption, savings, and investment through fixed prices, wages, 
and interest rates. Taiwan protected infant industries through import-substitution 
77 
 
industrialization (ISI) and focused on internal growth, turning to exports only when the 
limits of ISI had been reached.139  
The “free market” interpretation of Korea’s growth contends that the economy 
was stagnating in the late 1950s as a result of an “inward-looking” ISI policy which 
protected inefficient industries and discouraged exports. A series of reforms in 1965, 
including exchange rate reform, reductions in tariffs, and increased real interest rates, 
represented a turn to an export-led development strategy. These reforms, the free market 
view contends, mobilised savings for investment, allowed Korea to use its comparative 
advantage in labour-intensive manufacturing exports, and placed competitive pressure 
on inefficient domestic producers. A broader body of scholarship argues that the state 
continued to play an interventionist role similar to the GMD after these reforms with 
limits on imports, preferential treatment for large firms, and continued subsidies for 
ISI.140  
There were substantial differences between Taiwan and South Korea on the one 
hand and South Vietnam on the other, including their contrasting colonial experiences. 
Several scholars have noted the importance of the legacies of Japanese colonialism in 
laying the foundations for the developmental states in Taiwan and Korea.141 Although 
Japanese colonialism was brutal, legacies included a large, strong bureaucracy with 
considerable reach, a factor critically absent from South Vietnam. In Taiwan, Japanese 
colonial authorities had established a commercialised agricultural system based on 
small owner-operators employing technological advances as opposed to low-tech rice 
production on the Mekong Delta’s large latifundia during French colonial rule in 
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Vietnam.142 After 1949, the GMD’s bureaucratic reach allowed it to exert control down 
to the village-level agricultural economy, determining prices and making farmers 
dependent on the state through virtual monopolies on credit and fertilizer. In Korea, 
during the colonial era the state had forged productive alliances with the principal 
economic classes.143 Taiwan benefited from coming under the American umbrella 
during the Korean War, while South Korean economic growth was driven, in no small 
part, by participation in the Vietnam War.144 South Vietnam had no such war to profit 
from. In addition, the military in both states was eventually co-opted into or had a 
vested interest in the economic development strategy. This was in stark contrast to 
South Vietnam where the burdensome military complex, corrupt government and 
military personnel, the absence of an industrial class, and continued rural devastation 
detracted from economic development.  
Thieu saw a mixed economy in the Taiwan model. Taiwan’s economic success 
was down to a combination of “free enterprise and government planning”.145 While 
private investment and business were to be encouraged, in the field of agricultural 
development, Thieu saw an important role for the state. He believed that Taiwan’s rural 
development model which included state interventions in the form of land reform, 
agricultural modernization, and farmers’ organizations was the “most important 
reference point” for South Vietnam.146 
Others in the RVN bureaucracy used Taiwan, Korea and other models from the 
Global South to lobby for a more liberal, free market economics. In a speech before the 
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Saigon Chamber of Commerce in September 1969, newly appointed Minister of 
Economy Pham Kim Ngoc, an LSE-trained economist, suggested that the solution to 
South Vietnam’s economic troubles already existed in the development experience of 
Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Pakistan, Turkey, and Iran. South Vietnam 
could address its woeful balance of payments deficit by drawing on the lessons of these 
countries which included austerity and the redirection of consumption toward savings 
and investment. The GVN would use the profit motive to induce private investment in 
areas of comparative advantage in the primary sector and manufacturing. Some degree 
of ISI was acceptable but no country, Ngoc argued, that has sought “economic 
independence through very high tariffs and a closed economy has ever developed 
successfully”.  Exports of rural commodities such as rice, rubber, timber, and fish would 
not only help address the balance of payments gap but would raise rural incomes, an 
important element in the battle against the National Liberation Front.147 The lessons 
learned it seems were austerity, export-led development through the exploitation of rural 
resources, the promotion of foreign investment, and a place on the capitalist periphery.  
This was a sanitised picture; Ngoc did not mention these regimes’ preference for 
authoritarian governance. Nor did he mention each states’ use of import-substitution 
and intervention in the economy. Ngoc’s vision of South Vietnam’s economic future 
encapsulated the ideas of several civilian technocrats, including Minister of Finance 
Nguyen Bich Hue, a graduate of Paris’ Ecole National d’Administration and Hue’s 
successor Ha Xuan Trung, who held an MA in economics from Yale. These men had 
previously worked in national and private banking circles and were close to Ly Luong 
Than and Nguyen Cao Thang, two wealthy Saigon businessmen who provided slush 
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funds for Thieu.148 They attained senior positions in the RVN in the years after the Tet 
Offensive and were able to push through a series of liberalizing reforms. USAID’s 
terminal report on economic assistance to South Vietnam credited the positive economic 
reforms in this period to a “change in economic leadership” in the late 1960s composed 
of “American-trained professionals with high regard for the merits of a free enterprise 
system”.149 These liberalizers strengthened the United States’ hand in pressuring the 
GVN to reform because they shared many of the same ideas. Ngoc was a particular 
favourite with the Americans. Bunker told Nixon that he was “first rate, the best man 
they’ve got in the cabinet”.150 Yet their commitment to the free market was often more 
rhetorical than real. Ngoc, Hue and Trung realised that only the state could foster 
private enterprise and during their tenure the GVN regularly intervened in the market. 
Still, the ideas of these liberalizers clashed with those who advocated greater state 
planning and those, particularly senior officers in the military, who advocated stricter 
government control. Given that Thieu saw free enterprise and government intervention 
as complementary components of Taiwan’s development strategy, he was easily pulled 
between these divergent constituencies.  
 
The Romance of Export-Led Development 
The liberalizers’ initial experience with reform was far from positive. A U.S.-
GVN stabilization agreement finally negotiated in late 1969 called for a combination of 
additional U.S. aid and GVN fiscal and economic reforms.151 In response, Ngoc and 
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Hue introduced an austerity tax on imports but this failed to dampen demand. Fearing a 
decline in its foreign reserves, the GVN introduced import licensing restrictions which 
led to further hoarding, speculation and price rises. The reform proved deeply 
unpopular, badly hit the urban middle-class and was heavily criticised in the National 
Assembly. The cost of living rose by 53% between July 1969 and July 1970 decimating 
fixed, public sector wages. According to the CIA, in the spring of 1970 the government 
faced the real possibility that it might fall or be overthrown due to economic unrest. 
Saigon faced growing protest from students and ARVN veterans and it seemed that 
Thieu might be forced to make scapegoats of Ngoc and Hue.152 Some South Vietnamese 
officials resented the new demands being placed on the GVN. Many felt that the 
distortions in the economy were American-made and that the South Vietnamese were 
now being compelled to tighten their belts. One South Vietnamese economic official 
told journalist Robert Shaplen “you created an economic Frankenstein monster here by 
making this a big war, and now you are telling us that we have to learn almost overnight 
to be austere and take care of ourselves, when we all know this is a long process and 
that there is no such thing as instant Vietnamization”.153 
Massive inflation in late 1969 and 1970 sparked intra-administration discussion 
in Washington in the spring and summer. The Treasury, offering the most radical 
option, wanted the GVN to assume the full economic burden of Vietnamization; a 
solution that was inconceivable for most U.S. officials as it might have led to a South 
Vietnamese collapse within months. Economists in the DoD, consistently the most 
forceful advocates for an overhaul of economic policy, offered an alternative option. In 
a report that Secretary of Defence Laird passed to Nixon in July 1970 with a cover 
                                                                                                                                          
November 1969, The Inflation in Vietnam, Oct-Nov 69, Box 75, Vietnam Subject Files, NSC Files, 
Nixon Library. 
152 CIA Intelligence Memorandum, ‘South Vietnam: National Cohesion and Vietnamization’, 20 August 
1970, Box 92, Vietnamization (Jul-Dec) vol. 3 (1 of 2), Vietnam Subject Files, NSC Files, Nixon Library. 
153 Robert Shaplen, The Road from War: Vietnam 1965-1971, (London: Deutsch, 1971), 316-317. 
Shaplen did not disclose the identity of his informant, describing him as one of the Vietnamese charged 
with straightening out the economy and someone who was ordinarily pro-American. 
82 
 
memo warning that “our economic plans constitute perhaps the weakest link in the 
Vietnamization process”, DoD economist William Ford called for a long-term approach. 
Ford complained that U.S. economic policy had thus far focused only on propping up 
the RVN economy by controlling inflation and was premised on the assumption that no 
economic development was possible while the war continued. But the only way that 
South Vietnamese resources could replace American aid was by encouraging economic 
growth. Greater domestic taxation, the mobilization of savings and encouragement of 
foreign investment, would all help but the most promising means for achieving this goal 
was to institute a flexible exchange rate which would create the correct economic 
incentives for growth.154 
Ford was supported by Deputy Secretary of Defence for International Security 
Affairs G. Warren Nutter and fellow DoD economist Stephen Enke. Nutter had worked 
on his PhD in economics under the supervision of Frank Knight, one of the founders of 
the Chicago school of economics. Nutter was one of the founders of the Thomas 
Jefferson Center of Studies in Political Economy at the University of Virginia, which 
along with the Chicago school led the charge against the state intervention in the 
economy in the 1950s and 1960s, laying the ground for the neoliberal turn in the 
1970s.155 Nutter and Enke wanted the GVN to institute a flexible exchange rate for all 
but DoD purchases. This, they believed, would help recover $100m per year in windfall 
profits, removing the need to ask Congress for more money and would generate about 
$85m of exports a year within a short time. If the administration officials needed 
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evidence of the efficacy of such a policy, Enke claimed, they need only ask Milton 
Friedman.156  
But a report by a team of Rand Corporation and AID economists despatched to 
Saigon in June and led by Charles Cooper established the consensus view. The Cooper 
team reported that additional U.S. aid and reforms which would “dovetail” with current 
GVN plans was the only option that would neither increase Saigon’s dependency on the 
United States nor “impair the effectiveness” of the regime.157 The Vietnam Special 
Studies Group (VSSG) and Laurence Lynn of the National Security Council (NSC) 
believed that the assumptions of the DoD recommendation were unproven and might 
have unforeseen political consequences. Besides, the GVN was opposed to devaluation. 
For many in the administration the key concern was whether the GVN could enact 
reforms without precipitating a drop in the standard of living for major income groups 
such as the already suffering urban middle and working classes and public sector 
employees. The Cooper report appeared to satisfactorily address these concerns. But the 
report’s authors, as well as administration officials in Washington, believed more 
dramatic reforms would be necessary in the future, perhaps after the 1971 Vietnamese 
presidential election.158  
The Cooper report and VSSG recommendations became the basis for National 
Security Decision Memorandum 80 which attempted to balance the perhaps 
irreconcilable goals of political stability and development. It called for export 
promotion and increased domestic taxation but the Saigon government would not be 
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forced to devalue the piaster. Total aid of $750m would be the ceiling for FY71 and 
beyond. As domestic production and South Vietnamese exports increased, U.S. 
assistance would decline. But NSDM80 warned that pursuing these goals should not 
jeopardize Vietnamization.159  
Despite the very obvious barriers to export-led “take-off” in South Vietnam, 
which some American officials acknowledged, there is scant evidence that Vietnamese 
officials questioned the wisdom of such an approach.160 Even before the Nixon 
administration issued NSDM 80, in early 1970 the Ministries of Finance and Economy 
reported that the basic problem with generating export-led growth lay in the unrealistic 
exchange rate and requested that the government establish a fund to subsidise exports at 
a higher level. These subsidies would be reduced as the war diminished and the 
difference between the official and real exchange rate declined.161 In September and 
October 1970, in response to the demands of NSDM80 for reform, the government 
raised interest rates and enacted a partial devaluation. The October reform introduced a 
parallel exchange market with different exchange rates for different transactions and 
acted as a subsidy on exports. Highlighting the complexities of Saigon politics and 
economic reform, the Senate diluted the package. The Australian ambassador suspected 
that Senators did not want to be associated with the hardship the reform would cause in 
urban areas.162 Indeed, the economic reforms during the final years of the war, all with a 
view to boosting exports, pushed against policies of the mid-1960s that privileged urban 
areas, and along with land reform, expanded agricultural credit, and subsidised 
agricultural inputs, swung economic advantage towards the countryside. 
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In February 1971, in a bid to keep the pressure on the South Vietnamese, Nixon 
requested his Ambassador-at-Large for Foreign Economic Policy Development David 
Kennedy to visit Saigon. Kennedy could tell Saigon officials that the United States 
would continue to offer “substantial amounts of economic assistance” as long as they 
implemented the “necessary improvements”.163 Ngoc’s talking points for discussions 
with Kennedy reveal that the South Vietnamese were not simply responding to U.S. 
pressure however. Ngoc emphasised that the South Vietnamese effort now needed to be 
“development-minded, reorienting the economy toward production”. He again stressed 
the need to focus on areas of comparative advantage and, in line with the policy of 
“Bettering the Image” of the government, the GVN would enact a better investment law 
and privatize public enterprises, selling shares to civil servants and military personnel, 
the first step in a program of “popular capitalism”.164 Meeting with Ngoc and Hue in 
early March, Kennedy criticised complicated import and customs procedures, the high 
cost of labour, and corruption, all of which discouraged investment. Kennedy 
recommended better collection of taxes in rural areas and further exchange rate reform. 
He told the ministers that if the GVN implemented further reforms the United States 
would be ready to support South Vietnam to progress to a position similar to Taiwan 
and South Korea. Kennedy’s recommendations, Hue reported to Thieu, were not 
contrary to the Saigon’s economic and financial policy. The Ministry of Finance 
believed that Kennedy’s visit demonstrated that the U.S. government wanted to once 
more determine what the GVN policy was, allowing the United States to clarify its aid 
program for Vietnam. The visit, Hue noted, was an opportunity to show that the GVN 
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was carrying out a program that would lead to “self-sufficiency and self-
strengthening”.165 
Kennedy’s criticism of corruption was certainly justified. From the “tea money” 
village and hamlet officials extorted from peasants for routine paperwork to the top 
leadership, corruption appears to have infected every level of the GVN. An informant 
even alleged that ARVN Generals took their Vietnamese piasters to Hong Kong, one of 
the few markets for the currency, where Chinese Communist agents would exchange it 
for U.S. dollars and then funnel the piasters back to the North Vietnamese and NLF 
units operating in South Vietnam.166 The United States placed pressure on the GVN to 
clean up and Saigon made periodic attempts to remove corrupt military and civilian 
officials. But the GVN never came close to resolving the problem and both Americans 
and South Vietnamese officials came to see it as part of the fabric of society. As 
Kissinger told Nixon, South Vietnamese tend “tacitly to accept corruption as normal – 
as do societies in some other Asian countries”. Only a few weeks after meeting with 
Kennedy, Ngoc told an audience at the American Chamber of Commerce in Saigon that 
corruption was “present in every country in this region. Some are better than others, but 
I believe that in some of these countries, conditions are hardly any better than they are 
in Vietnam”.167 While it is impossible to measure the real impact of corruption on the 
South Vietnamese economy, there is no doubt that it accounted for a major drain on 
resources. 
In their conversations with Kennedy, Ngoc and Hue placed more emphasis on 
what the GVN planned to do, rather than what it had done to that point. But timing was 
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of crucial concern for the Thieu regime in enacting potentially politically destabilizing 
reforms. In 1970 and 1971, the GVN faced considerable pressure from the U.S. 
Congress to devalue exchange rate for DoD and U.S. personnel purchases in Vietnam. 
Congress justifiably condemned this false exchange rate as “a hidden subsidy” for the 
Vietnamese economy. The administration realized the GVN would have to devalue 
sooner or later to avoid Congressional ire but it wanted to delay the action for as long as 
possible so that DoD purchases could compensate for declining AID appropriations.168 
Senior administration officials pressed the GVN to take steps in other areas that would 
improve the image of the regime in the United States. In a meeting with Thieu in July 
1971, while referring to continued U.S. assistance, Kissinger suggested that “the South 
Vietnamese should discuss reforms which would free the economy somewhat”.169 But 
Saigon would only act when it was ready. Thieu faced what he thought would be a 
tightly contested election in 1971 and the government was not willing to risk economic 
unrest.  
Moreover, U.S. officials were once again divided as how best to proceed with 
reforms. Charles Cooper, the lead author of the 1970 AID/RAND study, was now 
economic counsellor in the Saigon embassy and had primary responsibility for 
negotiating economic stabilization and reform with the South Vietnamese. To David 
Kennedy it seemed Cooper was “an absolute disaster” and Kennedy wondered why 
anybody had sent him to Saigon. Warren Nutter agreed that Cooper “seemed to be 
acting erratically to the situation and didn’t seem to know what to do next”. In the 
spring and summer of 1971, the administration also awaited the results of ten separate 
economic development studies before making further decisions. Many of these studies 
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aimed to model the inflationary impact of different reforms. Nutter dismissed such 
studies as “a waste of time”. The more important issue was “long-term reforms” and 
everyone agreed on the basic requirements.170 “We continue to face this bureaucratic 
contest”, NSC staffer K. Wayne Smith told Kissinger, “between those who want to rely 
on a ‘seat of the pants’ feel for the Vietnam economy and those who support analysis”. 
 At a conference to determine the best path for South Vietnamese economic 
development at the U.S. Embassy in Singapore in late May, and from which South 
Vietnamese representatives were conspicuously absent, a vague consensus was reached. 
Attendees concluded rather lamely that the South Vietnamese should be encouraged to 
continue moving the economy toward a “free market”, establish realistic public 
investment priorities, and improve the climate for private and foreign investment. The 
seminar report noted some “doubts that there is a clear cut or universal case for the 
economic desirability of [an] export industry as compared to import substitution”. 
Nonetheless, the participants concluded that Saigon should study the means for 
stimulating exports and search for export markets. These ideas became the basis for 
Cooper’s negotiations with the South Vietnamese economic team for post-election 
reform.171   
In November 1971 the GVN launched by far its most dramatic economic reform 
package to date. British observers reported that U.S. officials privately admitted to have 
inspired the reforms, if not their timing.172 Yet U.S. records show the degree to which 
Ngoc and new Minister of Finance Ha Xuan Trung, who succeeded Hue in mid-1971, 
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were instrumental to the design and implementation of the reform. At a meeting on 
August 19 the GVN economic team handed U.S. officials a 150 page economic 
programme for 1972 which included “plans for reform in almost every nook and cranny 
of economic policy” and four days later they provided a list of more specific import and 
exchange rate reforms. U.S. embassy officials reported that they were “somewhat 
surprised by apparent decisiveness of GVN economic team at this juncture. However, 
proposed reforms so close in spirit and substance to mission views, which it reflects, 
that we believe this initiative should be wholeheartedly supported”. The embassy also 
reported that it was unsure whether Thieu would support the proposed reforms, despite 
Ngoc and Trung’s confidence that they could convince him.173 Put simply, U.S. officials 
had a broad outline of the reforms required and the GVN economic team were able to 
provide the specifics largely because their ideas were in consonance with those of U.S. 
embassy officials. Above all, the United States needed Ngoc and Trung on the inside to 
convince Thieu of the merits of the reforms. 
In addition, the package bore the hallmarks of the GVN liberalizers, who once 
again played on the symbolism of the Asian tigers. Introducing the proposed reforms in 
November 1971, Ngoc and Trung wrote that “following the experience of many 
countries such as Taiwan, Korea and Singapore, free enterprise is the soundest and most 
effective path to economic development”. The ministers called for the removal of 
economic restrictions and the encouragement of private investment. The government 
would encourage exports through further devaluation, the reduction of import duties 
which had acted as protectionism for local industries, and a shift of resources from ISI 
to exports.174 Announcing the reform package, Thieu spoke of the GVN’s determination 
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to open up the economy and to encourage foreign and South Vietnamese private 
investment in production and exports. The GVN would soon enact an investment law to 
support such ventures. The development of exports, Thieu said, was “a top priority in 
the national effort to achieve economic independence”.175  
In their outline of the November reforms Ngoc and Trung attempted to 
undermine certain other civilian economists and technicians within the GVN who had a 
marked preference for planning and who were lobbying Thieu to strengthen the state’s 
planning functions. “Only a small number of countries in the world” the ministers 
wrote, “have the required capacity and means to apply a direct and detailed control 
system necessary for the harmonisation of a planned economy”. In a country with as 
poor administration as South Vietnam “it would be hard to carry out economic control 
in an effective manner”.176 While the men had a point about the problems of planning 
for a state lacking bureaucratic reach and data collection, all of this was in stark contrast 
to their model states of Taiwan and Korea. Although both Taiwan and South Korea 
were pursuing export-led development models by the 1970s, this was after long periods 
of import-substitution. Even as both Taiwan and Korea turned to an export strategy, the 
state continued to play the central role in the economy and engaged in long-term 
planning. The GVN’s 1971 economic package bore more than passing resemblance to 
South Korea’s 1965 reforms mentioned above. While Ngoc and Hue presented the 
reforms as reorienting the economy toward the market, in South Korea similar reforms 
had left plenty of room for continued intervention. Indeed, in announcing the package, 
Thieu not only stressed export promotion but also import-substitution.177 Interpretations 
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of economic reforms were malleable, dependent on the meaning individual 
policymakers attached to them. 
While for some technocrats the improved security situation in 1969-1971 was 
cause to remove government restrictions on the economy, others believed that security 
offered stability and an opportunity to return to planning and state guidance of the 
economy. In June 1970 the Special Assistant for Planning in the President’s office, Tran 
Dai Trung, suggested that Thieu appoint a committee to draft a Five Year Plan.178 
Pursuing this idea, at the end of 1970 Thieu told Deputy National Security Advisor 
Alexander Haig and Ambassador Bunker that U.S. withdrawals had “raised serious 
concerns among the people”. In the hope of convincing the people of a continued 
American commitment to South Vietnam he said the GVN would have to develop “a 
long-range economic plan which would reflect continued U.S. participation”.179 Thieu 
was hinting at the performative aspects of planning. Like other Third World leaders, 
Thieu recognized that an economic plan was a prerequisite for securing international 
and bilateral assistance. Whether he believed in the merits of planning or not, Thieu 
believed a plan would be a useful tool in legitimising his rule and gaining continued 
U.S. support. In June 1971, Thieu therefore established a Ministry of Planning and 
National Development. Minister Le Tuan Anh and the Director General of Planning 
were responsible for heading up the committee to draft the plan. Although Ngoc and 
Trung had deputies on the committee, they did not sit on it themselves.180 It is not 
entirely clear why Thieu decided to place economic functions in several different 
ministries. He may have wanted to divide and conquer his ministers, ensuring that none 
gained too much power. In any case, the divisions between those who advocated private 
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enterprise and those who saw a more important role for the state sowed the seeds for 
rivalry and conflict within GVN economic circles. These tensions would explode after 
the Paris agreements, with the interventionists ultimately ousting the liberalizers. 
Outlining its strategy in early 1972, the Ministry of Planning noted that recent 
military, political, and economic developments had created a favourable environment 
for economic planning. The Communists had been forced to return to low level guerrilla 
warfare and through hamlet and village elections the GVN had established “democratic 
foundations” down to the hamlet-level. Planning, however, was contingent on the 
continued territorial security of the country, the maintenance of the current low tempo 
of the war, improved administration, and the continued support of friendly countries. 
These were uncertain assumptions in a war torn country and a volatile global economy. 
In addition, the Ministry’s strategy highlighted that if Taiwan and South Korea offered 
something to aspire to, they also provided Vietnamese planners a yardstick against 
which to measure South Vietnam’s poor economic performance. South Korea, Taiwan, 
and the Philippines provided planners with economic indicators and statistics on 
savings, investment, and exports, which only confirmed the imbalances and 
inadequacies in the South Vietnamese economy.181 
Due to the “grave deficiencies” in data collection, the authors of the plan noted, 
they had drawn together various schemes of Saigon ministries, the Postwar 
Development Plan of David Lillienthal’s Joint Development Group, as well as 
documents from other countries, notably Taiwan and South Korea. One government 
economist working on modelling the plan employed Rostow’s rhetoric to suggest that 
increases in exports were a precondition of “economic take-off”. With the prospect of 
reductions in U.S. aid, Tran Thanh Dang wrote, South Vietnam must try to increase 
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exports and reduce imports to fill the large foreign aid gap. But the government must 
also maintain price levels, a prerequisite for development and social stability.182 The 
plan called for both agriculture supporting and export-oriented industries as well as 
import-substituting industries using domestic raw materials. Government intervention 
by planning would depend on the constitution, historical and cultural traditions, and the 
level of development and would “decrease as the private sector and economy grow in 
strength”.183 Thieu described the plan as the “guiding light” in the journey to “stability 
and self-reliance from the present state of underdevelopment and foreign aid 
dependence”. The goal was self-sufficiency in food and agricultural diversification that 
could provide raw materials for light industry, paving the way for “large-scale 
industrialization and modernization”. Despite the conflicting visions of whether 
government planning and intervention or free enterprise would achieve economic 
growth, the apparent successes of Taiwan, Korea and Singapore moved GVN planners 
from internal growth models in the early 1960s to export-led development by the early 
1970s.  
Although much of the talk of public versus private investment, and ISI versus 
export-led development was fanciful, the South Vietnamese had placed the economy on 
a footing far more likely to result in economic growth than any time since the early 
1960s. In late 1971 inflation was down to 10-15% - the lowest level since 1964-, 
savings and receipts from exports and taxation were up, while devaluation had 
“virtually eliminated” windfall profiteering and considerably undercut the currency 
black market.184 Nonetheless the November 1971 reforms had exposed the regime to 
further criticism, again demonstrating the degree to which economic reform was 
contested in South Vietnam. General Duong Van ‘Big’ Minh, Thieu’s main challenger 
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in the presidential election before dropping out of the race, noted “that a dark future is 
waiting for our people”. The devaluation of the piaster and the rise in prices would 
mean more misery. The reforms, Minh said, only aimed to protract and widen a war 
“belonging to foreigners”.185 Others were clearly concerned by the degree to which 
recent reforms would subject South Vietnam to the whims of global capital. One 
National Assembly deputy said “the country will henceforth be exploited by foreign 
capitalists to the detriment of the people”.186  
 For many GVN technocrats and U.S. officials, however, the November 1971 
reform package appeared to usher in a new era, one of development rather than 
stabilization. Indeed, the reforms came to be known, perhaps a little hyperbolically, as 
the “Autumn Economic Revolution”. The London Financial Times called the June 1972 
investment law which resulted from the reforms “the most liberal such law in existence 
in Asia” and the government also established a well-capitalized Economic Development 
Fund.187 The United States was especially pleased that Thieu had taken such a strong 
personal interest in economic policy. In a speech before the American Chamber of 
Commerce in Saigon, Cooper noted that economic development had been placed, for 
the first time, on the same level as defence and pacification. The government had shown 
itself to be committed to a liberal economy, in which private enterprise and foreign 
investment would play the leading role. In what was surely a swipe at his enemies 
Nutter and Enke in the Department of Defense, Cooper said “Milton Friedman might 
not much appreciate the changes that have occurred here, but all of you with experience 
doing business in the developing world certainly should be greatly impressed”. South 
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Vietnam was “ripe for development”, Cooper said. “Of course the job would be easier if 
the war would end”.188   
Unfortunately, the war refused to end. For most GVN officials the relative 
security of 1969-1971 provided the entire logic for economic liberalization or state-led 
planning, depending on one’s preferences, and they even began to speak of a post-war 
era. Former Director of the Agricultural Development Bank and later Deputy Prime 
Minister for Economy and Agriculture Nguyen Van Hao noted that the “Autumn 
Economic Revolution” had aimed to reform the entire structure of the economy “to step 
into a period of development” and had appeared to promise great things to come. But 
1972 was an inauspicious year to begin economic planning or to jump start economic 
development in Vietnam and globally. The North Vietnamese Offensive which began in 
March, put paid to the pretence of the Four Year Plan and the growth promised by the 
liberalizers. The offensive saw a major contraction in domestic production and created 
another 800,000 refugees. The government revised the 1972 budget upwards twice to 
deal with increased defence and refugee costs. In addition, Hao noted, 1972 was the first 
year that the South Vietnamese economy felt the real impact of U.S. troop withdrawals. 
As many as 100,000 Vietnamese in the service of U.S. military and civilian 
organizations lost their jobs. Although the government had managed to close the 
yawning balance of payments gap by US$100m in 1972, Hao concluded that other 
major economic indicators had gone in the wrong direction which “does not allow us to 
adopt an optimistic attitude”.189  
The prospects for 1973 did not appear promising. The National Bank anticipated 
an even larger budget deficit in 1973, a drop in foreign exchange reserves due to the 
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decline in U.S. spending, and further unemployment. At the same time, the GVN could 
not limit imports without an adverse impact on prices and production. Whatever the 
efforts made, it would be difficult to keep prices increases at 1972 levels.190 Little did 
GVN officials realise that, after January 1973, these problems would be compounded by 
factors beyond their control, namely the 1973 oil shock, the decline in the real value of 
U.S. economic aid, and the presence of tens of thousands more North Vietnamese 
troops competing for resources with the regime in the south. 
 
Conclusion 
Vietnamization presented U.S. and South Vietnamese economic officials with a 
complex set of problems and placed near impossible demands on the South Vietnamese 
economy. These demands drove policymakers in Saigon in two directions – one 
reasonably free market and the other somewhat dirigiste- both in part inspired by the 
Taiwan and Korean models. Despite the contested vision in Saigon, the economy was 
placed on a sounder footing for development in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Many 
economic indicators including receipts from exports, domestic savings, and taxation 
rose considerably. These reforms often generated domestic backlash, both popularly and 
in the National Assembly. Nonetheless, the reforms initiated were never radical enough 
to address the economy’s fundamental inadequacies. While GVN technocrats and 
planners might have waxed lyrical about South Vietnam’s future among the Asian 
Tigers, economic reform was always secondary to political stability. As this was the 
case, the demands of Vietnamization could not have been met without continued, 
though gradually declining, U.S. and international aid. After 1973, this would become 
increasingly unlikely in the context of the global economy, the continuing war, Thieu’s 
increasingly illegitimate rule, and U.S. domestic politics in the 1970s. 
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The South Vietnamese regime was a dictatorship but clearly there was a degree 
of pluralism in terms of its development vision. Technocrats such as Ngoc, Hue and 
Trung saw free enterprise and a diminished role for the state as the best way to promote 
development. But even they sometimes had to acknowledge that, in a volatile economy 
and in the absence of other forces, the state had to intervene. Others such as Thieu and 
Anh, while making a rhetorical commitment to private enterprise, saw the state as 
playing a crucial role in guiding the economy through planning, controls, and import-
substitution. But all sides in the debate believed that export-led growth was the key to 
South Vietnam’s modernization and economic survival. This represented a shift away 
from the endogenous growth model of the Diem era. Above all, this demonstrates that 
economic development policy reflected the Saigon regime’s attraction to the model 
offered by the East Asian developmental states. 
Examining South Vietnamese economic policy in the years after the Tet 
Offensive tells us a good deal about South Vietnamese agency and dependency on the 
United States during the final years of the war. South Vietnamese actions were taken in 
response to the external environment – U.S. pressure and the perceived success of the 
Taiwan and Korean development models- but equally as importantly in response to the 
internal environment, particularly the tempo of the war and strength of certain political 
constituencies within South Vietnam at different times. While the U.S. was able to get 
the reforms it wanted in 1969-72, this was because it had allies in the GVN who already 
believed in a more liberal development policy. Between 1969 and 1971, Ngoc, Hue and 
Trung’s hand was strengthened by their ability to convince Thieu that reforms were 
what the U.S. wanted and that further aid was dependent on these decisions. They were 
also able to point to Thieu’s model states of Korea and Taiwan to justify these moves. 
During this period, Thieu’s perception that the war was going reasonably well as well as 
his need for continued U.S. support made him far more likely to enact the reforms that 
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these technocrats advocated. After the Paris Peace Agreement, as will be seen, the U.S. 
was far less concerned about South Vietnamese macroeconomic policy and, in light of 
the deteriorating security situation, those who opposed the liberalizers were able to 
assert their authority.  
An examination of economic reform in the post-Tet years begs the question of 
why, in the face of such overwhelming obstacles, did U.S. and South Vietnamese 
officials adopt a strategy based on exports and foreign investment? For a regime that 
hoped to achieve export-led take-off, export figures should have been a major cause of 
concern. Exports of rubber, fish, and plywood in 1972 amounted to $23 million while 
imports in the early 1970s were between $700-750 million per year.191 Foreign 
investment would prove an equally wishful method of attracting economic support as 
long as the war continued. Yet successive U.S. and South Vietnamese decisions on the 
RVN economy called for the expansion of exports and private investment as the main 
solutions to the economic crisis. Why did South Vietnamese pursue these goals? On the 
one hand, drawing on Taiwan and South Korea provided a useful rhetorical tool. The 
lessons offered by these states’ export-oriented model, however ill-defined it was and 
whatever its distance from South Vietnamese reality, offered an attractive narrative that 
RVN technocrats could employ to describe the tasks of the present and to draw a picture 
of the future. On the other hand, it was not entirely unrealistic for South Vietnamese 
leaders to imagine their country as the next Taiwan or South Korea. While there were 
certain dissimilarities, there were many similarities between the three countries. Above 
all, the primary cause of South Vietnam’s economic troubles was not the inadequacies 
or corruption of its authoritarian leaders but the ongoing war. A look at agricultural 
development, a subject to which this dissertation now turns, shows the degree to which 
                                                
191 ‘Import issues and the establishment of a thrifty and austere way of life’ [Vấn đề nhập cảng và việc tạo 
lập một nếp sống cần kiệm, khắc khổ], 1 August 1973, Folder 3031, PTTDNCH-TTLTQGII. 
99 
 
the war, more than any other factor, undermined the GVN’s ability to capitalize on the 
tremendous rural changes that occurred in South Vietnam after the Tet Offensive. 
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Chapter Two 
“He Behaves Like an Economic Man”: Agricultural 
Development and Land Reform in South Vietnam 
 
In January 1968 two farmers from My Phuoc Village in An Giang province drove 
down Nguyen Thuc Thong Street in Saigon on a Fiat 612, a medium size, heavy duty 
tractor. The men had bought the tractor in Saigon for VN$550,000 (US$4,600) and had 
waited 3 months for its delivery. They planned to return to An Giang, 170km away, 
where they hoped to hire out the tractor to fellow farmers, ploughing up to 300 hectares 
a season. These were “not sophisticated individuals” U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth 
Bunker suggested, “but there was no doubt in their minds as to the profitability of the 
tractor. The entrepreneurial spirit is not lacking- the farmers saw a chance to profit by 
the application of a new (to them) technology and seized it”. Bunker was not alone in 
such assumptions. The central challenge of agricultural development in the Global 
South, it seemed to U.S. social scientists, development practitioners, and government 
officials, was to transform the psychology of the peasant. The tractor-riding men 
Bunker saw were the kind of individualistic, risk-taking and entrepreneurial farmers that 
United States officials and their South Vietnamese allies wanted to see in war-torn 
South Vietnam.192 
 In the 1950s and 1960s development agencies overwhelmingly focused their 
efforts on the rural areas of the Global South. The countryside, where the vast majority 
of the world’s poorest lived, seemed the most likely source of communist insurgency. 
Indeed, in 1949 the Chinese Communist Party had risen to power on a tide of peasant 
support. These rural areas appeared to embody a pre-capitalist social and economic 
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order. Many development projects aimed to erase this order, eliminate the grievances 
that might lead to rebellion, and integrate the postcolonial nations and their peasant 
populations into the global capitalist economy.  
Social scientists were unsure of the value of agriculture to postcolonial 
economies. Early development theory framed the agricultural sector as merely a source 
of surplus labour for industrialization. Rice production in particular appeared to 
contribute little to development. In a process he called “agricultural involution” Clifford 
Geertz argued that peasant families worked harder for ever smaller increments in 
production. Intensification of input did not result in a corresponding increase in output 
per capita. Geertz argued that rice production hindered modernization because 
traditional cultivation methods absorbed surplus labour and although productivity kept 
up with population growth, it did not increase. By the early 1960s however, 
development economists such Theodore Shultz and Simon Kuznets argued that 
agriculture, and particularly small farmers, were drivers of development.193 
More than any other social scientists, modernization theorists believed in the 
necessity of transforming peasant farmers’ values as the route to economic 
development. Marion Levy, in one of the early works that would become part of the 
modernization canon- The Family Revolution in Modern China- argued that future-
oriented people were open to the manipulation of their environment whereas tradition-
bound people were fearful of change. MIT’s Centre for International Studies, in a report 
submitted to the U.S. Senate in 1960, suggested that agricultural modernization would 
require “radical changes… not only in the knowledge of these numerous producers but 
in their values, their perception of alternatives and their motivation”. Rostow in 
particular saw the importance of psychological transformation. “A requirement for take-
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off”, Rostow believed “is… a class of farmers willing and able to respond to the 
possibilities opened up for them by new techniques, land-holding arrangements, 
transport facilities and forms of market and credit organization”. A small elite can 
stimulate growth but “especially in agriculture... a wider-based revolution in outlook 
must come about”.  Modernization of agriculture would require a move away from 
subsistence mono-cultures to crop diversification, livestock rearing, mechanization, and 
the application of new technologies on the farm.194 
Once the psychology of the peasant farmer had changed, higher agricultural 
production could create a surplus that could then be invested in new industrial 
enterprises. The rural areas, with newly awakened, middle peasants with disposal 
income would become a new market for growing industries. Daniel Lerner said that this 
consumer penetration of countryside was a key goal of modernization. The Sears-
Roebuck catalogue, Lerner suggested, was “the great symbol” of the “spread of 
consumption of urban products beyond the city limits”.195 
Despite the belief in the need to transform peasant society, there was no consensus 
about how to best approach the subject of agricultural development in the Global South. 
Late 20th century narratives of the success of the “Green Revolution” elide the many 
compromises and contestations that accompanied rural development in the first 25 years 
of the Cold War. “Modernizers”, Cullather argues, “imagined many attainable futures 
for Asia, and the alternatives of land reform, community development, TVA-style river 
valley development, farm-industry integration, and the ‘new strategy’ based on high 
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yielding varieties of wheat and rice each represented a distinct interpretation of the 
Asian condition and the goals to be sought”.196  
Of all the development paradigms that U.S. government and non-government 
organizations promoted, however, none occupied as prominent a place in the 
development tool box as land reform, community development, and the high-yield 
varieties of the Green Revolution. One scholar has suggested that these approaches 
succeeded one another, with the triumph of the Green Revolution in the late 1960s 
finally erasing the chances for more equitable programmes of land reform and 
community development that practitioners had promoted in the 1940s and 1950s.197 
This chapter demonstrates that in South Vietnam these paradigms could co-exist. 
Between 1968 and 1973, the GVN introduced high-yield ‘miracle rice’ varieties, 
initiated community development projects in the form of the Village Self-Development 
(VSD) Programme, and launched the Land-to the-Tiller, a massive program of land 
reform. Added to this was the state-led introduction of huge amounts of agricultural 
credit on easy terms. For South Vietnamese and U.S. officials there was no apparent 
contradiction among these varied approaches. Each of these steps aimed to draw peasant 
farmers to the side of the government and contribute to economic development and 
village self-government. The miracle rice project sought to increase farmer income and 
return South Vietnam to a state of rice self-sufficiency. Farmers’ new found wealth 
would be channelled into the Village Self-Development Program (VSD), which sought 
to increase communal solidarity, forging closer links among the people and between the 
people and village authorities. Even more so than the miracle rice project and the VSD, 
land reform would provide the peasantry with clear evidence that their best interests lay 
with the government. The VSD and land reform represented a significant 
decentralization of power to the villages and a redistribution of the nation’s wealth. By 
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encouraging peasants to donate to local development projects and by allowing village 
governments to collect taxes on newly redistributed land, the projects also sought to 
increase village self-sufficiency at a time when national resources were stretched thin. 
Modernization theory might have come under fire in the social sciences by the 
late 1960s, but social scientists continued to debate the economic behaviour of the 
Asian peasant. This was best encapsulated in the post-Vietnam War debate between 
James C. Scott and Samuel Popkin. Scott believed that peasants were inherently risk 
averse. Experiences of food shortages meant that peasants were more concerned about 
ensuring subsistence and avoiding failure than making profit. Peasant societies, 
although exploitative, guaranteed subsistence and peasants only rebelled when this 
subsistence was threatened. Such societies were not “radically egalitarian” Scott argued 
but had developed a “moral economy” which included certain forms of social insurance 
to protect those who suffered economic misfortune. The commercialization of 
agriculture and new forms of taxation and landholding during the colonial era had 
exposed peasants to fluctuating market forces and stripped away these forms of social 
insurance.198 
Employing the rational choice theory which had become so popular among 
Chicago School economists, Popkin argued that peasants were motivated by individual 
and family interests, not those of the village, political parties, or the nation. Popkin 
doubted that Scott’s “moral economy” had ever existed because it took too benign a 
view of village institutions and overlooked conflict within them. Instead Popkin argued 
that peasants were rational actors who made “many long-term as well as short-term 
investments” and both risky and risk-averse economic decisions.199 
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During the war itself, U.S. and South Vietnamese officials employed something 
akin to the “moral economy” and “rational peasant” models to understand peasant 
behaviour and to design development projects.200 Whether one accepted the concept of 
the moral economy or the rational peasant influenced the kind of nation-building and 
development projects one might advocate. Those who saw the Vietnamese peasant as 
inherently individualistic and rational tended to favour modernization projects which 
provided economic incentives and sought to integrate these farmers into the cash 
economy. Those who saw the peasants as essentially moral advocated community 
development projects which required that peasants pool labour and money for the 
greater good of the village.  
The post-Tet GVN programmes sparked major changes in the countryside. 
Agricultural output and rural prosperity increased considerably. But the fruits of 
development were unevenly distributed. South Vietnam was environmentally diverse 
and development projects played out very differently in different areas of the country.201 
Farmers’ ability to benefit from GVN programmes was heavily dependent on their 
geographical location and the quality of their land, the degree of security in their village, 
and their access to GVN credit. The two men Bunker spotted on the tractor in Saigon 
hailed from An Giang province, touted as “the most pacified province in the nation”. As 
such American and South Vietnamese officials selected the province as a site for 
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experimental agricultural development and credit programmes. An Giang enjoyed much 
greater peace and prosperity, and much higher level of agricultural mechanization than 
other South Vietnamese provinces. Peasant farmers in the northern provinces, on the 
other hand, were at a distinct disadvantage to enjoy the benefits of the GVN’s 
agricultural modernization and land reform projects, for reasons of both security and 
environment. Even as it pushed the NLF forces back after 1968, the government 
controlled much less territory in the northern half of the country and the refugee crisis 
there was far more acute. Had the war not raged so badly in the provinces in the north, 
population pressure, inferior rice land, and a poor agriculture infrastructure would still 
have placed these peasants in a weaker position. In ignoring these realities, Bunker 
spoke of the “entrepreneurial spirit” of these farmers in contrast to their more 
“traditional” counterparts, suggesting that a psychological transformation in peasant 
farmers was more fundamental to agricultural modernization than access to good land, 
credit, and security.202 
Large numbers of wealthier peasants with the means to take advantage of GVN 
programmes thrived during the final years of the American War. This was particularly 
true of those wealthier farmers with good land in the Mekong Delta. After the Tet 
Offensive rice production in the Delta increased dramatically and there were numerous 
signs of prosperity and greater consumption. The GVN attempted to guide this process 
and direct the increased wealth into channels of support for the government but it 
struggled to harness these changes, both politically and economically. 
 
Land Tenure and Agricultural Development in South Vietnam, 1954-1968 
Between the 1880s and 1930s the French colonial state dredged canals and 
reclaimed hundreds of thousands of hectares in the Mekong Delta. Up to the 1920s an 
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average of 73,000 Vietnamese per year settled along the Delta’s new canals, only to 
discover that they had become tenants of French and wealthy Vietnamese landlords.203 
In 1945, 2.5% of landowners owned 50% of the land while about 80% of farmers were 
tenants, meaning the Mekong Delta had among the highest concentrations of land 
ownership of any region in the world. Rental rates were often as high as 50% and 
usurious loans were common. Tenants had no protection against crop failure or floods, 
relying entirely on the benevolence of their landlords which was often not 
forthcoming.204 French colonial administrators and later many South Vietnamese 
officials believed that the peasantry accepted this as the permanent condition of their 
lives. Jeffrey Race has suggested “this fatalistic passive attitude” provided “a terrific 
stumbling block” and that the Viet Minh’s “decisive destruction of this fatalism” was 
one of the enduring accomplishments of the revolution during the First Indochina War. 
Yet the revolution, Race argues, did not rile up passions that did not already exist.205  
The Viet Minh was therefore able to secure a considerable amount of its support 
by addressing land ownership, the issue of greatest concern in the lives of the 
Vietnamese peasantry. The Viet Minh’s programme included the assassination or 
coercion of landlords, and the reduction of rents and the redistribution of land. Other 
landlords fled to the towns and cities. Many peasants received land in return for their 
support of the revolution and some areas of South Vietnam where Viet Minh land 
reform had occurred would remain hotbeds of revolutionary support well into the 
1960s.206  
From its inception the South Vietnamese state was thus at a disadvantage. The 
land policies of Emperor Bao Dai’s State of Vietnam (1949-1955) and Ngo Dinh 
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Diem’s Republic of Vietnam only served to compound this disadvantage. More often 
than not these reforms amounted to a reassertion of the privileges of the landlords that 
the Viet Minh, with the peasantry’s support, had fought to abolish. In the dying days of 
the First Indochina War, the State of Vietnam introduced a number of ordinances that 
ostensibly included maximum rents of 15% and limitations on the size of landholdings. 
The reforms, USAID later reported, “were so watered down as to make it meaningless” 
and were not enforced largely because the government did not control the 
countryside.207 Upon his ascension to power in 1954, Diem continued land reform along 
much the same lines. Ordinances 2 of January 1955 established maximum rents of 15-
25% and contracts to prevent competitive evictions. Ordinance 7 of the following month 
sought to promote agricultural production by providing protection for tenants on some 
600,000 hectares of rice land that had been abandoned during and reclaimed after the 
French-Viet Minh war. These reforms sought to regularise the landlord-tenant 
relationship and increase production. The laws again went unenforced, while neither 
piece of legislation did anything to address the inequality of land ownership in the 
countryside. Indeed for many peasants, the creation of the Republic of Vietnam in 1955 
simply meant the return of the landlords that the Viet Minh had chased out during the 
war against the French.208 
Ordinance 57, promulgated in October 1956, was the most ambitious of the Diem-
era reforms. It set a maximum rental rate at a still very large 100 hectares. Over this 
amount, the government would purchase land from the landlord and resell it in small 
parcels to tenant farmers. This high retention limit, over thirty times higher than post-
war land reform programmes in Japan, Taiwan and South Korea, meant that only one-
third of the cultivated rice land in the country was affected. By the mid-1960s the 
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government had distributed only 40% of this land. Along the coastal plains of central 
Vietnam, where there were almost no holdings over 100 hectares, the programme had 
no impact. Despite the professed goals, Ordinance 57 was likely to make little 
contribution to higher agricultural productivity or encourage landlords to use their 
compensation to invest in industry simply because it impacted so little of the country.209  
Both Edward Miller and Philip Catton have suggested that Diem paid lip service 
to land reform but was more interested in the redistribution of people, not land. He 
pursued this through his concept of Land Development. This programme involved 
relocating thousands of demobilized soldiers, refugees from North Vietnam and 
peasants from the densely populated central coast into unoccupied land in the Mekong 
Delta and central highlands. The idea was to “fill vacant territory with a contented 
population” and build a “human wall” that would defend the area in the name of Saigon. 
The programme would also boost agricultural production by opening up unproductive 
lands and encouraging a measure of agricultural diversification. This programme, had 
antecedents in the precolonial and colonial settlement of the Mekong Delta and the 
GVN would resurrect the idea in the 1970s in a bid to increase agricultural output and 
plant the countryside with loyalists of the Saigon regime.210  
Land reform practically ceased during the years of growing revolutionary control 
in the countryside and political instability in Saigon. By the mid-1960s, the Delta was 
still one of the worst regions in the world for landlessness. In 1967, a study by the 
Stanford Research Institute found that 70% of farming families were substantially or 
wholly dependent on tenancy. As a peasant in South Vietnam prior to 1970 the best 
chance of receiving land or reduced rents was if you lived in an area of revolutionary 
control and the NLF had killed, coerced or chase away your landlord. Conversely, as 
Bernard Fall suggested “whenever government troops reoccupied a given area” the 
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government “restores the old tenant-landlord” relationship. Until well into the 1960s, 
the establishment or reestablishment of GVN authority in the countryside went hand in 
hand with the return of rent-collecting landlords.211 
Despite the absence of meaningful land reform, up to 1960 the RVN could still 
claim reasonably healthy agricultural and export sectors. Hanoi’s decision to escalate 
the struggle in the south in 1959 was at least partly motivated by the growing 
commercialization in the south and South Vietnam’s integration into the global 
capitalist economy.212 As the war escalated, however, the struggle for the rice crop grew 
with an obvious negative impact on agricultural output. Historian John Perkins has 
noted the centrality of food supply to national security, particularly in war time. 
“Neither armies nor urban workforces nor farmers can function to defend the nation if 
their food supply is interrupted, inadequate in quality or quantity, or unsafe. Targeting 
the enemy’s food supply…demonstrates the strategic importance of agricultural 
production”.213 From the late 1950s onwards, the forces of the revolution emphasised 
the need for food self-sufficiency in liberated areas but as North Vietnamese troops 
infiltrated into the south, the strain on the food supply increased. Intelligence suggested 
that North Vietnam did not send enough rice down the Ho Chi Minh trail to meet the 
needs of PAVN troops operating in the south so these units depended on locally 
procured supplies. Particularly in the northern provinces of South Vietnam where rice 
was always in shorter supply and where PAVN troops operated most, the U.S. and GVN 
pursued rice denial operations which included the destruction of the crop in enemy-
controlled areas and the burning of captured rice caches. On occasion, when the rice 
crop in enemy controlled areas appeared promising, the U.S. forces would airlift 
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refugees into the area to harvest the rice, with U.S. and GVN forces providing security. 
One observer noted that such operations were designed not only to deny the 
NLF/PAVN food but “to convince all the populace living under enemy control to move 
into the GVN area to avoid food shortages”.214  
U.S. and South Vietnamese forces also sprayed herbicides and defoliants to deny 
the NLF and PAVN access to food and cover but such operations ruined crops and 
destroyed village economies. An even more destructive policy was the deliberate 
depopulation of the countryside to deny the enemy access to recruitment, tax revenue, 
and other forms of support. In a 1968 memo, Westmoreland noted that removing the 
revolutionary forces from the villages was “very time consuming” but removing the 
people from villages “can be carried out relatively quickly”. As the result of such 
policies, at least one third of the South Vietnamese population registered as refugees at 
one time or another between 1965 and 1972. This upheaval had obvious negative effects 
on the agricultural economy, to say nothing of Vietnamese village life.215  
The GVN and U.S. struggled to balance destruction with the need for agricultural 
development. In an address to the Armed Forces Congress in January 1966, Nguyen 
Cao Ky spoke of the need for crop diversification, mechanized agriculture, improved 
irrigation techniques, and livestock husbandry as evidence of progress. The following 
month at the Honolulu Conference, Lyndon Johnson expressed his desire to see higher 
agricultural output and rural electrification.216 Despite such lofty rhetoric however, due 
to the escalating violence in the countryside South Vietnam went from the world’s third 
largest exporter of rice in 1963 to depending heavily on imported U.S. rice under the 
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PL-480 programme. This imported rice not only granted the Johnson administration 
leverage to gain the reforms the United States wanted, but privileged urban stability 
over rural production.217 Such was the South Vietnamese demand on American rice, 
however, that by 1967 the United States was struggling to meet its PL480 rice 
commitments around the world. President Johnson began to wonder whether subsidies 
might to be used to encourage Vietnamese to eat more wheat. The U.S. embassy 
eventually rejected this idea, believing that the preference for rice in Vietnam was so 
marked and that Vietnamese culture was so organized around rice consumption that it 
would never work.218 As such efforts would have to be made to increase domestic rice 
production but past experience indicated that this would be an uphill battle. Despite a 
plethora of U.S. and government-sponsored rural development projects, in June 1966 
Robert Komer could tell Johnson “it’s incredible that in 11 years in a rural country, 
even during wartime, we’ve accomplished so little in agriculture”.219  
What Komer did not realise was that major agricultural changes were already 
underway but the United States had not identified them and, in some cases, the GVN 
was impeding them. Over the next year and a half, however, U.S. officials began to 
detect these changes. USAID researchers suddenly discovered that as the canal 
infrastructure fell into disrepair farmers in the Mekong Delta had begun adapting 
portable motor-boat engines into pumps to manage water-levels in their paddies. These 
engines became available through the Commercial Import Program in 1963. By 1967 
approximately 50,000 Delta farmers had bought one. Far from embracing this kind of 
development the GVN wanted to regulate it for fear that the engines were falling into 
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the hands of the revolution. Despite these restrictions, the authors noted, “the economic 
revolution which is currently taking place in rural Vietnam is staggering”.220  
In late 1966 the government also reduced subsidies on wholesale rice and 
increased the price of paddy, while maintaining the price of fertilizer. This proved an 
incentive to rural production and by the middle of the following year it appeared, at 
least to U.S. officials, to be stimulating a revolution in the countryside. In Ba Tri district 
in Kien Hoa, a Revolutionary Development priority area, observers noted that 
“consumerism is in full sway” as “as the good life filters out of Saigon and into the 
Vietnamese countryside”. Locals had swapped their black pyjamas for brightly coloured 
shirts and many households now had sewing machines, radios and a Honda motor 
bike.221 In Tieu Can district in Vinh Binh, similar changes were occurring, despite the 
fact that several of the district’s villages remained firmly under NLF control. The 
conclusion that reporters drew was that better prices for agricultural products could 
stimulate rural change even where only minor security gains had been made.222 U.S. 
embassy officials touring the countryside were particularly keen to understand these 
changes in terms of the economic behaviour of peasants. It was clear that wealthier 
farmers were making profit-maximizing investments but they were also pleased to 
report that some poorer famers were making similarly “rational decisions”. After 
interviewing Mr. Nguyen Van Dong of Tan Phu New Life Hamlet in Vinh Long 
province, U.S. officials reported that despite his meagre means, Dong “does make some 
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attempt to allocate his resources so as to maximize his profits. In other words, he 
behaves like an economic man”.223 
Historians have noted how the Tet Offensive shattered these changes almost 
before they began. They have used the NLF and PAVN’s offensive as a convenient 
narrative tool for ending their discussions of development and modernization. Others 
have assumed that the South Vietnamese state was so weak in the years after 1968 that 
it was unable to conduct meaningful development projects.224 Yet these changes 
continued and even accelerated after 1968 and scholars have paid this period scant 
attention. Innovations such as the adapted boat engines demonstrated the pervasiveness 
of “rational” farmers in the Delta and the degree to which such social and economic 
developments could occur outside of GVN and U.S. efforts. The way in which these 
changes had occurred as a corollary to the CIP, rather than as conscious policy, offered 
an important lesson for the future. After 1968 many GVN-led development 
interventions stimulated economic and social change but it was questionable to what 
extent the GVN could guide these processes, how much they would change the political 
loyalties of those who adopted them and whether the state could even harness these 
transformations to its economic advantage. 
 
The Green Revolution Comes to South Vietnam 
As South Vietnamese agricultural production declined in the mid-1960s, scientists 
at the Ford Foundation-funded International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) in the 
Philippines were cross-breeding rice to create high-yield varieties. Traditional rice 
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varieties produced lower yields, and their longer stems meant that even if they 
responded well to fertilizer, they would become top-heavy and fall over, or “lodge”. 
Moreover, traditional rice varieties could only produce one crop a year. IR8, the first 
strain of “miracle rice” developed in 1965 and released the following year, matured in 
125 days, responded well to fertilizer and did not lodge, thanks to its shorter stem. It 
could produce yields two to three times higher than the two tonne average of varieties 
common to Southeast Asia, and in optimum conditions a farmer could grow two or even 
three crops a year.225 
Official experimentation with miracle rice began in South Vietnam as a private 
initiative when Professor Ton That Trinh- consultant to the government and soon 
Minister of Land Reform and Agriculture - planted it in small plots in the Delta.226 
When floods hit Vo Dat in Binh Tuy province in 1967 it offered a pretext for the GVN 
and American advisers to apply the new miracle rice seed on a wider scale. The floods 
had destroyed the crop and once the water had receded it would be too late to plant 
indigenous varieties. Because IR8 had a shorter growth cycle it was not too late in the 
year to plant it in Vo Dat. Village leaders and farmers were flown to an experimental 
plot at Hiep Hoa to convince them of the viability of the project. This demonstration 
effect would become a key principle in the GVN’s effort to spread HYVs in South 
Vietnam. The project required oversight by the GVN- pumps had to be repaired and 
farmers had to be “persuaded to continue farming during the holiday season”. The 
villagers planted the new rice in October and harvested it four months later, shortly 
before the Tet Offensive. According the GVN, IR8 saved the village from “starvation”. 
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A USAID report claimed the Vo Dat experiment was “a stellar success” as the villagers 
“doubled the yield over local varieties” despite adverse conditions.227  
The introduction of miracle rice recast development and military priorities. In 
January 1968, in the wake of the Vo Dat experiment, the Ministry of Land Reform and 
Agriculture (MLRA) launched an Accelerated Rice Production Program with the goals 
of planting 44,000 hectares to new varieties in 1968 and attaining agricultural self-
sufficiency within four years. This was an ambitious goal for a war-torn country, 
heavily dependent on U.S. rice, but it indicates the hope that the GVN invested in the 
new varieties. One of the primary reasons the new varieties appealed so much to MLRA 
planners was that it seemed to simplify agricultural development. More rice could be 
grown without having to increase the acreage of land under government control.228 The 
GVN even renamed IRRI varieties “Than Nong (TN) rice” after the Vietnamese God of 
agriculture. 
The MLRA informed Province Agricultural services that the increase in food 
crops, particularly rice was the key concern in 1968 and if services were short staffed 
they should terminate “sporadic programs” and focus on rice production instead.229 
Following instructions from Washington, Westmoreland’s 1968 campaign plan in the 
Mekong Delta was “carefully coordinated with agricultural production and designed to 
minimize disruptions”. The sixteen provinces of the Delta and Long An province 
accounted for South Vietnam’s surplus rice-producing area, and seventy-five percent of 
the country’s total rice production. The rest of the country was deficient in rice supplies, 
relying on the Delta or imports to meet demand. U.S. and ARVN forces would provide 
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a shield for increased rice production and clear away key lines of communication to 
ensure that the rice got to market.230  
In addition to miracle rice’s ability to produce higher yields, it appealed to 
modernizers because it could act as a social solvent, transforming the work habits and 
psychology of the peasant farmer and in turn the entire agricultural economy. IRRI’s 
work proceeded from the notion that peasants were not yet rational economic actors, but 
Green Revolution technology could make them so.231 Because IR8 required higher 
applications of chemical fertilizer and pesticides, farmers would have to make 
potentially risky investments in return for higher yields and higher profits. As one 
American adviser put it, the new rice would “require substantial alteration of centuries 
old-farming habits and methods”.232 In other words, it was precisely the kind of 
technology modernizers had sought to pull the economically isolated peasant into an 
agricultural-industrial complex. 
Much like American developmental thinkers and policymakers, GVN planners 
identified poverty as the cause of rebellion. The peasantry’s support for the NLF, they 
believed, resulted from violent coercion and economic privation. Increases in rural 
wealth, these officials hoped, would undermine the NLF. Miracle rice was particularly 
promising in this respect, since it had the potential to break the peasants’ bonds with the 
NLF by creating economic incentives that would encourage farmers to act in individual 
rather than communal interest.233 These economic incentives also encouraged farmers to 
produce larger surpluses which could feed South Vietnam’s deficit areas and perhaps 
even generate exports. In this sense, the commercialization of agriculture would serve 
the interests of the fragile state. Although this alone would not resolve Saigon’s 
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economic and political woes, it would demonstrate some measure of economic viability 
to U.S. and international audiences as well as to Hanoi.  
Many of Saigon’s development projects focused on incremental wealth increases 
in contrast to the NLF’s redistributive policies.234 The miracle rice project proceeded 
from much the same point of view largely by default. Early strains of miracle rice 
required specific cultural conditions including level land and access to a manageable 
fresh water supply. Such conditions were far more prevalent in the central part of the 
Delta than in the rest of the country. Particularly in the country’s northern provinces, 
where the war raged most violently, farmers rarely had access to a manageable water 
supply. Farmers could, and many did, grow miracle rice on suboptimal land, but they 
almost certainly could not double-crop or produce as high yields. The MLRA 
encouraged those peasants without adequate land to modernize within the limits 
possible. But the focus, director of cabinet in the MLRA Tran Quang Minh noted, was 
to create a “sizeable corps” of “progressive farmers”.235 USAID framed the issue in 
similar terms, noting in 1969 that South Vietnam could once again export rice “even if 
only 30% of small farmers in Vietnam would engage in modern cultural practices”.236 
These were what the NLF termed “middle” and “rich peasants”, those with sufficient 
access to land, inputs and credit to benefit from the Green Revolution. The GVN sought 
to harness these farmers’ productive capacity. Thus, the miracle rice programme further 
aggravated social stratification in the countryside.  
To get the programme started, the GVN and USAID distributed miracle rice kits 
and launched a “supervised credit” programme through which farmers received 
financial and technical assistance to grow miracle rice in return for a pledge to follow 
the correct cultivation practices. It was crucial, agricultural technicians believed, that 
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early adoptees were successful so that their neighbours would replicate their efforts.237 
Provincial agricultural services also established demonstration plots along well-
travelled roads to ensure that passing farmers saw them. Advisers were encouraged to 
host field-days to show local farmers and officials the plots’ success.238 Senior MLRA 
officials’ belief that provincial agricultural cadre could guide the process of agricultural 
development proved as misplaced as their belief that the peasantry existed along a 
tradition-modernity axis, however. U.S. and South Vietnamese officials at the 
provincial level, found themselves struggling to control events, while peasant farmers 
proved once again the agents of innovation as the seed proliferated beyond GVN-
controlled programmes. There was little need for concern that Vietnamese farmers 
would not adopt the new technology; by 1969, USAID estimated that at least 70,000 
had independently done so.239 While the new rice reached some NLF areas, the need for 
fertilizer, credit and security dictated that most of these farmers were in GVN-controlled 
areas. The proliferation of the new rice was one of the project goals and was good news 
for agricultural output but it became clear almost immediately that tracking the number 
of plots and volume of rice and, by implication, the rationalization of the rice market 
would be “practically impossible”.240 
The GVN launched the Accelerated Rice Production Programme at an 
inauspicious time, just a month before the Tet Offensive. Civilian advisers followed 
American and South Vietnamese military forces, as they pulled back to defend towns 
and cities. Dikes and paddies were further damaged, and marketing links between the 
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Delta and Saigon were disrupted for weeks. With a decline in security and increased 
transportation costs, rice shipments from the Delta to Saigon might drop dramatically, 
creating another disincentive to production. This disruption combined with U.S. rice 
shortages led the White House to predict major shortages in Vietnam by the end of 
1968. Johnson expressed his concern just five days after the beginning of the offensive, 
again raising the idea of wheat consumption, telling his staff “be sure that we are trying 
to teach Indonesia and South Vietnam to eat wheat as quickly as possible, and start 
furnishing wheat in lieu of rice”. But he was also concerned about the political 
ramifications of rice shortages and price rises at a time when South Vietnam’s cities 
were under attack: “take whatever steps necessary to be sure we have surplus rice for 
Vietnam, so prices stay in line”. This decision to maintain the price of rice in the cities, 
at a time when transport and other costs had risen, badly affected farmers’ income in 
1968.241 
Nonetheless, by April 1968 joint GVN-USAID surveys of the provinces 
suggested that damage was not as bad as originally suspected and the year’s rice 
production goals might still be met.242 Average yields for the second harvest in the 
autumn of 1968 were more than double those of indigenous varieties.243 Despite the 
tremendous destruction in the countryside in 1968, rice shipments from the Delta to 
Saigon were slightly higher than 1967.244 Interviews with farmers in GVN-controlled 
areas suggest they were genuinely enthusiastic about the new rice varieties, and many 
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associated their introduction with the government.245 Pleased with the results of the 
1968 effort, the MLRA set a target of planting 200,000 hectares of TN rice for the 
following year, and Minister Trinh declared that “Vietnam will probably return to her 
position of a rice exporting country in the near future”.246   
In September and November 1968 the government removed all restrictions on the 
rice transportation and then raised the wholesale price of imported U.S. rice. Given that 
the price of domestic varieties was largely determined by the availability and price of 
U.S. rice, Bunker said that this action “accomplished one of the major goals of U.S. 
economic policy in Vietnam, i.e. to raise rural incomes, and provide farmers with an 
incentive in the form of higher paddy prices”. For those who remained in NLF areas, the 
Ambassador reported, “economic life has a different cast… activity is stagnant and 
standards of living are primitive”.247  
During the Accelerated Pacification Campaign which began in November 1968, 
the spread of TN rice closely followed military operations.248 Such was the violence of 
the APC that many peasants in areas previously under the control of the NLF were 
forced to relocate around GVN posts, while NLF forces continued to contest 
depopulated hamlets on the edges of these villages.249 GVN development projects 
bypassed those hamlets that remained under the control of the NLF. Only those with 
land close to GVN posts could benefit from government agricultural programmes, while 
many peasants found themselves far from their fields which had become free-fire 
zones.250 
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In an effort to reverse the trend of urbanization, in 1968 the government also 
began to encourage refugees and urban migrants to return to their native villages. Under 
the “Return to Village Programme” returnees qualified for benefits including cash, 
construction material and rice rations.251 Many refugees returned to discover that 
violence continued unabated and often did not remain long. Some refugees accepted 
benefits but did not return to the countryside while others still were reluctant to abandon 
the economic opportunities they had discovered in the cities.252 Urbanization remained 
the trend in South Vietnam during the final years of the war, but the GVN and their 
American advisers claimed that hundreds of thousands of refugees returned to their 
villages or resettled in new areas after 1968.253 Security in the countryside and the 
Return to Village Programme suffered a setback with North Vietnam’s Easter Offensive 
in 1972 but the programme continued after the Paris agreements. 
While there was certainly a contradiction between development and violent 
military operations, increased government control in the Delta from 1969 to early 1972 
opened up space for development projects in a way not seen since the early 1960s. 
Although the GVN acknowledged that less than fifty percent of the country’s arable 
land was under cultivation, 1969 was the first year in which the declining rice 
production trend was reversed, and the following year the MLRA claimed to have 
exceeded its target of 500,000 hectares of TN rice. Both American and GVN officials 
repeatedly suggested that self-sufficiency and exports were just around the corner.254  
Even the reconfiguration of the global rice trade could not dampen these 
sentiments. Enthusiasm for the promises of miracle rice spread far beyond South 
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Vietnam. West Pakistan reportedly anticipated a bumper crop of rice in late 1968 thanks 
to IR8 and was studying markets in Europe for export. Even Laos, with historically the 
lowest yields in Asia, was hopeful that it could end its dependence on U.S. and Thai rice 
and could begin to export the new varieties.255 It must have come as great 
disappointment when these countries’ governments discovered that new rice varieties 
had transformed the global market and potential for export. With so many rice-
consuming nations approaching self-sufficiency, by 1969 export markets were shrinking 
and becoming increasingly competitive. The market now lay in aromatic and luxury 
strains of rice or in agricultural diversification.256 Nonetheless, the GVN did not 
abandon the hope of exports. Cao Van Than, the new Minister of Agriculture, wrote that  
the ministry’s targets for 1970-1971 were to increase TN rice cultivation to meet 
domestic needs, with the goal of exporting 300,000 tonnes of non-TN varieties.257 This 
was extremely optimistic, as the economic incentives of South Vietnam’s Green 
Revolution led most farmers to cultivate TN rice for the market. U.S. officials even 
began to worry that 1972 and 1973 might see rice surpluses that were difficult to export 
leading to a drop in peasant incomes or costly government subsidies. To deal with such 
an eventuality the GVN would have to encourage crop diversification and livestock 
development as soon as possible.258 
The massive expansion of agricultural credit was also another major factor in 
sparking social and economic changes in rural South Vietnam after Tet, but like miracle 
rice its effects were uneven. The goal was to provide farmers with small loans to make 
the kind of risky investments necessary for the growth of the agricultural economy. In 
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the first seven months of 1968 the Agricultural Development Bank (ADB) loaned 
US$25.5m to 100,000 farmers and fisherman, a massive four and half times more than it 
had loaned during the same period in 1967. Most of these were short-term, low interest, 
small loans extended directly to farmers for crop production and livestock development. 
A further $500,000 was loaned directly for farmers growing TN rice varieties but the 
CIA reported that the typically neglected farmers in I and II Corps in the north of the 
country struggled to access credit.259  
The bank operated at the province level and the branch director was given 
considerable independence of action. Many of these provincial directors were motivated 
by profit and it seems likely that there was discrimination in the distribution of loans, 
with credit difficult to access for many. The Director of the ADB in An Giang, arguably 
the most peaceful province in the country, told cadres in the spring of 1968 not to lend 
to those with outstanding debts to the ADB, people over 60, widows, and military-aged 
people. Given the wartime situation many of those who remained working the land were 
women and the elderly. Provincial agricultural services complained that the ADB 
director’s instructions would reduce by half the number already listed to grow TN 
rice.260 Farmers interviewed by CORDS officials, most of whom had secured loans, 
noted that the ADB only loaned to “people who have land, property, [a] garden, and 
who live in easy circumstances”. For Nguyen Van Hao, the Director General of the 
ADB, the entire logic of the bank was “the monetization of the peasant economy”. 
Although the bank loaned to poor farmers, Hao claimed, he justified lending to wealthy 
farmers on the grounds that they had a high sense of debt repayment and their 
entrepreneurial spirit would encourage the dynamic growth of credit and production. 
Loans were also predicated on the security conditions in the farmer’s village and 
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political loyalty, further restricting the ability of those in insecure or NLF-controlled 
areas to profit from agricultural development. The only other option for credit was the 
usurious, unofficial money lenders. More problematically, from the point of view of 
securing government support, research indicated that poor farmers were well aware of 
the ADB and felt that they were outside the scope of its operations. Agricultural credit 
was clearly more readily accessible for wealthier farmers in GVN-controlled areas.261 
In the first 18 months of its operation the ADB had loaned almost US$52m, more 
than its predecessor the National Agricultural Credit Office had loaned during its 10 
years of operation. By 1969, however, the bank was badly overextended and the central 
ADB was having difficulty providing funds to the provincial branches. Hao noted that 
the bank would only be able to expand to a certain point and even then would not be 
able to meet the needs of the country. To attract private capital into the banking system 
the government would have to encourage the establishment of a system of rural, private 
banks. The most obvious point of reference for South Vietnam in this regard, Hao 
believed, was the “very successful and rapidly expanding rural banks in the 
Philippines”. Deploying Rostovian rhetoric, Hao suggested that if South Vietnam could 
set up both a public and private banking system it would play “a vital role in the take-
off of the economy” and bring “Vietnamese agriculture to a state of development which 
can be equal to that of any other neighbouring countries”.262  
In July 1969, the National Bank laid out the conditions for private, rural banks and 
by autumn four were operating at the district level. The ADB provided some 
capitalization to match private funds. If farmers had trouble accessing money from the 
state-run ADB, they would find it even more difficult to obtain loans from the local 
private banks whose motivation was profit. The rural banks first opened in areas like 
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Thot Nhot in An Giang province which were essentially experimental agricultural towns 
that received priority attention for development projects. But the goal was to expand the 
system, eventually phasing out the ADB as a short-term lending institution and instead 
making it responsible for larger and longer-term projects. ADB officials again found 
useful models elsewhere in East Asia. In Taiwan, the Philippines, South Korea, and 
Japan, state run agricultural credit institutions had contributed to development through 
loans to long-term and large-scale infrastructural projects.263  
If miracle rice and rural credit attempted to capitalize on rational peasants, the 
Village-Self Development (VSD) program aimed to appeal to the ‘moral economy’. 
Launched in rural areas in 1969, this grass-roots program sought to restore greater 
financial and decision-making autonomy to the villages. The program was designed to 
give villagers a voice in development, allowing them to agree on projects by majority 
consensus after discussions at public meetings. The GVN provided villages with funds 
and rural development cadre provided technical assistance, while villagers 
supplemented GVN funds with contributions of their own money and labour. Projects 
were modest in scope, such as animal husbandry and well construction, but the point 
was to allow villagers to express their felt needs, choose their own projects and to forge 
a greater sense of community in the process. Every village was provided with 
VN$400,000 (about US$3,350) to carry out projects costing between VN$50,000-
$150,000, while villages that had already elected village councils were provided an 
additional VN$600,000 to carry out projects in excess of VN$150,000.264 
The idea of the VSD, as one CORDS field evaluator put it, was to take 
advantage of growing rural prosperity and channel in it into community-building 
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ventures that would generate government support. “Prosperity by itself does not build 
identification with the governmental system”, John Figueira noted. “Substantial 
individual financial participation in the development of the community is essential. 
Until the administration of government assistance and local tax laws reflect this, village 
governmental poverty and stagnation will continue amid widespread rural individual 
prosperity”.265 
For the VSD to work as designed, it was dependent on non-interference from 
district and province officials on the one hand, and on honest and competent village 
authorities on the other. Evidence suggests that where such village leadership existed 
the results of the program were reasonably good. Elsewhere province and district 
officials imposed their will or, more commonly, village authorities captured the 
decision-making process, chose projects without consulting the people and then failed 
to explain to purpose of the program to the villagers. As such many residents had no 
idea of the basic goals of the programme and showed little inclination to participate. If 
the VSD was to succeed in forging communal solidarity it was essential that local 
officials communicate its purpose and goals. The programme was designed to introduce 
limited direct democracy into the villages and forge stronger village links through 
popular participation in projects for the common good. It seems that this message was 
not always delivered to villagers. Such was the prevalence of hog-rearing projects that 
peasants in one village in Binh Duong understood the VSD entirely as a programme in 
which “the government gives us pigs to raise”.  
U.S. officials expressed disappointment in local government’s failure to 
communicate the intent of the VSD programme but were equally as likely to argue that 
the programme was fundamentally ill-conceived. They pinned the blame for the failure 
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of these projects on the absence of a moral economy. One observer noted “the people 
were generally hostile to the idea of raising animals together”. Reporting on the 
programme in the villages of Kien Phong province, CORDS evaluators wrote that “the 
concept of working together for the common good is somewhat alien to most rural 
Vietnamese. The people generally prefer to work independently, especially on income-
raising projects”. Another CORDS official attributed the poor results of the programme 
to the “traditional reluctance on the part of many rural Vietnamese to form groups for 
the common good”.266 The evidence indicated that the GVN was struggling to build a 
sense of community at the village level which identified with the government. This was 
at the core of the GVN’s post-Tet strategy and the weaknesses of the VSD programme 
bode ill for Saigon. Individual farmers could benefit from new agricultural technologies 
and this might be economically useful but if the GVN could not harness their new found 
wealth into meaningful support then the VSD would be a political failure. 
As the VSD faltered, Saigon began working on its most ambitious post-Tet effort 
to shape the political identities of peasant farmers: the Land-to-the-Tiller Programme. 
Historians note that the LTTT was “a massive attempt at social engineering” in that it 
sought to sway the peasantry to the GVN’s side.267 Several scholars argue that political 
results of the LTTT were ambiguous. The programme may have undermined support for 
the revolution by granting farmers permanent title to their land, but this support did not 
necessarily shift to the GVN. Peasants had made their decisions about political loyalty 
based on the NLF’s earlier land reform programmes or were increasingly motivated 
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simply by self-interest and a desire to survive.268 Scholars have also marginalized South 
Vietnamese actors from accounts of land reform after 1963. One historian notes “the 
escalation of U.S. war efforts in Vietnam after 1965, personnel changes in Washington 
and bipartisan congressional pressure generated a second push for land reform that 
culminated in the Land-to-the-Tiller Law of 1970”.269 While these factors were 
significant, such interpretations understate the degree to which the specifics of land 
reform were negotiated by South Vietnamese actors. 
The United States certainly pressured the GVN to institute a land reform 
programme but there is little indication that Thieu was not basically amenable to the 
concept. In late 1967, just weeks after his election, Thieu told President Johnson that the 
GVN had begun working on a comprehensive land reform programme.270 On the other 
hand, U.S. officials were divided about its relative merits. Indeed, the lack of land 
reform in the years after Diem’s death was due as much to U.S. policies as to GVN 
inertia. From 1960-65, the U.S. mission in Saigon did not have a single official working 
full-time on land reform. Having pushed Diem to introduce land reform prior to 1963, 
U.S. policymakers in Washington and Saigon dismissed land reform as a serious issue 
as the war in the countryside escalated. Those working on land reform in South Vietnam 
in the late 1960s claimed that the inaction on the issue was due to the influence of a 
group of lower-echelon staffers in the Saigon embassy who believed that landlords, 
including many ARVN officers, were the final bastion of political stability and should 
not be alienated.271 In their studies of land tenure in South Vietnam, social scientists 
Robert Sansom and Charles Callison pointed to a Rand Corporation study as the 
intellectual justification for this inaction. Edward J. Mitchell’s study concluded that 
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greater land inequality correlated with greater government control. Mitchell suggested 
that “the greater power of landlords and relative docility of peasants in the more ‘feudal’ 
areas accounts for this phenomenon”. According to Callison, the findings of the 
Stanford Research Institute (SRI) in 1967 as well as those of Sansom had significant 
impact in turning around the U.S. mission’s attitude.272 The SRI, in a study of land 
tenure in the southern half of South Vietnam in 1967, discovered that the desire to own 
land remained the key aspiration of tenant farmers. The majority would happily 
purchase land over several years and would prefer government assistance in this area 
more than community improvement or agricultural extension projects.273 
On a visit to Ba Tri in Kien Hoa province on September 20 1968, Thieu 
announced that following the pacification of an area, the GVN would no longer reinstate 
absentee landlords but would allow peasants to keep any land they had received from 
the NLF. In February 1969 the GVN froze land occupancy and rents in newly pacified 
areas and subsequently extended this to secure areas in April. The idea was to prevent 
landlords from readjusting land tenure, for example installing relatives, while the 
government drafted a land reform law. At first the GVN considered a “voluntary 
purchase” programme, whereby tenants would be given the opportunity to buy the land 
they farmed at a fair price. But the government soon realised, Minister of Land Reform 
and Agriculture Cao Van Than noted, farmers would not be willing to pay for land 
where landlords had long ago stopped collecting rents or where the NLF had told 
farmers they already owned the land. Instead, the GVN decided to grant land 
completely free of charge to all tenants, sharecroppers, squatters, and beneficiaries of 
NLF land redistribution. New owners would receive title to the land and could then 
contribute to village autonomy and financial self-sufficiency by paying land taxes to 
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their village government. The GVN would compensate landlords, made possible by 
U.S. aid, with a small down payment in cash and the rest in government bonds. The 
programme, Than said, would “create in insecure areas and among the uncommitted 
rural people a large class of small landowners who must realize that they become [sic] 
landowners thanks to the government”.274 
One of the main obstacles to land reform, it would turn out, was not the Thieu 
regime but the National Assembly, where many of the country’s landlords held sway. 
As the Lower House considered the GVN’s law in late 1969 it became clear, and of 
considerable concern to U.S. officials, that political elites might jeopardize the bill. 
Many deputies rejected the very idea of granting permanent title to farmers who had 
accepted land from the NLF. Others worked to dilute the GVN proposals. In September, 
the Lower House added the provision that landlords could keep 15 hectares of land, 
whereas the original GVN proposal was for a zero retention limit. They also wanted the 
government to compensate landlords on a sliding scale, with 100% cash payments for 
smaller landlords. Later in the year, the U.S. embassy reported that National Assembly 
opposition to the regime’s unilaterally declared austerity tax, mentioned in the previous 
chapter, was a major reason for the assembly’s continued foot dragging on the bill. 
Some deputies argued that land reform had been thrust upon the regime by the United 
States. In an ironic twist these assembly members employed something akin to Marxist 
analysis to defend current, feudal land tenure relations. Land reform was nothing more 
than an American scheme to change land tenure so that the United States could better 
economically exploit South Vietnam.275 Of equal concern for the U.S. embassy was the 
possibility that deputies might complicate land reform by trying to make it more 
equitable. Some members of the Assembly wished to include provisions which would 
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ensure that groups who had supported the government such as soldiers and refugees but 
who were currently away from their land would not lose out. This would considerably 
complicate the implementation of the programme as, unlike a reform which simply 
granted land to current tillers, it would lead to a potentially irreconcilable claims and 
counter-claims. Minister Than, in acknowledgement of the GVN’s weak administrative 
capabilities, said he wanted a law that was “simple and easy to administer and can be 
put into immediate effect”.276 
Into this debate stepped Roy Prosterman, one of the leading U.S. land reform 
experts of the 20th century. Prosterman was a University of Washington professor and 
one of the authors of the SRI study. In September 1969 he toured South Vietnam on 
behalf of the National Committee for a Political Settlement in Vietnam, a group which 
viewed land reform as a powerful source of leverage for Saigon in the Paris peace talks. 
He left Vietnam convinced that National Assembly opposition to the law was based 
upon fears that the GVN could not afford to compensate landlords. Prosterman 
suggested that the United States underwrite this compensation, and pay part of this 
through the transfer of agricultural inputs like fertilizer and tools. In what amounted to a 
capitalist reformulation of the feudalistic landlord-tenant relationship, Prosterman 
suggested that former landlords could then sell these inputs to their former tenants. The 
report, and a series of articles in the Seattle Post-Intelligencer painting Prosterman as 
“the white knight of land reform”, generated a good deal of ire within the Nixon 
administration. One article highlighted that AID officials in Saigon were still not fully 
committed to a sweeping land reform program and even favoured a different approach 
“to the free land plan”. Administration officials in Washington suspected that such 
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reports might be true.277 Nonetheless, the State Department and U.S. embassy in Saigon 
dismissed Prosterman’s solution as economically unfeasible and further noted “we 
should also consider carefully the overall political effect here of our ‘taking over’… the 
GVN’s land reform program. This program, a very broad and sweeping one…initially 
came entirely at President Thieu’s initiative, and so far it remains a thoroughly 
Vietnamese effort despite our supporting assistance”.278 
The reform that emerged therefore was a negotiated process. It was shaped by 
U.S. pressure and some U.S. opposition, by Thieu and Than’s preferences for a simpler, 
though less equitable reform, and by National Assembly resistance. In addition, Saigon 
attempted to shape the meaning of the LTTT. The GVN very explicitly tried to 
appropriate the Viet Minh’s legacy and the NLF’s political platform. The MLRA 
promised that the Land-to-the-Tiller was part of a “social revolution” that would 
transform the countryside.279 Saigon officials liked to point out that land reform in 
North Vietnam had been tremendously violent while the NLF had used terror and 
coercion in the south. Saigon’s land reform, on the other hand, was peaceful. GVN 
officials failed to acknowledge that violence in the countryside preceding Saigon’s land 
redistribution meant few tenants were farming the land and fewer landlords were 
collecting rent, both of which made the programme feasible. Than also argued that the 
GVN had something of an edge over the NLF because it was the only authority which 
could constitutionally and legally grant peasants land. Of course, as far as a peasant was 
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concerned, that point only matter if one thought the GVN would eventually win the 
war.280 
As the RVN got ready to carry out the LTTT, Minister Than visited Taiwan, one 
of the first country’s to implement a non-Communist land reform in post-war Asia. In a 
report that displaced the United States from any involvement in Taiwan’s land reform, 
Than reported that the GMD’s reforms were based on Sun Yat Sen’s Three Principles of 
the People. The country had carried out land reform in phases beginning in 1949 and 
culminating in the Land to the Tiller programme which had paved the way for the 
transformation and commercialization of agriculture. Than recommended that the GVN 
send more Vietnamese land reform personnel to Taiwan to study these processes. The 
following month, Archibald Woodruff, director of the Land Reform Training Institute in 
Taiwan and S.K. Shen, Taiwan’s Director General of Land Reform visited South 
Vietnam. Woodruff commended the GVN for its “determination to enact a progressive 
social revolution” in the face of considerable barriers, while Shen promised to promote 
South Vietnam’s land reform abroad to obtain “material and spiritual support from the 
friendly countries of the free world”.281 
At the level of implementation, the LTTT amounted to a major transfer of 
authority to the village. The Village Administrative Committees, which included the 
elected village chief and deputy chief, determined the compensation landlords received 
for each plot. Village Land Distribution Committees, chaired by the village chiefs, 
processed applications and issued titles. New landowners were then entered on village 
tax rolls and after one year’s relief would begin paying tax to the village government. 
The GVN anticipated that these steps would contribute to village self-sufficiency and 
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give peasants the impression that local government officials were acting in their best 
interest.282 
Saigon planners hoped that new owners would invest in their land and increase 
production. Thieu told farmers that once they became owners they must defend their 
land against the Communists and “increase production to help the country soon attain 
self-sufficiency”.283 However, the economic impact of the programme depended greatly 
on geography. In the coastal lowlands north of the Delta, where the war continued 
unabated, higher population pressure and less available land meant that the LTTT only 
affected five percent of the area, with most farmers remaining on marginal plots.284 
Even in some parts of the Delta itself, low-yield floating rice was the norm, and the 
LTTT’s three hectare retention-limit was far too low for these farmers to engage in 
commercial agriculture.285 In contrast, studies indicated that where the GVN had 
redistributed land in some areas of the Delta, farmers had dramatically increased their 
marketable surplus.286 The LTTT may therefore have formalised a situation in which 
some farmers had sufficient arable land to engage in commercial agriculture, while 
others did not.  
Long Tri village in the Delta province of Chuong Thien provides an example of 
how the dynamics of these various programmes- miracle rice, the VSD, and the LTTT- 
played out on the ground. In early 1970 and again in mid-1971, CORDS evaluators 
produced detailed reports on the political and socio-economic conditions in Long Tri. 
Colby declared that the first report was “one of the best evaluations I have ever read” 
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and recommended that it be forwarded to senior civilian and military officials in both 
Saigon and Washington.  
Long Tri was situated along the Cai Lon River on strip about 15km long and 
5km wide. Due to the poor conditions of the roads and bridges, access to the village was 
largely by sampan along the area’s canals and waterways. The standard of living was 
modest. Farmers grew a single rice crop annually and supplemented this with some 
sugarcane, fish, ducks and hogs. The village had been solidly behind the Viet Minh 
during the French War and residents looked back “wistfully” at the years of peace after 
the Geneva Conference. “There was no government at that time” said the current village 
chief, “and the people simply went on about their business”. Over the course of the next 
10 or so years, the GVN subjected the village to “a bewildering array” of pacification 
projects, from strategic hamlets to the construction of schools and dispensaries. The 
CORDS evaluators reported, however, that little had been done to organize the people 
to protect themselves or to solve their community problems. Meanwhile the NLF 
maintained a strong presence, taxing as much as 90% of the village population.  
After the Tet Offensive however, NLF local forces had suffered huge losses and 
many defections. The revolutionaries could still threaten the village but their presence 
had considerably diminished. At the same time as many as 3,000 residents had 
abandoned their homes and fields in two of the outlying hamlets and had moved to more 
central hamlets, essentially becoming refugees within their own village. Development 
projects focused on this area of nearly 9,000 residents. Nonetheless, the village was 
isolated from centres of technical expertise. Only two farmers who were interviewed 
“had heard of the wonders of IR-5/8, but they did not know where to purchase seed”. 
With no technical assistance, Long Tri’s farmers simply threw away broken water 
pumps and sprayers when they stopped functioning. This lack of technical assistance 
had plagued the VSD programme too. The villagers had selected 18 hog and fish rearing 
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projects but all had failed. An undiagnosed disease wiped out most of the pigs and, 
despite the efforts of the village chief to convince villagers to keep the surviving pigs 
for breeding, residents slaughtered them or took their pigs and left the project.287  
By July 1971, things were looking slightly better in Long Tri though there were 
some worrying signs. The village was now running many of its own affairs. The local 
Popular Forces companies had finally been placed under the authority of the GVN 
village chief as per central government policy and the village was now self-funding 
40% of its activities. In secure areas of the village, authorities had begun redistributing 
over 1,200 hectares of land under the LTTT. Local GVN forces had pushed further into 
insecure areas, however, and were now “stretched to their limit”. The village authorities 
could not exploit these areas for economic or political advantage. A few “brave souls” 
had moved back onto these abandoned fields beside new GVN outposts but most 
remained too fearful of booby traps and continued fighting. Over 4,500 hectares of this 
land were eligible for free redistribution under the LTTT but villagers had made 
requests for just 300 hectares. Villagers were understandably unwilling to risk their 
lives or pay tax on such insecure fields. Meanwhile, the failure of small income-
boosting VSD projects in 1970 had convinced residents to focus on larger, physical 
construction projects such as classrooms and bridges the following year. Finally, some 
farmers had managed to get their hands on TN rice seed but heavy losses due to high 
water had dissuaded others from growing it. The evaluators concluded that the 
economic situation was “basically good” but “serious economic development has barely 
begun in Long Tri”.288  
If Long Tri was any indication of how agricultural development was playing out 
in the rest of the country, the results were ambiguous. The village had become more 
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autonomous in terms of local defence and financing but self-sufficiency was a long way 
off. Devolution of authority to the villages was all well and good, but Long Tri’s 
experience with the VSD indicated that community development projects still required 
assistance from technical experts if they were to succeed. Such technical expertise was 
in short supply in South Vietnam in the early 1970s. GVN development policies, 
particularly the LTTT, clearly had some significant impact in parts of the village firmly 
under GVN control. But Long Tri demonstrates the degree to which development in 
many areas, despite a considerably improved security situation, continued to be 
bounded by territorial control and the ability of government officials to reach remote 
villages, or even parts of villages. 
GVN planners attempted to frame the narrative as one in which the government 
was successfully guiding rural modernization. The authors of the Five Year Rural 
Economic Development Plan wrote that government efforts in the promotion of miracle 
rice had reversed agricultural decline and created the potential for agricultural 
diversification. The authors wrote that “a majority of our rural people are no longer as 
conservative as before” having “understood and accepted new farming techniques”.289 
The plan’s goals were self-sufficiency in food production in the first phase (1971-1972) 
and agricultural exports in the second (1973-1975). These exports would raise foreign 
exchange and encourage investment in light industries that would process agricultural 
products for global markets.290 The plan’s goals highlight the degree to which GVN 
planners hoped the adoption of TN rice could have a knock on effect, transforming the 
entire agricultural economy. Not everyone accepted this line of reasoning. The plan 
came in for criticism in the National Assembly, with one representative and former 
bureaucrat in the MLRA Vo Long Trieu arguing that the government was massively 
overstating the speed with which such projects could be completed. The government, 
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Representative Trieu said, was hoping for “a prosperity that could only be had in one’s 
imagination”.291  
Saigon’s optimism was not entirely baseless, however. The country had made 
advances in agricultural production. The GVN estimated that rice output increased by 
almost fifty per cent from 1968-1969 to 1971-1972.292 Markets were bustling, and 
consumer goods such as Honda motorbikes flooded the countryside. Even reasonably 
partial observers were impressed. “Rural prosperity” in the Delta “is a fact of life”, the 
UK embassy reported in early 1970, “and the IR8 programme is an undoubted 
success”.293 Agricultural credit also continued to expand. By the end of 1972, 35 private 
rural banks were in operation and in 1972 alone total agricultural credit amounted to 
more than US$50m. This was a staggering amount of money to infuse into the rural 
economy and generated changes that historians have largely overlooked.294 
Another cause for GVN optimism was the revolution’s considerable rice 
procurement problems in this period. NLF defectors reported in 1969 that life in the 
revolutionary zones had become unendurable. In the autumn of 1970, an NLF defector 
reported that the NLF command around Saigon had ordered cadres to hire themselves 
out as agricultural labourers to get food and to try to catch fish. By the autumn of 1971 
Hanoi was even telling rear service personnel in the Laos panhandle that no food would 
be delivered from the North in the coming dry season and they would have to aim at 
self-sufficiency.295 Revolutionary propaganda urged peasants to “quickly harvest and 
carefully conceal their rice” from the GVN. If Saigon could not steal rice by military 
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means it would use “its inflation devalued-banknotes… to buy paddy from our 
peasants”. The United States Senate’s resolution cutting Nixon administration aid to 
Saigon in late 1971 was bad for farmers because “the clique’s rice-stealing scheme is 
one measure to relieve its critical situation”. But by late 1971, most of those engaging in 
commercial agriculture were the middle and rich peasants, beyond the moral suasion of 
the revolution.296 
By the spring of 1973, 1.1 million hectares of land had been distributed to some 
800,000 farming families under the provisions of the LTTT. USAID research indicated 
that the new land owners were more likely to make risky investments, adopt new 
agricultural techniques and purchase consumer goods.297 As the modernizers had 
predicted, a stratum of middle and rich peasant farmers in the Delta had seized on a new 
agricultural technology and turned to commercial agriculture. However, the 
consequences of rural change were not what the modernizers anticipated. Measuring the 
political implications of these changes proves very difficult. Undoubtedly, many 
peasants who had received land through the LTTT appreciated the government’s efforts, 
while the results of the VSD were more ambiguous. On the other hand, it is easier to 
measure how agricultural development effected South Vietnamese economic viability. 
For several reasons, these developments did not redound to the GVN’s economic 
advantage. 
MLRA officials placed their faith in TN rice for its increased production. 
However, accelerating production proved less problematic than processing, storing and 
especially marketing surplus grain. Even as production increased and security 
improved, rice shipments from to Saigon repeatedly failed to meet GVN planners’ 
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estimates. Although the security environment had improved considerably in 1970-1971, 
the Delta’s waterways remained insecure, and roads and highways were inadequate to 
handle increased volumes of grain. In addition, a small number of merchants dominated 
all aspects of the rice economy. For all of the GVN’s pretensions of guidance, control 
and planning, lack of competition meant that these merchants could control the market 
and manipulate prices. They could reap handsome profits without delivering more rice 
to Saigon.298 
The GVN, on the other hand, had inaccurate or conflicting data on production, 
consumption and demography, inhibiting the rationalisation of imports or creation of 
market incentives for farmers to sell and merchants to deliver to Saigon. Particularly 
revealing was that the MLRA – responsible for increasing production - and the Ministry 
of Economy – responsible for scheduling imports - disagreed on rice production 
levels.299 GVN agricultural officials at the provincial level, frustrated with the lack of 
ministry coordination, argued that farmers would respond to incentives if marketing 
prospects were good.300 The GVN tried to assert control by intervening in the rice 
market, reducing subsidies on imported rice, guaranteeing prices for short periods of 
time or maintaining security stocks to prevent market disturbances.301 Each step was an 
attempt to encourage farmers to part with their stocks and to prevent merchant 
speculation. But in such a volatile economy, merchants kept a close eye on government 
stocks and scheduled rice imports. The CIA reported these merchants were often able to 
drive up prices despite no absolute shortages of rice.302 The Saigon media did not help 
the GVN in this respect. The Ministry of Economy found itself having to respond to 
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newspaper articles which speculated about government stocks and looming shortages by 
assuring the population that there was enough rice to go around.303 
Robert Nooter, head of USAID in Vietnam in the early 1970s, later recalled that 
the main difficulty in the agricultural sector in South Vietnam was not transforming 
peasant psychology but the far more mundane issues of pricing and marketing. Nooter 
said that “under wartime conditions, the South Vietnamese first instincts were not to 
handle [rice] on a market economy basis… the government was inclined to go out and 
collect it at the point of a bayonet. We argued that that was not a good way to run an 
economy”. Nooter believed that if prices were right, farmers would sell their rice. As 
Nooter recalled, Minister Ngoc understood and agreed with the U.S. position and things 
started to turn around.304  
Ngoc became the United States’ point man on reforming the agricultural 
economy. In mid-1970 USAID agreed to additional rice imports to meet looming 
shortages only if the GVN equalised price between domestic and imported rice in 
Military Regions I and II. Ngoc supported this move, arguing that subsidies had deflated 
local rice production, discouraged trade between the Delta and the north, created false 
demand and encouraged corruption.305 Ngoc pushed through the reform, eliminating 
subsidies. The Ministry of Economy also attempted to encourage more private trade 
between the Mekong Delta and rice-deficient provinces in the north of the country. The 
absence of such trade was a major reason for the continued high volumes of rice 
imports. In late 1970, Ngoc announced a number of measures to encourage merchants to 
                                                
303 ‘Communique- Minister of Economy Pham Kim Ngoc’ [Thông Cáo, Tổng Trưởng Kinh Tế Pham Kim 
Ngoc], 24 February 1970, folder 2519, PTTDNCH-TTLTQGII. 
304 ‘Interview with Robert Nooter’, 6 January 1996, Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection of the 
Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, (available at: 
http://www.adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Nooter,%20Robert%20H.toc.pdf; retrieved 9 February 2014). 
305 ‘Strengthening the Rice Market’ [Lành mạnh hóa thị trường gạo], 27 June 1970, Folder 2518, 
PTTDNCH- TTLTQGII. 
143 
 
engage in such trade, including subsidized transport and handling costs and offering to 
buy back merchants’ unsold rice. Such reforms had limited impact however.306 
The trouble with turning peasant farmers into “rational economic actors” in this 
unstable, inflationary economy was that “rationality” encouraged speculative behaviour. 
An early indication of farmers engaging in such speculative behaviour came in 1969. 
Despite a bumper crop and increased security farmers decided to hold on to their stocks 
as prices steadily rose and eventually doubled during the year. As a result, Saigon had to 
schedule emergency imports.307 In 1970, as rice prices fell and hog prices rose, USAID 
estimated that farmers diverted large volumes of rice to feed livestock. Rice shipments 
from the Delta to Saigon again failed to meet GVN expectations in 1970 so to shore up 
prices and ensure deliveries the GVN had to greatly increase its share of the market.308 
USAID hinted at peasant speculation again the following year when it noted that 
farmers in Long An were “aggressively developing greater on-farm storage facilities” 
which would allow them to store rice until prices rose. USAID estimated, in early 1971, 
that there was enough surplus rice in the Delta to meet 97% of national needs. However, 
government rice procurement that year again fell well below GVN targets.309 In order to 
become self-sufficient in a meaningful way, and given the negligible private rice trade 
between the Delta and the north of the country, the GVN had to procure rice from the 
Delta and ship it to the provinces north of Saigon. When procurement targets went 
unmet, the GVN had to request further rice imports from the United States. The 
peasantry, it seems, was responsive to the market. But a combination of factors, 
including increased security in the Delta, land reform and the financial incentives 
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created by the Green Revolution, did not benefit the state economically. Rather it seems 
to have increased the economic leverage of wealthier farmers vis-à-vis the state.  
In March 1972, the North Vietnamese army and NLF forces launched a military 
offensive throughout the south, shattering the precarious security situation in the Delta. 
Although U.S. airpower stalled the offensive by October, Hanoi had inserted a huge 
number of North Vietnamese troops into South Vietnam and the NLF once again made 
inroads into the countryside. Ironically, reports indicated that farmers were now 
urgently trying to sell their rice as soon as it was harvested to avoid taxation by the 
forces of the revolution. It seemed that the NLF and PAVN had accidentally caused 
economic incentives which the GVN had struggled to create. But the disruption caused 
by the offensive had considerably reduced the GVN’s ability to get the rice to market.310 
For the South Vietnamese, while continued rice imports highlighted the 
ambiguous results of the miracle rice project, there was no doubt as to the success of the 
LTTT. Having sought to learn about land reform from the rest of the Global South, by 
late 1972, MLRA officials were comparing the LTTT favourably to land reform in the 
rest of the region. Following a trip to Japan, the Philippines, and Malaysia, a MLRA 
official reported that South Vietnam’s LTTT was easily the most progressive 
program.311 GVN agricultural officials believed that the LTTT was so successful that 
South Vietnam would have to begin looking to more “advanced friendly countries” for 
replicable models of land administration and management. In the summer of 1973 Cao 
Van Than and Bui Huu Tien, Director of Land Reform therefore visited the United 
States, France and the Shah’s Iran to learn about aerial photography, land records 
management and land taxation. They toured these countries to gather additional 
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experience with which to nurture the results of the LTTT.312 The tables had turned in 
other ways too. For the first time, South Vietnam had apparently produced a 
development success to which other Global South nations might aspire. In a 
conversation with Kissinger in the summer of 1973 Lee Kuan Yew passed on a 
Singaporean report on the situation in South Vietnam which described the LTTT as 
“virtually a model for the region”.313 
 
 Conclusion 
 U.S.-South Vietnamese agriculture projects in the years between the Tet 
Offensive and the Paris agreements serve as a microcosm of post-war U.S efforts in this 
field. The post-war social science and development consensus may have been coming 
apart in the United States just as Nixon took office, but there is no evidence that the 
U.S. team in Vietnam had received the message. During the Nixon years, U.S. officials 
continued to pursue the same strategies, helping the GVN complete projects initiated 
during the Johnson administration, namely the accelerated rice production campaign 
and land reform. There was no decisive break in the approach to rural development 
between the two administrations.  
Post-war social science indicated that a psychological transformation of the 
peasant was required if the economies of the postcolonial nations were to ‘take-off’. 
GVN officials and their U.S. advisers hoped that the introduction of a single technology 
in the form of a small seed could spark that psychological transformation. This would in 
turn revolutionize the entire agricultural economy and revamp the peasantry’s 
relationship with the state for the better. As such GVN and U.S. agricultural advisers set 
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about convincing South Vietnamese farmers of the merits of the Green Revolution. It 
would turn out that transforming peasant psychologies was not required. U.S and GVN 
officials acted almost as if the commercialization of agriculture was yet to happen in the 
late 1960s, when in fact peasants had been exposed to market forces since the colonial 
era. It should have come as no surprise then that tens of thousands of farmers with the 
means seized on miracle rice regardless of GVN guidance. U.S. and GVN observers 
pointed to the subsequent growth in prosperity and consumerism as evidence, backed up 
by social science, that rural society was moving in the right direction. But as long as 
these farmers could enjoy the fruits of modernization without committing themselves to 
community development and the functioning of local government then this new wealth 
was politically meaningless for the GVN. The LTTT and miracle rice project appealed 
to the “rational” peasants while the VSD appealed to the “moral economy” of the 
villages. As U.S. observers saw it the first two succeeded and the latter failed because 
peasants were self-interested actors. This interpretation called into question the GVN’s 
entire post-Tet strategy which was premised on communal solidarity and the 
establishment of self-governing, self-sufficient, and self-defending villages.  
An examination of agricultural development in Vietnam highlights the need, 
once again, to place South Vietnam in a regional context. For each of the problems that 
South Vietnam encountered in rural development, from increased rice production to 
credit and land reform, South Vietnamese technocrats looked to the Global South for 
answers. For the GVN these lessons were very real and applicable. In South Vietnam 
the Green Revolution was not simply a narrative created by the postcolonial state and 
development professionals to convince domestic and international audiences of the 
vitality of the regime. Nor was it simply a story of environmental degradation, though 
that would be one of the legacies of the miracle rice project too. Rather, real and 
significant social and economic changes occurred in the South Vietnamese countryside 
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during the final years of the war which would have important consequences after 1975. 
The farmers who benefitted most from the GVN’s rural development policies would 
prove to be the fiercest opponents of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam’s attempts to 
collectivize agriculture. 
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Chapter Three 
Creating Clean, Modern Citizens: Public Health in 
South Vietnam 
 
Public health systems give states enormous power to intervene in and regulate 
their citizens’ private lives. While agricultural development projects tend to enter the 
workplace, public health projects enter the home. Particularly in postcolonial states, 
public health systems allowed new states to build new men. In the name of extending 
health care into the countryside in ways that colonial states had never attempted, 
governments could create the kind of modern citizens that they wanted by determining 
the way they should cook, eat, clean, dispose of waste, defecate and reproduce. Such 
projects were as much about staking the state’s claim on the population and establishing 
the writ, sovereignty and legitimacy of the postcolonial state in rural areas, as they were 
about giving citizens a better standard of life. Thus, it is no surprise that in the years 
after independence, peasant populations sometimes accepted and sometimes resisted the 
postcolonial state’s health interventions. 
This chapter examines the GVN’s attempt to build a modern public health 
infrastructure that would contribute to economic and social development and to the 
sustainability of the South Vietnamese state following the American decision to begin 
disengagement from Vietnam. The GVN’s health programmes and policy debates 
centred on the best way to marshal the human resources of the country to serve the 
military and economic needs of the state. The chapter focuses on two projects in 
particular: the National Sanitary Hamlet Programme and population planning. The 
Sanitary Hamlet Programme attempted to build a public health infrastructure in the 
countryside through a campaign of hygienic reform. The RVN was critically short of 
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health care professionals and the state dedicated the vast majority of its modest 
resources to defence. By encouraging modern hygienic practices in the villages, the 
Ministry of Health (MOH) hoped to produce a self-governing citizenry that would take 
responsibility for its own health care needs. Accepting the age old American link 
between health and productivity, the GVN believed this healthy rural population would 
contribute to South Vietnam’s economic take-off. These modern practices would create 
healthier, more productive citizens with as little impact as possible on the overstretched 
manpower of the state. But the Sanitary Hamlet Programme was also the manifestation 
of an elite South Vietnamese vision of an unsanitary peasantry and in this sense bore 
striking resemblance to late colonial era development. The programme once again 
highlights GVN elites’ ability to both idealize and wish to reform village life. 
Alarmed by high population growth, some GVN technocrats and their allies in 
the Family Happiness Protection Association [Hội Bảo Vệ Hạnh Phúc Gia Đình], a 
Saigon-based NGO, began to lobby for a population planning programme. While some 
advocates championed family planning as a women’s rights issue, most saw 
contraception as a means to manage the size and composition of the South Vietnamese 
population. These political and civilian elites became part of a transnational network of 
population control advocates which reached the peak of its global influence in the late 
1960s and early 1970s. South Vietnamese population planning campaigners endorsed 
the same approach to the problems of population as influential demographers and 
international NGOS, namely that top-down efforts to shape the demography of a 
country could generate economic development. To speed up the economic 
modernization of the country and to end the RVN’s dependency on the United States, 
population planning advocates believed that South Vietnam needed to increase the 
productive portion of the population relative to the number of dependents. Taiwan and 
South Korea once again seemed to provide replicable models.  
150 
 
U.S. officials in Vietnam endorsed these programmes but acknowledged that 
both were very much South Vietnamese-led efforts. The United States provided 
construction material and technical assistance for the Sanitary Hamlet Programme, with 
counterinsurgency advocates seeing links between hygiene and anti-Communist, 
communal solidarity. In the area of population control, USAID was keen to take a 
backseat for fear that the United States might be accused of neo-colonial meddling in 
the reproductive health of Vietnamese women. Instead, USAID facilitated South 
Vietnamese officials’ engagement with the international population control movement 
and hoped to achieve population planning goals through Vietnamese actors who shared 
a similar outlook. The United States would prove disappointed with the results of these 
efforts, highlighting its limited leverage over the Vietnamese political scene. 
 
One of the biggest challenges for postcolonial nations in the early years of 
independence was providing primary health care including preventive medicine, health 
education and sanitation, for all citizens. Yet historians have noted that throughout the 
Global South development institutions and postcolonial states placed less emphasis on 
basic health care and focused instead on two major efforts: disease eradication- 
particularly malaria and smallpox- and population planning. But development agencies 
were not only interested in these high modernist approaches. Historians of development 
have overlooked a third trend in international health: the construction of toilets as a 
means to improve the sanitary conditions and health of peasants in the Global South. 
Each of these global trends played out in South Vietnam from the 1950s to the 1970s. 
The major post-war global health regimes had colonial antecedents but in the 
Cold War they acquired a new logic. U.S. policymakers and social scientists 
contemplated the links between health and communism but there was no consensus. For 
some, illness, poverty, hunger led inevitably to political instability and revolution. 
151 
 
Places of ill-health were promising hunting grounds for communist agitators. 
Improvements in public health in the postcolonial world, some U.S. policymakers 
believed, would guard against communist revolution. Outlining the Truman 
administration’s program of technical assistance to the developing world known as 
Point IV, the State Department wrote in 1949 that “the undernourished Eastern peasant, 
afflicted with chronic malaria”’ was “a weak and lethargic worker”. “A more vigorous 
physique”, brought about by better health, would make him more productive.314 
For modernization theorists, however, public health was one of the few areas in 
which the application of technology, if not very carefully managed, could have a 
negative effect. Max Millikan and Walt Rostow of the Center for International Studies 
at MIT, challenged the common belief that hunger caused revolution. Rather, “the 
energy-stimulating effects of better nutrition… is likely to release the psychological and 
political pressures for change which may find expression in revolt”.315 Better nutrition 
could lead to increased productivity or could be the catalyst for communist revolution.  
The decision to focus on disease eradication and population control in the early 
Cold War was in large part because technologies existed which appeared to deal with 
these problems. Whereas inter-uterine devices and DDT could eliminate privation in 
one fell swoop, no single technological fix could assist in the more complicated mission 
to provide basic health care. As economist John Kenneth Galbraith noted “having 
vaccine, we identified smallpox”.316 In addition, health and population experts managed 
to convince policymakers in the Global North and South that these solutions offered a 
quicker route to economic growth, that most cherished of postcolonial development 
goals. Indeed, the only way one could reconcile the conflicting goals of disease control 
and population growth control – one seeking to keep people alive, the other seeking to 
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keep people unborn- was to justify both in terms of economic development. Both could 
be used to engineer an ideally-sized, healthy and productive labour force. 
Modern malaria eradication dated back to the late 19th century but health experts 
disagreed on the best means to deal with the disease until the 1940s. It was only after a 
number of developments during World War Two, including the invention of DDT and 
the apparent successes of malaria eradication in select areas of Latin America and 
southern Europe that health experts settled definitively on the method of vector control, 
which focused on attacking breeding grounds and fumigating houses in malaria-prone 
areas. Drawing on these lessons and new technologies, in 1955 the World Health 
Organization (WHO) launched a global Malaria Eradication Program (MEP) amid 
concerns that vectors would soon develop resistance to DDT. Throughout the Global 
South teams of rural health workers travelled around rural areas spraying homes with 
DDT and identifying and treating cases of malaria. 
Scholars argue that the United States threw its weight behind this effort because 
malaria eradication would help the United States win “hearts and minds” in the Global 
South, while healthier and therefore more productive postcolonial citizens could resist 
Communism and provide markets for U.S. goods. Advocates of eradication situated the 
program within the larger project of postcolonial development. They argued that malaria 
was responsible for underdevelopment and were more interested in how eradication 
served economic growth than they were in its public health benefits. But they could 
never satisfactorily demonstrate any link between eradication and economic 
development. As the 1960s progressed the program became ever more costly, major 
donors lost interest, and mosquitos showed growing resistance to DDT. The MEP was a 
helpful tool for the postcolonial state to project its power into the interior but peasants 
came to resent rather than appreciate these state interventions in their homes. In 
addition, an emerging environmental movement, mobilized in part by Rachel Carson’s 
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best-selling Silent Spring, called into question the use of DDT. By 1969, such were the 
ambiguous results of the MEP that the WHO abandoned attempts to eradicate malaria 
and returned to the less ambitious goal of control.317 
Population politics were rooted in Thomas Malthus’ late 18th Century tract An 
Essay on the Principle of Population, in which the British cleric argued that 
uncontrolled population growth would eventually outstrip food and other resources, 
leading to famine, disease and human misery. By the late 19th Century many Western 
intellectuals and policymakers feared the rise of hostile “hordes” of non-whites and 
imagined the white race being swept away by the “yellow peril”. These non-white races, 
it seemed, could subsist on lower levels of resources, threatening the existence of 
Anglo-Saxons. These fears of scarcity continued to motivate those concerned about 
overpopulation well into the 20th century.318 
Interest in population politics came from a huge array of groups, from human 
and physical scientists to feminists and religious leaders, with equally diverse 
motivations of racism and eugenics, women’s emancipation or religious morality. Prior 
to the era of decolonization and particularly in the interwar years, there was little 
consensus on the relative merits of population increase, reduction or redistribution. 
Population politics in some places, however, would provide important precedents for 
post-war population planning. In pre-war Puerto Rico, colonial officials sought to limit 
the productivity of the poor, claiming that overpopulation, and in particular too many 
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working-class people, was the reason for the island’s poverty and economic 
underdevelopment.319 
It was not until the early Cold War, however, that social scientists began 
explicitly linking population to political economy and economic development. Having 
been the domain of biologists and eugenicists prior to World War Two, in the 1940s, 
overpopulation became the concern of economists, sociologists and especially 
demographers. Influential demographers first developed demographic transition theory, 
which argued that birth rates would only decline after economic development, 
industrialization and urbanization. However, it soon became clear that demographic 
changes in the Global South were not conforming to this model. Instead, it seemed that 
changing reproductive behaviour in the postcolonial world might speed up 
development. One scholar notes that this created the space for policymakers, rather than 
individuals, to determine population increases. By tying population control to economic 
development, population experts shook off their association with eugenics and many 
postcolonial political elites greeted their ideas with enthusiasm.320 
In the 1950s NGOs such as the Population Council and International Planned 
Parenthood spearheaded population control programmes. The United States’ 
government, on the other hand, was wary of involvement both because of Catholic 
opposition and Third World accusations of a neo-colonial plot. By the mid-1960s, 
however, Johnson was convinced of the merits of population control having been 
presented with questionable analysis which suggested that it offered a better return on 
the investment of U.S. foreign aid. Even as the Nixon administration downsized 
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USAID, its Office of Population grew between 1969 and 1971. But the United States 
continued to avoid direct involvement in population control, instead funnelling money 
through UN agencies and NGOs.321  
By the late 1960s, as population control reached its apogee, advocates also 
became more forceful in their policy prescriptions. Given Third World citizens’ 
ignorance about contraception and the consequences of large families, argued 
Population Council President Bernard Berelson, voluntary programs were likely to fail. 
Berelson and other population experts like Davis believed that governments rather than 
individual couples should determine fertility rates by incentivising contraception and 
sterilization.322 Without top-down demographic management, improvements in public 
health would only accelerate population growth, food would become scarcer and 
underdeveloped economies would remain stagnant.323 Thus public health in the 
developing world, for both U.S. policymakers and many local elites, became an issue of 
managing the population for optimum economic advantage. The framing of the 
population issue in these terms, despite the lack of social science consensus on links 
between population growth and per capita income, led to coercive programmes in some 
Asian countries including India, Taiwan and South Korea. Governments gave rural 
midwives targets for sterilization and intra-uterine device insertions but often there was 
no follow-up care, leading to pain and bleeding, or ectopic pregnancies and septic 
abortions. 
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Like disease eradication and population control, American toilet-building as 
nation-building dated back to the colonial era and continued into the Cold War. But 
whereas historians of medicine have examined the centrality of latrine construction to 
U.S. public health projects in the colonised world, historians of development have 
largely overlooked the continuation of this health regime in the postcolonial Global 
South after 1945.  
Although colonial medicine initially focused on protecting white enclaves, the 
development of the germ theory of disease in the late 19th century convinced colonial 
health officials that colonizers would remain vulnerable unless medical interventions 
also targeted local populations.324 From the early 20th century, the more “progressive 
colonies” such as the United States in the Philippines and the Dutch in the East Indies 
therefore instituted hygienic reform campaigns. Seeing the apparent filth of the 
colonized as a cultural deficiency, divorced from social or economic context, colonizers 
began instructing colonial subjects about good hygienic habits, including the use of 
sanitary latrines. Colonial officials could point to the civilizing, sanitizing mission to 
legitimise colonial rule, while protecting the health of local labour would allow colonial 
powers to better exploit the resources of empire.325  
In addition to the colonial powers, philanthropic organizations took up toilet-
construction with aplomb. From the 1900s through the 1920s the Rockefeller 
Foundation carried out efforts to eradicate hookworm, the “germ of laziness”, in the 
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American South and Latin America. The goal was to increase economic productivity 
and the chosen means was treatment and toilet construction.326 The Rockefeller 
Foundation was so enthusiastic about the potential for the toilet to improve the health 
and therefore productivity of colonial labour that it even carried out projects in British 
colonies.327 
One might get the impression from the historiography of Cold War development 
that this practice ended in the era of decolonization. But it continued unabated. In the 
1940s, U.S. health professionals estimated that hookworm was so prevalent in some 
parts of Latin America that people only gained nutrition from about 50% of the food 
they consumed. Between 1942 and 1952 the Institute for Inter-American Affairs and the 
Latin American nations therefore constructed more than thirty eight thousand outdoor 
toilets in rural areas of Latin America.328 The ubiquity of this mode of U.S. intervention 
was not lost on Che Guevara who, at the launch of the Alliance for Progress in 1961, 
dismissed U.S development as offering only “the paradise of the latrine”. The United 
States seemed to believe the latrine was “the fundamental thing” in improving the social 
conditions of the poor. “It is a bit like… I do not know”, Che mused, “but I would 
almost classify it as a colonial mentality”. As Che highlighted, little better illustrates the 
continuity of colonial and postcolonial development than United States’ toilet-building 
in the Global South during the 20th Century.329 
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As in other fields of development, South Vietnam turned to global solutions to 
its public health problems. These three trends of post-war public health – disease 
eradication, population control, and hygienic reform – each found enthusiastic backers 
among South Vietnamese political and civilian elites. In the case of malaria eradication 
and population planning, South Vietnamese pushed these programs at the very time they 
were reaching their peak globally. While Diem’s First Republic endorsed malaria 
eradication in the 1950s and early 1960s, civilian elites seized on population planning in 
the late 1960s and 1970s. As in many other areas of the Global South, civilian NGOs 
spearheaded the campaign for population planning. Hygienic reform and sanitation 
remained a concern of South Vietnamese political elites throughout the country’s 
history but it was not until the late 1960s that the GVN began to implement a systematic 
effort in the form of the Sanitary Hamlet Program. 
 
Bringing Health to the Villages 
U.S. health assistance to Vietnam began with nursing education programmes 
during the First Indochina War. Following the partition of Vietnam in 1954, this 
programme continued in the south, along with technical assistance, overseas training 
programmes and the provision of medical equipment that South Vietnam could not 
afford. The WHO also ran a malaria eradication programme. As the conflict escalated in 
the early 1960s, the U.S. increasingly used health care to serve civic action and 
counterinsurgency goals. Yet despite the emphasis on nation-building and civic action 
during the early years of the American War, by 1968 the United States and the GVN 
had made little progress toward building a public health infrastructure in the 
countryside.  
Medical assistance in the countryside was very basic. Plague, tuberculosis and 
leprosy were common, and average life expectancy was 35-40. In 1965 there were 
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approximately 800 doctors in South Vietnam, 500 of whom served in the military and 
150 of whom were in private practice. This left 150 doctors working in Ministry of 
Health hospitals serving a population of 15 million people; a ratio of one doctor to 
150,000 people. Many of these doctors were simultaneously engaged in administrative 
duties. Those in private practice were predominantly based in urban areas, 
compounding the inequality between the cities and countryside.330 
Given the dearth of health care professionals the GVN attempted to devolve 
modest health care services down to the village and hamlet level. In 1957 the 
government established a Rural Health Program which sought to provide villages of 
more than 10,000 residents with a maternity dispensary staffed by a midwife and a 
village health worker. Smaller villages were served by only a village health worker, 
while hamlets of 500-1,000 people had a medical kit looked after by the hamlet health 
worker. These part-time staff received only one month’s medical training, and their 
health stations were equipped with a medical chest and a training manual on which they 
relied heavily.331 Very limited numbers of district health nurses, sanitary agents and 
health educators supervised and assisted the village and hamlet health workers. U.S. 
advisers placed great emphasis on health education and sanitation but as a report 
claimed, the GVN was sceptical of the need for these services. It was not until “their 
value could be demonstrated” that the Ministry of Health agreed to pay the salaries of 
these personnel beginning in 1961.332 The NLF frequently targeted the health workers 
and their supplies and by 1961 the security situation in the countryside meant that health 
services had shut down in many areas. Five years later, the MOH reported that over 250 
                                                
330 Myron Allukian Jnr. and Paul L. Atwood, ‘The Vietnam War’ in Barry S. Levy and Victor W. Sidel 
eds. War and Public Health, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 313- 337. 
331 James T. Baird and Willard H. Boynton, ‘The Challenge and the Task in Vietnam’, Public Health 
Reports (1896-1970) 79, no. 5 (May, 1964), 383–391. 
332 ‘Helping to Develop the Health Program of Viet Nam: Annual Report Public Health Division United 
States Operations Mission Viet Nam’, July 1, 1960 - June 30, 1961, No Date, Folder 16, Box 11, Douglas 
Pike Collection: Unit 11 - Monographs, TTU-VVA, Item No.: 2391116005. 
160 
 
health workers had been killed, captured or were missing, while 107 health installations 
had been destroyed.333 
In marked contrast with the paltry contribution to basic health services, the GVN 
showed great interest in the WHO’s malaria eradication campaign. By 1961, South 
Vietnam had contributed $2m and over 2,500 Vietnamese were working on the 
programme. This GVN contribution equalled the annual U.S. health program budget in 
the same period, an enormous outlay given the Saigon’s limited resources.334 Like many 
postcolonial leaders, Diem showed enthusiasm for health programmes that applied a 
single technological fix to overcome complex environmental and epidemiological 
problems. The malaria eradication programme also allowed the state to intervene in the 
lives of the peasantry on an unprecedented scale and thereby stake a claim on the 
population. Teams sprayed DDT inside homes once every six months and collected 
blood samples. The programme continued into the 1970s but with resistance from the 
peasantry and a lack of territorial security the high modernist ambition of eradication 
was, by the mid-1960s, scaled back to less ambitious goal of malaria control. The 
abandonment of eradication in favour of control, however, merely foreshadowed the 
WHO’s abandonment of the global eradication program in 1969. 
Given the manpower difficulties of the MOH and inability to maintain health 
facilities in the countryside, as the Unites States increased its involvement in South 
Vietnam it began to play the major role in delivering medical services. The CIA 
attributed foreign “omnipotence” in the field of public health to a lack of GVN 
personnel but also to the “different attitudes towards patient care in eastern and western 
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cultures”.335 Having contributed in large part to the burden the war placed on the South 
Vietnamese health system, U.S. officials blamed the South Vietnamese for a lack of 
consideration. By the time of the U.S. decision to send large numbers of troops to 
Vietnam in 1965, the United States had been involved in health projects in the south for 
almost 15 years. Yet the public health infrastructure had improved little. As the war in 
the countryside escalated, maintaining health facilities became increasingly difficult. 
Health projects became militarised and politicised as the United States and South 
Vietnamese struggled for the “hearts and minds” of the peasantry.  
Medical treatment was often delivered as an element of civic action 
programmes, whereby South Vietnamese units and their U.S. counterparts would enter 
villages and deliver basic services to the people. In 1962, a joint proposal by the U.S. 
embassy and U.S. military established the Medical Civic Action Programme 
(MEDCAP) and Dental Civic Action Programme (DENTCAP). The goal was to 
provide outpatient care in rural areas while simultaneously training South Vietnamese 
medical technicians. More importantly, the programmes aimed to convince the rural 
population that the government cared about their well-being.336 Often provided during 
“County Fair Operations” or as part of a “cordon and search”, U.S. forces surrounded a 
village as ARVN troops questioned military-aged villagers. U.S. and Vietnamese 
medics then immunized villagers against common diseases, treated basic medical 
problems, extracted teeth and handed out soap, toothbrushes, toothpaste and leaflets on 
hygiene. The troops barbequed food while military bands and even magicians 
performed as the crowd looked on, sometimes with “enthusiasm”, sometimes with 
dismay. One report complained that in some instances the MEDCAPs “amounted to no 
more than a travelling medicine show”. While the programme might have some 
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advantage in convincing locals that “Western magic is more powerful than local 
magic”, the observer complained, it “represents an inexcusable prostitution of medical 
facilities”.337 American claims that the programme would deliver better health care 
aside, the true aim was to win the loyalty of the rural population by establishing a 
benevolent government presence in the countryside. As one U.S. military report stated: 
“the primary benefit from MEDCAP is psychological rather than medical”.338  
Nevertheless, the results were not always as desired. The sight of ARVN troops 
and their foreign counterparts delivering medical treatment while gathering intelligence 
and interrogating villagers did not give the impression of an entirely benevolent Saigon 
regime. It was clear that the programme was at least in part intended to blunt opposition 
to military operations. The militarization of medicine and its use as a political weapon 
was not lost on the villagers but “Free World Forces” were at a loss as to why 
Vietnamese villagers did not show more appreciation for their efforts. Australian 
MEDCAP teams based near Vung Tau wondered why nearby villagers maintained “an 
air of indifference” after civic action operations in which they had pulled the villagers’ 
rotten teeth, treated their endemic TB, killed their mosquitoes and provided them with 
“some good Australian tucker”.339  
MEDCAPs and DENTCAPs continued until U.S. forces withdrew in 1972. In a 
post-war assessment, ARVN Generals Nguyen Duy Hinh and Tran Dinh Tho suggested 
that MEDCAPs “resulted in better health care for those areas where indigenous doctors 
were a rarity”.340 This was no doubt the case but the programmes made little 
contribution to the creation of a modern, sustainable public health infrastructure in 
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South Vietnam. Most critically, the programmes failed to deliver adequate follow up 
care in the villages because there were not enough medical teams to go around and rural 
insecurity sometimes prevented return visits. Fearing that drugs would fall into the 
hands of the NLF, the teams sometimes limited the quantity of medicine prescribed to 
ill villagers to a 2-3 day supply.341 Acceptance of medical care did not indicate support 
for the government. MEDCAP teams reported that they had to stop handing out 
commodities such as candy and clothes because “opportunists” were flocking to 
MEDCAPS with inexplicable “coughs and headaches”.342 Nor were the programmes a 
novel way to secure the peasantry’s loyalty; intelligence gathered at one MEDCAP 
indicated that North Vietnamese Army medics had conducted their own medical civic 
action programmes in the area before South Vietnamese and American troops. The 
civilians in the area were “generally very healthy”.343 
Medical civic action programmes delivered health care to remote rural villagers 
who had previously had little or no access to medical attention. However, the 
programmes had little lasting impact. They were delivered in piecemeal fashion and 
with psychological goals in mind. Furthermore, MEDCAPs and DENTCAPs did little to 
modernize the rural peasantry’s practices and social relations. It was not until after the 
Tet Offensive that the South Vietnamese government attempted ambitious social 
engineering projects to condition the peasantry to behave in more healthful, modern 
ways. 
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Filthy Camps and Sanitary Hamlets 
With Vietnamization, the GVN’s financial and manpower resources were thinly 
stretched. Even prior to the Tet Offensive the Ministry of Health had requested closer 
coordination between the civilian and military health services but during the offensive 
itself, at a time when civilian health services were overwhelmed, military physicians 
attached to civilian facilities were called back to their units.344 As the GVN prepared for 
General Mobilization in response to the Tet Offensive, the MOH called for a flexible 
policy and expressed concern that medical personnel would be drafted. The military, the 
MOH noted, had nearly its full required number of physicians, pharmacists and dentists 
while the civilian branch had less than 40% of its required staff. The MOH warned that 
General Mobilization, if strictly applied, would lead to paralysis in some areas of 
civilian health. Unsurprisingly, General Mobilization in June, which called up all males 
aged 16- 50 for military or paramilitary service, aggravated the already dire shortage of 
health professionals. In an illustrative case, Da Lat general hospital was forced to cancel 
all surgeries when the army drafted its only anaesthetist.345 The Joint Utilization 
Program, whereby civilian and military medical personnel shared facilities beginning in 
late 1969, alleviated the problem somewhat, but shortages of civilian health 
professionals remained critical until the fall of Saigon. 
The military’s drain on national resources was such that by 1970 the MOH’s 
operations accounted for just 2.9% of the national budget. Minister Tran Minh Tung 
told Prime Minister Khiem that in most countries this figure was 6-12%. To compensate 
for this shortfall, the ministry sought assistance from “free world” countries other than 
the United States and in 1970 raised US$21m, more than its projected budget for 1971. 
However, these countries were mostly willing to assist with hospital construction and 
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training programmes and there was little left for rural health projects.346 In light of this 
dire resource shortage, many post-Tet development projects sought to encourage village 
self-sufficiency. In the area of public health, the Sanitary Hamlet Programme aimed to 
provide the peasantry with the means to manage its own health care needs.  
Poor sanitation was responsible for many common illnesses in Vietnam. The 
Walter Reed Army Institute of Research reported that hookworm was “almost 
universal” and dysentery and acute enteric diseases were very common, “reflecting the 
sanitary conditions and hygienic habits of the population”. The use of night soil, 
previously rare, was becoming more common due to the financial pressures of the war. 
“Excreta disposal facilities” were inadequate and, as another report claimed, “people 
won’t use them anyway”.347 These problems were even worse in refugee camps. After-
care and sanitation were almost non-existent. In many camps, refugees received little or 
no food, had no access to water, no toilets, inadequate shelter and no medical 
facilities.348  
Filth was everywhere for the American soldier serving in Vietnam. “They’re 
very ignorant. They shit and wipe their ass with their finger. They smell. The villages 
stink. Stink!” complained one.349 The sight of Vietnamese squatting in fields was 
particularly upsetting for young U.S. troops. For these soldiers the perceived filth of the 
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villagers somehow devalued the American cause in Vietnam. “We were fools to be 
ready to die for a people who defecated in public” one claimed.350 It was not only the 
grunts who believed that Vietnamese were filthy. Larry Flanagan, a USAID officer, said 
“they have no idea of why a clean market is any better than a dirty market; it’s just a 
market and leaving trash around has been a way of life for who knows how long”. For 
Flanagan, filth was a Vietnamese tradition. The GVN, composed of the urbane French 
and U.S.-educated elite, also equated squalor with custom and hygiene with progress. 
The Ministry of Health attributed the peasantry’s difficulty overcoming their 
“unsanitary habits” to “their ancient traditions and obscure superstitions” which “have 
not yet been cleared from their minds”.351 Encouraging rural Vietnamese to defecate in 
the correct place and dispose of their rubbish in an acceptable fashion thus became part 
of the mission to force them from tradition to modernity. 
In this sense, U.S. and elite South Vietnamese perceptions of the peasantry 
mirrored that of the late colonial discourse of the “unsanitary other”. Japanese public 
health regimes in Korea, Taiwan and mainland China as well as U.S. projects in the 
Philippines aimed at reforming colonial or “underdeveloped” subjects. Often these 
programmes in the colonial periphery were extensions of those that targeted the urban 
poor in the colonial metropole. In the early part of the 20th century, the United States in 
the Philippines and Japan in Korea and Taiwan used the image of the unsanitary native 
to justify the continuation of colonial rule. U.S. colonial officers argued that Filipinos 
were not in control of their bodily functions and their lack of hygienic knowledge 
endangered their children.352 If these people could not govern their personal hygiene, 
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colonial officials reasoned, they very well could not govern themselves. The difference 
with earlier visions of imperial medicine was that colonial officials now saw these 
subjects as capable of change. But only through a process of reform, including hygienic 
reform, could they become ready for independence. The GVN’s Sanitary Hamlet 
Programme, in adopting a similarly paternalistic attitude to the peasantry, points to the 
way in which some postcolonial regimes treated their rural citizens like colonial 
subjects, viewing them with something approaching disgust. 
The GVN’s National Sanitary Hamlet Programme began with two pilot hamlets 
in Phu Yen and Tay Ninh provinces in 1965 but did not become a nationwide campaign 
until 1969. The GVN chose model hamlets in select areas, while existing hamlets could 
elect to voluntarily replicate these efforts and turn their hamlets into sanitary ones 
through the Village Self-Development program. The goal of the program was to ensure 
“cleanliness everywhere” and protect the people’s health. Mobile health teams visited 
the target group, screening them for TB, dysentery, parasites and skin conditions and 
treated suspected cases. The peasants received immunizations against plague, cholera, 
smallpox and typhoid. When the teams detected malaria they carried out “a radical one 
day treatment of all the populace” and in instances of infestation, the teams conducted 
thorough delousing. There was also an emphasis on maternal and child health care. The 
target group was then subjected to two week’s intensive health education employing 
loudspeakers, radios, leaflets and demonstrations. Within the hamlets themselves the 
residents, under the supervision of GVN cadres and American advisers, constructed 
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sealed wells and toilets, washable concrete marketplaces and compost bins with 
concrete floors.353 
The refugee population became one of the principal targets of the programme. 
As noted in the previous chapter, these refugees had been driven into camps by an often 
deliberate U.S. and South Vietnamese military strategy. During the early years of the 
U.S. intervention, there seemed in the mind of the U.S. and South Vietnamese military 
planner and policymaker no contradiction between population displacement and health 
care. As a captive, dependent population and despite the general lack of sanitation in the 
camps, refugees presented an ideal target for disease eradication. Mobile health teams 
visited the camps and administered vaccinations, rising from 4.1 million nationwide 
vaccinations in 1964 to 27.8 million in 1968.354  
However, as Warwick Anderson notes, immunization programs do not give 
states the same regulatory power over citizens’ bodies as campaigns of hygienic reform. 
A state can immunize people but they would not become modern citizens until they 
began to follow modern hygiene and sanitation practices.355 With improved security in 
the countryside following the offensives of 1968, the government encouraged urban-
dwelling peasants to return to the countryside and used hygiene and sanitation projects 
to regulate behaviour in the new communities. As USAID director John Hannah 
implied, refugees were not a part of a national political community. The goal of the 
Return to Village programme, Hannah said, was “to move these war victims out of the 
status of refugees and back into the status of normal citizenship”.356 The rehabilitation 
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of the refugee and war victim population, it seems, not only included efforts to bring 
them back into the community of productive workers and loyal government supporters, 
but also included more sanitary habits. In 1971, the government therefore decided to 
establish sanitary hamlets at all Return-to-Village and resettlement sites. The GVN 
combined refugee resettlement with the Sanitary Hamlet programme to shape the kind 
of rural citizens it wanted. By encouraging both deurbanization and hygienic reform, the 
GVN was expressing its vision of rural modernity which tied hygiene and sanitation to 
anti-Communist identity.  
 The GVN was taking captive refugees living in unsanitary, overcrowded camps, 
immunizing them and educating them about preventing illness and sending them back 
to clean villages. The idea was that they would return to their villages, healthier, 
happier, more productive and more dedicated to the national, anti-Communist cause. 
The refugees, one assumes, must have wondered why, if sanitation was so important, 
were the camps and reception centres so filthy. Even in the case of the non-refugee 
population the programme was, for a government that had previously done little in the 
medical sphere to reach them, an ambitious intervention in the lives of the people, with 
the state often reaching right inside peasant’s homes. 
Long Qui hamlet, Long Thanh district in Tay Ninh was one of the earliest 
sanitary hamlets. Government cadres explained the need for better sanitation to the 
villagers and then solicited contributions of labour and money. They directed the 
villagers in the drainage of the area to prevent malaria, the construction of 262 water-
sealed latrines, and wells with cement walls.357 The cadres then instructed the villagers 
in “a concentrated cleaning effort in homes, kitchens, pigsties, etc”. Upon completion, 
U.S. observers reported, “many health hazards had been removed”. The programme was 
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not simply about medical benefits, however. Aside from these, the programme had also 
“led to more attractive hamlet and a sense of community spirit”.358 The programme 
would make residents healthier but also, by making the villages more aesthetically 
pleasing, the sanitary hamlets appealed to the modern sensibilities of U.S. advisers and 
middle-class, urban Vietnamese officials. The mass mobilization of villagers for the 
public good forged stronger community links. Hygiene would therefore serve the goals 
of counterinsurgency. The Sanitary Hamlet programme reflected the larger development 
and nation-building goals of the Second Republic: modern practices and community 
solidarity. In this sense, it demonstrates how the seemingly oppositional goals of 
modernization and community development could co-exist. 
The gap between design and practice was the primary shortcoming of the 
sanitary hamlets. In 1971 the MOH ordered each provincial health service to select three 
model hamlets which would act as beacons of hygiene for surrounding hamlets to 
replicate through the VSD programme. Each province received VN$100,000 (US$850) 
for each of the three hamlets.359 Cadres would then mobilize the local population in the 
construction of sanitary facilities, which GVN health officials estimated would take 30-
45 days.360 In practice, the government and U.S. advisers poured resources into some 
model hamlets that others could not hope to receive, while construction projects often 
took several months to complete. The hamlet of Ong Huong near Bien Hoa provides an 
illustrative example.  
The GVN chose Ong Huong as a model because of its size, population of over 
2,000 people and proximity to water sources. The 1971 Community Defence and Local 
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Development Plan gave the MOH the responsibility for guiding young people to 
participate in sanitation operations and the United States provided transport for 100 
students who assisted Ong Huong’s residents “in a beautification effort”. U.S. advisers 
then helped construct 100 garbage pits, 20 animal pens and 113 water-sealed latrines at 
a total of 1,500 man hours. They built a dam, which twice washed out before a 
permanent structure was built and a slow-sand filter to treat raw water into potable 
water. The latter was a “major undertaking” which required well over 2,000 man hours 
and the assistance of the local Popular Forces platoon. Local carpenters and labourers, 
with U.S. advisory assistance, took 5 months to build water tower with a 5,000 gallon 
tank mounted on top. The water was treated with calcium hypochlorite and the villagers 
installed two diesel pumps. Water-borne communicable diseases “will virtually be 
eliminated from Ong Huong”, reported the U.S. unit responsible for the project, and a 
potable water supply “has encouraged the local populace to continue good sanitation 
habits”.361  
The hamlet served as a showcase; public health officials visited Ong Huong to 
see the latrines, wells and slow sand filter.362 The idea was that surrounding hamlets 
would be inspired to replicate Ong Huong and under the Village Self-Development 
Programme, residents could vote to implement projects to sanitize their own hamlets. 
But the total cost of the Ong Huong project was VN$350,000 plus the donation of 
VN$250,000 worth of surplus American supplies and well over 3,500 man hours. The 
Engineering Branch of CORDS in Military Region IV estimated that a slow sand filter 
                                                
361 ‘MACV/CORDS Advisory Team 98 Accomplishments’, 13 May 1972, Civil Operations and Rural 
Development Support, Military Region 3 And Its Assigned Units, 1970-1972, Meritorious Unit 
Commendations, Vietnam Service Awards, RG472, available at: 
http://www.fold3.com/image/#268892424, accessed June 10th 2012; ‘Community Defense and Local 
Development Plan’, 1 January 1971, Folder 065, U.S. Marine Corps History Division Vietnam War 
Documents Collection, TTU-VVA, Item No: 120165050. 
362 ‘Report for Week Ending November 7- 13, 1971’, 16 November 1971, MACV, HQ CORDS, 
MR4/Public Health Div, Box 36, Folder 1601-03 PH General 1971, General Records 1966- 1972, 
RG472, NARA II. 
172 
 
could cost up to VN$700,000 including material and labour.363 Surrounding hamlets, 
inspired by beautified Ong Huong, would therefore be hard pressed to match this effort. 
Under the VSD programme the GVN contributed VN$1,000,000 to every village which 
had held elections. But these funds, in principle, had to be shared among 5 or 6 hamlets. 
Following the establishment of the sanitary hamlets, rural health teams made 
periodic visits to conduct health education “on a lower level of intensity” than during 
the initial week-long saturation.364 Such education sought to transform a traditional, 
rural culture into a modern one in the shortest possible time, allowing the state to retreat 
from health care responsibilities. The goal was to produce a self-governing citizenry 
that, once educated, would have minimal health care needs, would be productive 
members of the community and would therefore place less of a burden on precious 
GVN resources. As the 1972-1975 Four Year Economic Plan stated, the goal of health 
education was “a self-reliant public health system… in which each and every person can 
enjoy a healthy physical life”.365 For the Ministry of Health, health education had the 
power to transform rural society. The sanitary hamlet programme was not just a model 
for better health in the countryside but the first step toward rural modernization in all 
areas. The programme provided a model for other GVN ministries in the same way that 
the sanitary hamlets provided a model for unsanitary hamlets. As the model hamlets 
proliferated, all hamlets would become sanitized. The next step would be an 
Agricultural Hamlet in which farming methods would be modernized followed by 
Education Hamlets aimed at “expanding culture”.366 
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Throughout the war, the Vietnamese and their American counterparts developed 
a series of surveys to measure the impact of these programmes on the political identities 
of the population. But as one CIA report stated “this is almost impossible”.367 On the 
other hand, U.S. personnel discovered a way to measure the more quantifiable benefits 
of the Sanitary Hamlet Programme. The primary indicator of whether sanitation had 
improved in the newly upgraded hamlets was to measure the level of intestinal parasites 
in the local population before and after sanitary improvements had been made. In 
Military Region III the Parasitology Department of the U.S. 9th Medical Laboratory 
provided diagnostic services for parasitic diseases, collecting water and faecal samples 
and taking them back to the lab where they determined the levels of parasitic infection 
in the newly sanitized villagers.368 Rather than being a programme that “reaches into the 
heart of the hamlets” as Deputy Commander for CORDS in II Corps James Megellas 
said, it was in fact a programme that reached into the bowels of the hamlet.369  
Almost 60 years earlier, during a cholera outbreak in the Philippines, American 
scientist E.L. Munson had conceded that American faeces collection amounted to “an 
invasion of the accepted rights of the home and of the individual on a scale perhaps 
unprecedented for any community”.  The Philippines became a military laboratory and 
U.S. policies attempted to render the Philippines more laboratory like- clean, sterilized, 
hygienic.370 Similarly, these were the goals of the sanitary hamlet programme. But if 
modern sanitation meant the rather humiliating process of foreigners coming into your 
home and inspecting the contents of your new toilet, one can imagine that at least some 
peasants were not terribly enthused about the programme. For others it must have 
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seemed quite a sudden role reversal. Many refugees and other villagers had gained 
employment as “shit-burners” in U.S. military bases, a job which was exactly as it 
sounds.371 Some newly sanitized villagers simply expressed amusement, “every three 
days or so,” one said, “there is a group of Americans who come to see the toilets”.372  
By providing the peasantry with better living conditions, modernization projects 
such as the sanitary hamlet programme aimed to abolish a traditional hygienic culture 
and force the peasantry to modernize. As a corollary, the peasantry, seeing visible 
improvements in their standard of living could be more easily co-opted into the GVN’s 
support base. But as the experience in one sanitary hamlet showed, it was not so easy to 
transform a rural culture. Peasants did not respond as the government hoped, sometimes 
for quite practical reasons The toilets, a peasant mused, were “good at night but in the 
day time” when they were working “the people still prefer the rice fields or the river 
banks”.373 Some sanitary hamlets did not even get this far. In Ninh Thuan province on 
the central coast, the provincial health services had to abandon attempts to establish a 
sanitary hamlet at Dac Nhon in Buu Son district because “the people did not respond” to 
the cadres’ guidance.374 If the residents of one of the three hamlets that the provincial 
services had selected as a potential model site did not embrace the programme, it did not 
bode well for those hamlets which were supposed to voluntarily adopt MOH guidelines. 
The model sanitary hamlets cost a great deal more than the GVN was capable of 
contributing to elsewhere. With the expectation that neighbouring hamlets would 
replicate these construction efforts, the MOH was holding those peasants to standards of 
hygiene with which they were previously unfamiliar and that their economic status did 
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not allow them to maintain. Even within the model sanitary hamlets there were 
problems. The government expected the peasantry in the hamlets to maintain certain 
levels of hygiene and sanitation but rather than encouraging self-sufficiency, the 
government had built complex sanitation works that the peasantry could not maintain 
without government assistance. One USAID report complained that maintenance of the 
facilities in the sanitary hamlets was “less than satisfactory”.375 The government 
constructed new health facilities in the countryside to serve the sanitary hamlets but 
manpower and resources for maintenance, health education and medical treatment 
remained critically deficient as the central government was increasingly preoccupied 
with military matters. For example, three newly constructed rural maternities in Tay 
Ninh province remained unstaffed for over 6 months despite repeated appeals from the 
region’s Director of Health Truong Van Chuong. The MOH finally told Chuong that 
midwives were available but no funds were allocated for their salary.376 
By the end of 1971, there were 141 sanitary hamlets throughout the country and 
the MOH planned one hamlet and one fully sanitized village in each of the country’s 
257 districts by the end of 1973.377 By the end of 1974 the total had risen to 275 
hamlets, many of which had more than 1,000 residents each. Some American advisers 
were sceptical as to whether the GVN could sustain the effort. In Congressional 
testimony in April 1972 Robert Nooter of USAID said preventive health care was “new 
to them. I hesitate to say they are ready to take over that whole field” but the Sanitary 
Hamlet Programme was at least indicative of the GVN’s attempt to focus on long-range 
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planning.378 However, in the final analysis, USAID ruled the sanitary hamlets a “crash 
program” which served no long-term value. The peasantry was apparently interested in 
the programme, according to USAID, and keen to dedicate time to completing projects 
but given the dearth of sanitary agents and health education officers, “the people soon 
reverted to their old habits”.379 
The Sanitary Hamlet Programme, by teaching the peasantry about hygiene and 
sanitation, attempted to shift health care from curative to preventive medicine. 
Preventive medicine would place less strain on the MOH’s limited resources. The 
sanitary hamlets also aimed to forge community solidarity in the service of 
counterinsurgency. But the project required a rapid transformation of habits and held 
poor peasants to standards of hygiene that were difficult for them to maintain. The 
programme received unanimous support from both GVN and U.S. officials who 
believed that improving rural sanitation was an unquestionably benevolent goal. 
Criticism focused not on the concept of the programme, but its execution. Another 
programme to modernize South Vietnam’s public health practices, population planning, 
did not benefit from such unanimity of support. 
 
Quality, Not Quantity: Population Planning in South Vietnam 
The Sanitary Hamlet Programme fit neatly with the GVN’s desire to deliver health 
into the home. The GVN’s population planning project had similar ambitions and also 
occurred against the backdrop of debates about overcrowded cities, repopulating the 
countryside and changing national culture. Rather than treating the issue as one of 
women’s rights, population planning was, for most, an attempt to engineer an ideally 
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sized, economically productive population. In the late 1960s, a 1920 French law 
banning abortion and contraception and a 1933 decree which extended that law to 
Indochina remained on the statute books in South Vietnam. Modernizing technocrats 
fought to have this law repealed and for the establishment of a nationwide network of 
family planning clinics. Opposition to population planning came from a broad array of 
interests. Debates centred on whether South Vietnam needed more people to serve the 
country militarily and economically or whether the country’s population should be held 
down to improve per capita income and produce quality rather than a large quantity of 
economic actors. In the ongoing struggle with the NLF and North Vietnamese forces for 
control of populated territory, some officials believed that any limitations on the 
population, although it would be a long time before they took effect, would be unwise. 
Other opponents viewed population control as an imperial enterprise that the Global 
North was imposing on the Global South, while others still expressed fears that the 
availability of birth control would lead to increased sexual promiscuity and an erosion 
of the large, traditional Vietnamese family. 
While international non-government organizations were often “the first and most 
persistent advocates” of population planning in the Global South, in South Vietnam it 
was a domestic NGO which took up the challenge.380 Beginning in 1962 a group of 
private citizens sought to promote family planning knowledge but they received little 
support from the government and international agencies. Four years later, participants at 
a maternal and child health seminar raised concerns about the increasing number of 
illegal abortions endangering the lives of women and called on the government to 
establish a position on family planning. That year, a number of these doctors and private 
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citizens founded the Family Happiness Protection Association (FHPA) to promote 
family planning.381  
In response to these developments the Ministry of Health established a Committee 
for Research in Family Planning to examine the crisis, explore public opinion, and 
collect demographic information. The committee discovered the number of illegal 
abortions was high and only 15% of South Vietnamese women interviewed knew about 
any methods of family planning. Committee chair and Director of the Cabinet in the 
MOH Truong Minh Cac began to lobby the National Assembly to have the 1920 law 
repealed; an event that Cac and other officials repeatedly promised was just around the 
corner.382 In the meantime, the GVN adopted a permissive attitude to birth control and 
implemented a limited programme even while the anti-family planning laws continued. 
In 1969 the government opened eight clinics in densely populated areas and 
contraceptives were only available to women with more than five children. By 1971 the 
government deemed the pilot project successful enough for it to be extended to 30 
clinics, with one planned for each of the 44 provincial hospitals by 1972 and one in each 
of the 257 districts by 1974. The criteria for eligibility were also lowered to women 
with one living child “plus husband’s consent and a marriage or cohabitation 
certificate”.383  
The FHPA essentially became a front for the government and there was a good 
deal of overlap between officials in the MOH interested population control and the 
leadership of the association. Tu Uyen, previously a member of the MOH’s family 
planning research committee became Chairman of the FHPA and was later succeeded 
by Tran Nguon Phieu, formerly GVN Minister for Social Welfare. The 1920 law limited 
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the activities the GVN could conduct in the realm of family planning so the association 
became a vehicle through which the GVN could operate, including doing much of the 
publicity work. The FHPA trained government health officials in family planning 
“motivation” techniques, delivered guest lectures to students of social studies, 
demography and statistics, and made presentations to the National Assembly. Uyen and 
the MOH’s Truong Minh Cac co-authored articles on South Vietnam’s population 
planning for the Population Council’s Studies in Family Planning journal.384 The 
association also produced a newsletter for those interested in family planning, one issue 
of which featured on its cover an urbane and happy-looking young couple with one son 
and one daughter. The newsletters included reports on the activities of the association 
and bar charts indicating the increasing numbers of Vietnamese practicing family 
planning.385  
For GVN and FHPA officials a large part of the appeal of family planning was 
that it drew South Vietnam into an international network, conferring legitimacy on the 
regime. For development agencies, it appeared an uncontroversial issue. Whereas other 
development projects or assistance to South Vietnam with any hint of war support 
risked raising the ire of the non-aligned countries or charges of aiding a neo-colonial 
puppet regime, family planning appeared to raise none of these concerns. Under the old 
French law the GVN could only pay the wages of MOH family planning staff; US and 
international agencies including the International Planned Parenthood Federation 
(IPPF), Pathfinder Fund, the Population Council and Oxfam paid for commodities and 
training, while IPPF also funnelled money to the FHPA. The Population Council, 
USAID and regional governments also sponsored MOH officials to go to population 
seminars and on observation tours of population programmes in Singapore, Thailand, 
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Korea and Taiwan, joining an international network of demographers and population 
experts.386 International development institutions such as the World Health 
Organization or countries such as the UK which ordinarily made little contribution to 
South Vietnamese development were happy to help. In 1972 WHO secured $50,000 in 
UNDP funding for “a maternity-centred family planning welfare project” in South 
Vietnam.387 These were minor contributions in monetary terms but for South 
Vietnamese officials they amounted to endorsements. Similarly, for the Family 
Happiness Protection Association, becoming the official IPPF representative in South 
Vietnam was celebrated a major achievement.388  
As the GVN’s point man on population, Cac was on the receiving end of the 
international population control movement’s information pipeline, receiving 
“overpopulation” literature and tracts from a host of population planning advocates. An 
official at the U.S. Embassy sent Cac a copy of Paul Ehrlich’s The Population Bomb, 
the infamous polemic which warned that within years global population would outstrip 
food supply resulting in famine and war. The U.S. official included a cover note which 
observed “the population of Vietnam will double in 23 years…a sobering thought” as it 
would mean the need for twice as many houses, classrooms and teachers.389 Cac also 
received and circulated a copy of the ‘Declaration on Food and Population’, in which 
some the 20th century’s most prominent development thinkers and practitioners like 
Nobel Prize-winning biologist Norman Borlaug, former IRRI Director Robert Chandler 
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and economist Gunnar Myrdal called on the world community to adopt a common 
strategy to meet food shortages in light of rapid global population growth.390  
Given the need to repeal the 1920 law, one of the key tasks was to convince 
National Assembly members of the merits of family planning. In 1969 an amendment 
was introduced in the Lower House which proposed deleting the anti-contraception 
components of the 1920 law. However, the motion was tabled pending further study. 
USAID’s chief population adviser in Vietnam wrote to the Population Council’s 
representative in Taiwan saying “we are firmly convinced that the observational tours of 
Taiwan and Korean programs under Population Council in 1968 were largely 
responsible for the support that the amendment did receive”. USAID officials therefore 
continued to pursue this angle, making presentations to the Senate Health Committee 
and sending health committee members on further study tours of the region’s population 
programmes.391 But U.S. officials noted many obstacles that had to be overcome to push 
through population planning in Vietnam. For many Vietnamese, the large family was 
both a tradition and a guarantee of financial and social security in old age. Another 
challenge was the perception among Vietnamese that the United States and the West 
was forcing population control on the developing nations. Finally, Catholic opposition 
would prove a major barrier to change. Catholics represented just 10% of the population 
but included much of the urban elite. They wielded hugely disproportionate political 
influence in South Vietnam and accounted for as much as 50% of the National 
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Assembly membership. Much of the suspicion of family planning came from these 
legislators.392 
While the National Assembly prevaricated, advocates of family planning debated 
the role of women in the programme and the economic implications of family planning. 
A “Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices” (KAP) survey of 9,000 urban and rural women 
conducted by the MOH in 1969-1970 showed overwhelming approval for family 
planning. Only 25% previously knew of contraceptive methods and most women 
wanted smaller families. However, advocates of family planning were disappointed to 
find out that these women did not want much smaller families. The survey discovered 
the median actual number of children was 5.8 but the median ideal number of children 
was a still very high 4.3.393  
For some advocates, the task was to increase women’s knowledge of and access to 
contraception. Phung Ngoc Duy, a member of FHPA, complained that “women are 
virtually neglected” at South Vietnam’s family planning seminars. She argued that 
without women’s participation in the debate any family planning program could not 
succeed. Duy believed that government cadres should explain family planning to 
women in an informal manner at seminars in heavily-populated working class areas, 
soliciting their ideas and clearing up their concerns. These women could then spread the 
message of family planning in their neighbourhoods.394 
But the results of the KAP survey indicated that even under circumstances in 
which Vietnamese women could have their ideal number of children, population would 
continue to grow at a high rate. Vietnam’s Neo-Malthusians were dismissive of these 
women’s apparently irrational desires. Of women’s preference for more than four 
children, Luu Van Hinh, Chief of the Planning Bureau in the National Health Education 
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Service said “we can see at once that this ideal number is a figment of the imagination 
based on psychological judgement rather than reasoning from reality”. The Malthusian 
reality, Hinh argued, was that there were currently 16.5 hectares of land per person in 
South Vietnam and within 25 years this would be 0.5 hectares if something was not 
done about population growth. Hinh called for a family planning program based on 
socio-economic indicators. If it cost 5,000 piasters a month to feed a mouth, he 
reasoned, a family with a monthly income of 30,000 should have no more than four 
children. Notably, Hinh and Duy, despite their very different approaches, shared the 
belief that the poor should be the primary target of family planning interventions395 
While some wished to increase women’s access to contraception, the 
overwhelming justification for birth control centred on economic development and only 
a programme that established targets, rather than one which respected individual choice, 
could hope to influence the economy. As with other public health projects, population 
planning was an attempt to marshal the human resources of the country toward military 
and economic goals. Ministry of Health officials believed that a population control 
program would be “a decisive factor in the success of national development 
planning”.396 The goal was to manipulate the size and composition of the population to 
contribute to South Vietnam’s take-off and ensure the survival of the state after the U.S. 
withdrawal. The GVN’s Four Year National Economic Plan stated that “to increase 
workers’ productivity, programs on public health and family planning will be 
vigorously prosecuted”.397 The Inter-ministerial National Population Council, founded 
in April 1973, stated that “the major factors in the development of a country include its 
social and cultural patterns, the natural resources available, the levels of investment 
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achieved and the quality, rather than quantity, of the population”.398 Mrs. Nguyen Van 
Bong, Deputy Chairperson of the FPHA, referring perhaps more to the well-connected 
wives of the South Vietnamese military than to the rural peasantry, said that the women 
who ran big business in Saigon were evidence of female empowerment. “We don’t need 
women’s lib here”, she said, “We are already emancipated”. Bong said that reducing 
population growth would increase the standard of living and reduce inflation. It was “a 
matter of survival”.399 Demographic transition theory had supposed that development 
would precede declines in birth rates in the Global South. By the 1970s, the MOH and 
the FHPA, like the international population control movement, had inverted this theory, 
believing that lower population growth would generate a corresponding increase in 
Gross National Product per capita.  
A major deficiency in the development of an effective population planning 
programme and undermining any economic logic for one was the absence of accurate 
demographic information. The MOH based its information on a 1967 census of Saigon, 
a 1969-70 census of 14 cities, and a 1971 census of select rural areas in 15 provinces. 
Analysing this information, the MOH’s Committee on Statistics believed that South 
Vietnam’s population was growing by approximately 3.4% per annum, high by 
Southeast Asian standards and enough to ensure that the population would double 
within 25 years. The National Institute of Statistics believed growth was 2.6%.400 This 
was a considerable discrepancy and would have a meaningful impact on population 
growth. In Saigon, the only city where hospitals kept a reasonably good record of births 
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and deaths, the growth rate was estimated to be over 4%. Nonetheless, these rough 
estimates became the basis for population and economic development projections.401 
The irony of developing a population planning programme in a country where 
there was no accurate statistics on population size or growth and where the territory of 
the government changed daily was apparently lost on GVN, U.S. and international 
planners. Indeed, MOH officials expressed frustration at the National Assembly Health 
Committees’ reluctance to repeal the 1933 decree, but this was at least in part due to the 
absence of reliable demographic data.402 
It was not only the rate of growth that concerned population planning advocates, 
however. The demographic composition of the country also posed problems. South 
Vietnam’s dependency burden, which measured the number of economically productive 
people supporting dependents, was one of the highest in the world. The National 
Population Council argued that “a major drawback to economic development is too 
many children and retired people”. The GVN needed to address the population 
imbalance if it was to break its dependence on the United States. Seeking to reassure 
GVN leaders concerned more about security than economic development, the 
Population Council stated that no matter how quickly birth rates fell the number of men 
aged 20-34 would quadruple between 1971 and 2001. “The number of young men 
available for military service will continue to increase rapidly… as most of these 
potential future soldiers have already been born”.403  
The Population Council warned that the GVN must enact a vigorous family 
planning programme or risk economic stagnation. The council pointed to the example of 
Taiwan which had successfully reduced its population growth from 3% to 2% between 
1963 and 1973. The GVN should set similar goals of reducing growth to between 2- 
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2.4% by 1980. If the government failed to meet this target, the increase in the cost of 
education and health care would prove overwhelming and there would not be enough 
cultivatable land to support the population.404 
By the time of the Paris Agreements, there were 86 family planning centres 
throughout the country but the 1920 law remained on the statute books. Although a 
family planning law went before the National Assembly in early 1973, members 
appeared to be dragging their feet. Birth control had proved a controversial issue. Tu 
Uyen, the FHPA chair, told members of the baseless criticism of the association by 
“extreme” and “prejudicial” groups, as well as criticism of its activities in some 
newspapers.405 The debate over the merits of population planning would grow even 
more discordant in the months to come. 
 
Conclusion 
Ruth Rogaski, in an essay on Japanese public health projects in early 20th century 
Manchuria, stated that historians of public health “have faced two analytic paths: either 
(modern biomedicine) brings the desirable benefits of health and modernity… or it is a 
mode of social control, a coercive force, which, in creating modernity, limits the range 
of possible expressions of humanity”. There is no reason, Rogaski suggests, why it 
cannot be both.406 Access to birth control and improved rural sanitation are 
unquestionably positive development goals. But both are modes of social control and 
regulation and are therefore likely to meet resistance from the targets of public health 
interventions. 
The GVN attempted to meet the health care needs of the peasantry in spite of the 
limited money and manpower that it could commit to this area. By mobilizing peasants 
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in an effort to build toilets and beautify hamlets, the government expected to win the 
political loyalty of the peasantry while health education would modernize the peasantry 
to become responsible for its own health care. In this sense, the programme was both a 
modernization and community development project. 
All the while, the GVN failed to deal with a problem that some planners saw as 
a far greater barrier to achieving self-sufficiency: the high proportion of economically 
dependent people in the population. The sanitary hamlet programme was unlikely to 
raise objections from within the government bureaucracy. Better sanitation could appeal 
to all GVN planners. They reasoned that all peasants would appreciate the fruits of 
sanitary engineering. On the other hand, a population planning programme threatened 
the vision that some political elites had for modern South Vietnam. For some politicians 
and bureaucrats there was no contradiction between modernizing the peasantry and 
maintaining the traditionally large Vietnamese family. 
Neither of these programmes reached large numbers of the population. Yet, with 
the exception of the malaria eradication campaign in the late 1950s, no GVN health 
programme reached large numbers in the villages. Building a public health network that 
extended throughout the country was a huge task for any postcolonial nation, let alone 
for the RVN at a time when it faced an existential military threat. The GVN’s public 
health programmes highlight the difficulty of conducting “biomedical” policies in areas 
of territorial dispute and ongoing war. Aside from the political opposition, it would only 
have been possible to initiate a population planning programme in a time of peace when 
the government could reach and register everyone within its sovereign territory. 
Similarly, the pressures of the war considerably complicated the government’s efforts to 
mobilize manpower for anything other than war-making, undermining any attempt to 
extend health care into the countryside. Although the idea was to create a self-sufficient 
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population, the projects left behind a complicated sanitation infrastructure which the 
villagers could not maintain without continued technical assistance from government. 
GVN public health projects in the post-Tet era are more significant for what they 
hoped to achieve and what that tells us about the GVN’s vision of development and 
modernity, than for their concrete results. In the Sanitary Hamlet and population 
planning projects it is possible identify three goals in keeping with the GVN’s larger 
development vision including the desire for modern practices among South Vietnamese 
citizens- in this case in hygiene and reproduction-, the attempt to construct a sense of 
community in the villages, and the desire for economic growth.  
Such was the global momentum behind population planning in the late 1960s 
and 1970s that no postcolonial state in the non-Communist world, regardless of how 
appropriate or not a population programme might be, could avoid getting caught up in 
this frenzy. Not only did engagement with the transnational population network confer 
legitimacy on the GVN, but when South Vietnamese officials looked around the region 
they could see that their role model states were adopting these policies with even greater 
determination. Although the South Vietnamese project was never anything like as 
coercive as Taiwan and Korea’s, some South Vietnamese officials and private citizens 
believed that to be a developmental state in the early 1970s was to have a population 
planning programme that would place the power to determine birth rates in the hands of 
the state.  
The preference for sanitation is more difficult to explain in the 1970s without 
looking at the longer sweep of colonial and postcolonial medicine. U.S. officials 
envisioned a link between hygiene and military and social control that dated back to the 
colonial Philippines. The sanitary hamlet programme highlights the ways in which 
postcolonial elites’ adopted colonial ways of thinking about the peasantry and disdain 
for rural ways of being. As will be seen in the next chapter, urban areas in South 
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Vietnam were hardly bastions of hygienic modernity. Hygiene was one of the most 
obvious ways in which the elite could distinguish itself from the masses and one of the 
most immediate ways in which postcolonial leaders could remake their peasant 
societies. The attempt to radically transform a rural culture that, while seemingly 
unsanitary, was acceptable to the villagers, is symptomatic of urban technocrats 
deciding from afar what rural peasantry wants and needs. Sanitation was a central 
component of community development projects in the Global South in the 1950s and 
1960s. Yet the Sanitary Hamlet Programme demonstrates the ways in which the 
postcolonial state could employ the principles of community development, not for the 
sake of local interests and grassroots mobilization, but in the name of state-designed 
modernization projects.  
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Chapter Four 
“The City Will Always Win”: Urban Development in 
South Vietnam 
 
For most people the idea of the American War in Vietnam conjures up images of 
steamy jungles, verdant rice paddies, and booby-trapped villages. In many accounts of 
the war, whether academic histories or Hollywood movies, cities are conspicuous by 
their absence. But in many ways the war shaped urban life, including standards of 
living, social relations, and settlement patterns. If the GVN and the NLF had to win the 
‘hearts and minds’ of South Vietnam’s villagers, the war was equally a struggle for the 
loyalty of the urban population. After all, Hanoi’s military strategy from the early 1960s 
was to launch a “General Offensive, General Uprising”, the final stage of which would 
see the urban population take up arms against the GVN. The Tet Offensive 
demonstrated that the Communists could penetrate deep into South Vietnam’s cities. As 
for the general uprising however, the results for Hanoi were disappointing. The urban 
population had not come out to support the revolution en masse. Still, for Saigon the 
lessons were clear. Future offensives might prove more successful. The regime 
therefore hoped to take advantage of the shock that Tet had delivered to city dwellers 
and hoped that correct political organization and development might even draw the 
people of the cities to the government’s side.  
Looking at urban development in South Vietnam in the years after the Tet 
Offensive three themes emerge. Firstly, development policies and programmes shifted 
with the changing course of the war. Secondly, the GVN and its American advisors 
attempted both bottom-up and top-down development strategies. And finally, those 
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strategies once again demonstrate that both Vietnamese and U.S. officials drew 
inspiration from transnational development networks and global development trends. 
Between 1968 and 1973 the GVN and U.S. urban development strategy reflected 
a changing war and shifting political and military goals. In the months immediately 
after Tet, the GVN focused on bottom-up urban counter-insurgency and community 
development programmes in a bid to create a sense of anti-Communist community in 
the towns and cities. These projects appeared to yield mixed results. With the 
Communist threat to the urban centres seemingly on the wane and under U.S. pressure 
to better prepare for post-war economic development, urban development shifted to top-
down projects such as land use planning and more comprehensive urban and regional 
plans.  
Both bottom-up, community development projects and high modernist attempts 
to render the city more legible mirrored global trends. In the late 1960s these ideas were 
new and highly experimental. Decades of social science research, from the interwar 
years to the 1960s, indicated that urbanization was synonymous with modernization and 
development. As such, in the early years of decolonization, social scientists and 
development practitioners failed to elaborate a strategy for urban development in the 
postcolonial world.  
It was only during the United States’ urban crisis in the late 1960s that 
development institutions began to explore these problems in any depth. In the United 
States the solution was Community Action, empowering local communities to make 
decisions about their own neighbourhoods. In Vietnam, in a process similar to 
Community Action, Vietnamese development cadres with experience gained in South 
Vietnam’s villages entered urban slums, assessed the “felt needs” of the residents and 
helped the people carry out development projects. The goal was to forge closer links 
between urban neighbourhoods and the government. Dissatisfied with the results of 
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these community-based schemes, U.S. officials in Vietnam began to search for new 
strategies. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, as international development agencies 
switched their focus to Third World cities they concluded that the solution to the Third 
World’s urban problems was a more holistic approach and the integration of urban 
development and national planning. During the end of the American War, U.S. officials 
thus pushed these new solutions despite their questionable applicability to South 
Vietnam. 
This chapter makes new contributions to the historiography on international 
development and the American War in Vietnam. Firstly, the chapter traces the 
genealogy of ideas about urban development from American social scientists and 
development practitioners to the cities of the Global South from the interwar years to 
the 1970s. Secondly, it demonstrates that, beyond the Tet Offensive, South Vietnam’s 
cities were just as important sites in the American War as were the villages. Indeed, in 
the years after 1968 many projects in Saigon and other cities mirrored efforts in the 
countryside, not only in development but also in pacification within the city and its 
surroundings. U.S. and South Vietnamese officials believed that proper political, social 
and economic organization in the cities could regulate urban dwellers political identities 
in favour of the regime and lay the groundwork for economic development. 
 
American Social Science, Development Practice and Third World 
Urbanization 
In a 1969 talk at an Asia Society Southeast Asian Development Group seminar, 
urban geographer Terry McGee argued that development institutions had failed to 
predict the problems of Third World urbanization. McGee highlighted three 
developmental faiths so deeply embedded in the Western social sciences that those who 
grappled with issues of postcolonial development viewed urbanization as an end in 
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itself. Those faiths included the notion that urbanization was a solvent on “traditional” 
values and an inducer of social change; that urbanization was a precursor to 
demographic transition; and that urbanization was a function of industrialization and 
economic growth.407  
These faiths could be traced back to the interwar years. In the 1920s and 1930s 
Chicago School Sociologists focused their research on European immigrants’ and rural 
southern migrants’ encounters with American cities. With migration, as with war or 
revolution, Robert Park argued, the “cake of custom” was broken down. It was in the 
migrant or immigrant’s mind that “the process of civilisation is visibly going on”. The 
growth of the metropolitan cities, Park believed, had “loosened local bonds, destroyed 
the cultures of folk” and replaced “the sacred order of tribal custom” with “the rational 
organization which we call civilization”. Park’s University of Chicago colleague Louis 
Wirth argued that the size, density, and particularly the heterogeneity of cities had 
changed human relations and made urbanites more modern. The diversification and 
specialization that resulted from population density could offer “heightened mobility of 
the individual” but also instability. Balance was restored in the city, Park and Wirth 
believed, when traditional forms of social solidarity were replaced by new forms of 
association, competition and social control. Cities then operated as beacons of 
modernity. As the “center of economic, political and cultural life” the city “has drawn 
the more remote parts of the world into its orbit”.408  
The second developmental faith McGee highlighted was demographic transition 
theory. This theory held that levels of urbanization and technology shaped demography. 
The first phase was marked by both high birth and death rates as rural people placed a 
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high value on children for their labour and as social security in old age. In the 
intermediate period mortality rates would decline and birth rates would temporarily 
remain high as access to life-saving technology increased. With further urbanization in 
the final phase, the “value of children” changed with and birth rates declined, leading to 
demographic stability.409   
McGee’s final developmental faith emerged from the work of economists like 
W. Arthur Lewis and Paul N. Rosenstein-Rodan who saw the primary role of 
development as shifting underutilized labour out of the rural sector and into industry.410 
Most economists accepted, Rosenstein-Rodan argued, that if this surplus population 
were removed from agricultural areas agricultural output would actually increase, 
providing finance for industrial development. These economists believed foreign aid 
should concentrate on capital investments that would draw peasants out of the 
countryside. Urbanization would lead to the specialization of economic functions, the 
concentration of resources and thus greater economic efficiency.411 
In their approach to the issue of urbanization in the Global South, post-war 
modernization theorists built on these ideas but took them even further.412 Along with 
technological advancement, literacy, political participation, rising incomes, and mass 
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consumption, not a single modernization theorist would fail to include ‘urban’ in their 
definitions of modernity. Like Marxism-Leninism, modernization theory held 
urbanization and industrialization as the keys to economic development, albeit for very 
different ends. The general consensus among modernization theorists was that 
urbanization served as both a conduit for and a projector of modernity. People who 
encountered cities were transformed by their experiences, while the effects of the cities 
were felt far beyond the city’s boundaries. For modernization theorists, cities served as 
the fulcrum of modernization. 
Few wrote as much about the importance of urbanization to the modernization 
process as Daniel Lerner in The Passing of Traditional Society. Lerner believed that the 
successive phases of modernization were urbanization, literacy, mass media 
consumption and political participation. The vehicle to achieve this was the “mobile 
personality” and the key personality trait was “empathy”. Lerner believed that 
traditional village societies were non-participatory and had no sense of belonging to a 
bigger, national community. The most empathetic of rural people, however, would be 
first ones drawn to the city, where higher levels of media consumption would create a 
sense of national community. “The city will always win”, argued Lerner, and the 
villages could not resist the invasion of its influence.413 For Lucian Pye, modernization 
amounted to the diffusion of a “world culture”. Pye defined this culture as having “the 
essence of much of the culture of the West, its place of origin”. Cities served as the 
“vital links” in the diffusion of this culture, attracting people who were willing to 
change their status, accept new roles and learn new skills. As such cities served as the 
strongest point of attack on the “old order”.414  
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 Given this social scientific consensus that urbanization was a positive force for 
modernization, it is perhaps little surprise that global development institutions thought 
little about urban problems in the Global South in the 1950s and 1960s. Looking at 
early American efforts in the realm of urban development it is clear that it was not only 
social scientists but also development practitioners who internalized these faiths. U.S. 
development practitioners in the early Cold War tended to conceive of development as 
increasing the urban proportion of a country’s population. Urbanization was the end 
goal.415 If that was the case, the process hardly required guidance. Reflecting the United 
States’ preoccupation with rural development, spending on urban technical assistance 
amounted to a measly 1.5% of total technical assistance doled out between 1949 and 
1970.416 
 This is of course not to say that the development agencies were unaware of 
problems. Rural migrants had flocked to the cities of the Global South far in advance of 
the industrialization that might have provided them with jobs. Slums and squatter 
settlements had sprung up on the peripheries of every city. Already by the late 1950s, 
the cities of the Global South were suffering from massive housing shortages, 
inadequate sanitation, unemployment and enormous pressure on social services. In 
South Vietnam this situation was aggravated by the influx of hundreds of thousands of 
refugees from the countryside. In response to such challenges USAID, the World Bank, 
the World Health Organization and other agencies had offered capital assistance for 
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housing, power, roads and potable water supply projects in many Third World cities. In 
1964 the GVN and USAID hired Constantinos Doxiadis, principal architect of 
Islamabad and consultant to dozens of Global South countries, to author a long-term 
development plan for Saigon. But, as will be seen, the plan remained on the shelf. By 
the late 1960s as the major development agencies began to explore these issues in 
greater detail, they reported that none of these previous efforts amounted to a 
comprehensive approach to the social and economic problems of urban development. 
Their efforts in urban areas, the agencies acknowledged, had been uncoordinated, 
sectoral and ad-hoc in nature.417 
 The major reason for the more sustained interest in urban development issues in 
the late 1960s was the United States’ own urban crisis. If Western experience provided 
a compelling narrative for Third World urbanization, that narrative began to lose 
plausibility in the wake of the riots in Watts and Detroit. Certainly, the United States 
had experienced very obvious urban problems going much further back. From the 1940s 
onwards American cities were marked by industrial relocation, infrastructural decline, 
white suburbanization, and the inward migration of poor minorities.418 Forced to 
address these obvious problems in American modernity, modernization theorists 
pointed to the urban renewal projects of the 1940s and 1950s to demonstrate that the 
United States was overcoming these difficulties.419 But the efforts of reform-minded 
mayors in those decades, focusing on downtown redevelopment and slum clearances, 
rarely provided jobs for urban minorities nor did they address structural inequalities. By 
the early 1960s these failures could no longer be denied as Johnson launched his “War 
on Poverty”. The cornerstone of this effort and the proposed solution to the urban crisis 
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was the Community Action Program which aimed to put decision-making power in the 
hands of the urban poor. Under the terms of the program community action agencies 
would only receive funding if they could demonstrate “maximum feasible participation” 
of the poor. But liberal politicians recoiled when Community Action placed power in 
the hands of “radical” groups who organized rent strikes and voter registration drives 
and seemed to feed the social unrest in American cities in the 1960s.420  
The United States’ urban crisis was one of the principal causes of the breakdown 
of the post-war social science consensus and few attacked modernization theory as 
fiercely as Samuel Huntington. On the one hand, Huntington saw urbanization as a 
force for counter-revolution. Writing in 1968, Huntington argued that “in an absent-
minded way” the United States military in Vietnam “may have stumbled upon the 
answer” to wars of national liberation in the Third World. The degree to which U.S. 
military policy was depopulating the countryside and driving peasants into urban areas 
was quickly moving South Vietnam beyond the point at which it was susceptible to 
rural guerrilla insurgency. Nonetheless, Huntington warned, if the NLF could assert its 
control over the newly urbanized population “as easily as they were able to assert their 
control over the rural population” then whole urbanization process would have been 
nothing but a “Trojan horse” for the revolution. In this regard, there were worrying 
lessons from the United States’ urban experience. As in the United States, where the 
children of the Great Migration had revolted in the mid-1960s, Huntington claimed it 
would be the second generation of urban slum dwellers who would prove most 
revolutionary in the Global South.421  
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 The United States’ urban crisis compelled development professionals to pay 
greater attention to urban problems in the Global South. Though ironically, in their 
search for solutions they simply restated the basic tenets of forty years of American 
social science. The proceedings of the Honolulu conference on urban development in 
May 1967 demonstrate the degree to which development practitioners’ search for 
solutions was constrained by social science thinking and also expose the basic 
differences of opinion between U.S. development thinkers and Third World 
governments.  
Third World leaders had long viewed rapid urbanization as detrimental to the 
social, political and economic fabric of their nations. In response to the “urban horrors” 
of overcrowding, unemployment, squatter settlements, and disease, the instinct of the 
Asian countries had been to deurbanize. Policies focused on decelerating urban growth 
in major cities by building new and satellite towns. Some countries had also attempted 
to increase rural incomes through agricultural credit, land reform and resettlement 
programmes to stem the flow of migrants to the cities. In what amounted to a disavowal 
of modernization theory, these Third World officials believed cities destroyed tradition, 
were aesthetically displeasing and politically unstable.422  
At first, many delegates at the conference restated these older strategies. Then, a 
U.S. observer reported, a “new debate” emerged. Delegates began to acknowledge that 
the pull of the megalopolis was too strong and that little was known about the 
advantages of building secondary urban centres. The debate then switched from an 
emphasis on urban problems and the prevention of urban growth to identifying the 
positive role of urbanization in the national development process. What followed might 
have been lifted from the pages of Robert Park and Colin Clark. The advantages of the 
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city, the conference report concluded, were economies of scale, juxtaposition and 
specialization of function. Industrialization led to the concentrated accumulation of both 
capital and labour which led in turn to further urbanization. The city produced goods 
and skills for the rural areas and was “the theatre of change, the theatre for 
modernization in every aspect of life” setting norms for future national development. 
Delegates now accepted that urbanization, when properly organized, could stimulate 
national growth. In this sense rural migrants were to be encouraged, squatters tolerated, 
and land use plans must consider overall economic development.423 This was anything 
but a new debate. Rather it was the triumph of American perceptions of urbanization 
over the “anti-urban bias” of Third World anti-communists. But if Asian countries’ 
plans for deurbanization were unrealistic, this supposedly new and dynamic thinking 
was also conceptually bankrupt as a means for solving Third World urban problems 
because the solutions required manpower and resources which the Asian countries did 
not have. 
At the end of the 1960s and in the early 1970s, the major development agencies 
and lending institutions created or strengthened their staffs responsible for urban 
development. These agencies had come to view the cities of the Global South as 
seething hotbeds of discontent. The prospect that what had happened in Watts and 
Detroit might occur in Third World cities filled U.S. policymakers with dread. 
“Frustrations that fester among the urban poor”, World Bank President Robert 
McNamara argued in a 1970 speech, “are readily exploited by political extremists. If 
cities do not begin to deal constructively with poverty, poverty may well begin to deal 
more destructively with cities”.424 The problem was that these agencies could find no 
obvious solution to the crisis of the Third World’s cities. As a result of efforts to deal 
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with its own urban crisis, one USAID official noted, the United States had plenty of 
“the code words” of urban development such as “decentralization”, “citizen 
participation” and “advocacy planning” but it had none of the answers.425  
As they shifted their attention from rural to urban affairs, USAID, the Ford 
Foundation and the World Bank engaged in in-depth and coordinated reviews of how to 
respond to Third World urbanization. As will be seen, the outcome of these studies was 
remarkably similar to the ideas put forth at the Honolulu Conference. Urbanization, if 
properly managed, was a force that Third World governments could and should harness 
for economic development. These shifts in thinking about urban development as well as 
the tensions between Third World and U.S. approaches to urbanization would play out 
in South Vietnam during the final years of the American war. 
At first it might appear, that in the midst of a violent war, South Vietnam faced a 
very different, much graver set of urban problems than those of other Third World 
countries. Yet South Vietnam faced very similar challenges including rapid 
urbanization, slums and squatter settlements, a scarcity of housing and opportunities for 
sustainable employment, and inadequate resources to deal with these issues. In the years 
after the Tet Offensive, GVN and American officials would employ bottom-up counter-
insurgency and community development strategies like those of the Community Action 
Program, as well as the top-down strategies that the development agencies would 
endorse in the early 1970s. Differences of opinion would shape the urban debate 
between American officials in Vietnam and the GVN. On the other hand, the GVN 
would seek to deurbanize major urban centres by offering migrants inducements to 
return to the countryside and proposing new and satellite towns. While American 
officials supported some of these ideas in so far as they advanced pacification and 
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political stability, they also sought to encourage more comprehensive urban planning so 
as to encourage post-war economic growth. 
 
War, Urbanization and Society in South Vietnam 
Historians have paid scant attention to the urban dimensions of the Vietnam 
Wars but some recent scholarship has shown that when looking at these conflicts it is 
disingenuous to separate the rural from the urban. Recently, Christopher Goscha has 
shown that during the French War, Hanoi, Saigon and other urban centres served as 
sources of manufactured goods, labour, specialists, and medicines to the “isolated and 
unindustrialized guerrilla economy”. The Viet Minh cultivated a complex set of social 
relations to connect these “underground cities” to the countryside. Networks of itinerant 
female street vendors and children guided revolutionaries in and out of the city, and 
served as transporters of documents, money, and weapons. But the cities also served as 
battlefields. Viet Minh operatives in particular targeted the European quarter in Saigon, 
in response to which the French set up block houses and checkpoints. Surveillance, 
security checks, searches and curfews became the norm. Only with the onset of Chinese 
and Soviet aid did the war shift to conventional military operations in the 
countryside.426 David Hunt has demonstrated that in the wake of the French War and the 
early years of the American War, Vietnamese peasants had frequent encounters with 
towns and cities, for work, education, and even for leisure. Peasant identities in the 
1950s and 1960s, Hunt shows, were highly fluid and could not be charted along a 
simple rural-urban continuum or tradition-modernity axis.427 Still we know much less 
about the urban dimensions of the American War and even less about the nexus of war, 
counter-insurgency and urban development. 
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War and politics shaped urban life and urban spaces in South Vietnam. These 
spaces were fraught with political symbolism for city dwellers. Large swathes of Saigon 
were occupied by ARVN military installations, while city streets bore the names of 
Vietnamese intellectuals and politicians murdered by the Viet Minh. The ARVN 
monument in Lam Son Square was somewhat more ambiguous. Although intended to 
“symbolize the aggressive spirit of the Vietnamese army”, political scientist Allan 
Goodman observed that the statue appeared to depict two soldiers aggressively 
attacking the National Assembly building across the square. For Goodman the 
monument stood as a sad analogy for South Vietnam’s civilian politics, impotent in the 
face of military power. Lower House deputies proved sensitive enough to this 
interpretation that some requested the statue be replaced with one of Le Loi, the 15th 
century emperor and national hero.428 Others claimed the configuration of the statue, 
with one soldier in front of another, appeared to depict an American advisor pushing his 
ARVN charge into battle. Or perhaps it showed the ARVN soldier cowering behind his 
American adviser.429 
Standing in the centre of Saigon, in Chien Si (Soldier) circle, was the 
International Aid Memorial. Based on Saigon architect Nguyen Ky’s national contest-
winning design and dedicated on 22 June 1969, International Aid Day in Vietnam, the 
monument featured a huge pillar rising out of an octagonal pool. At the top of the pillar 
was a blossoming lotus, “the Asian symbol of purity”. A giant plinth mounted on a 
copper tortoise’s back, reminiscent of the stelaes in Hanoi’s ancient Temple of 
Literature, listed the forty-six nations that had contributed to South Vietnam’s 
reconstruction “in our hour of challenge”. Thieu allegedly approved its construction 
after a conversation with his fortune teller. The clairvoyant told Thieu that a dragon 
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rested under Saigon with its head under the Presidential Palace and its tail in Chien Si 
Square. The lotus tower was to pin down the dragon’s tail, while the water would keep 
it cool. This way the dragon’s tail would no longer cause turbulence in Saigon 
politics.430 The monument was an attempt to demonstrate South Vietnam’s international 
support and hence legitimacy, while downplaying the dominant role of the United 
States. But while it might have offered “a pleasant place to read, rest or stroll”, it no 
doubt also gave Saigonese the opportunity to contemplate their country’s massive 
dependence on foreign aid.431  
Rapid urbanization in war-time South Vietnam did even more to shape urban 
spaces. It was the result of both push and pull. Hundreds of thousands of peasants were 
driven off the land as a result of the horrific violence and destruction in the countryside. 
Others were attracted to Saigon and other urban centres by employment opportunities 
serving the allied military and civilian presence. Between 1960 and 1967 Saigon had 
grown by 25% while its suburban areas of Bien Hoa and Gia Dinh had grown by 70% 
and more than 200% respectively. The effect of urbanization was equally as badly felt 
in smaller towns. For geological reasons Saigon remained a low rise city and its 
outward growth was constrained on several sides by swamps to the south and west, 
military installations to the north and ARVN generals’ speculative land purchases along 
the north-east corridor to Bien Hoa. By the late 1960s, almost 18% of the country’s 
population lived in the capital and Saigon had among the highest population density in 
the world, approaching 90,000 people per square mile in some areas.432.  
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By the late 1960s, Saigon was a city of striking contrasts. Don Oberdorfer 
captured the contrasts well when he described Saigon as “the seat of government, the 
center of commerce and luxury… the haven of foreigners on the broad tree-lined 
boulevards and the dwelling place of poverty-stricken squatters in the back alleys and 
slum districts”.433 William Duiker, then an employee in the U.S. embassy, noted the 
contrast between a well-to-do middle classes in the city centre and a sea of “poor 
workers, beggars and refugees flooding into the refugee camps in the suburbs”.434 
Lavish U.S. aid and the spending power of Americans in Vietnam also shaped urban 
life. In PX Alley, a two-block area with hundreds of stalls, wealthy Saigonese could buy 
consumer goods pilfered from U.S. military post exchanges. The Commodity Import 
Program allowed middle-class Saigonese to purchase motorbikes, refrigerators, and 
other modern conveniences. Meanwhile, huge areas of the city containing squatter 
communities and slums of tens of thousands of people went completely untouched by 
government services. Here there were no schools, no paved roads, no sewerage, and no 
garbage collection. Many families lived in shacks and other makeshift shelters built 
from disused ponchos, parachutes and empty beer cans. The sidewalks served as toilets 
and sites of cottage industries and petty services.435 
The GVN attempted to make sense of these illegible urban areas. One U.S. 
urban planner working in Vietnam claimed that during the Diem era, such was the 
emphasis on security, that the regime had compiled maps with detailed information on 
buildings, alleyways and demographics. Michael Seltz said that following the 1963 
coup, “the charts and maps were destroyed”, though he did not say by whom or why. In 
any case the unregulated, breakneck growth of Saigon in the intervening years made old 
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data redundant and far outpaced the government’s ability to gather up-to-date 
information on demographics, employment, taxation, and land use.  
Between Diem’s overthrow in 1963 and the Tet Offensive, the Ministry of 
Public Works (MPW) initiated land use plans and programs of easement and 
construction for 52 cities and other urban areas. Forty-two were forwarded for local 
approval but due inaction or rapidly changing conditions just 10 were completed and 
mostly for smaller urban agglomerations.436 The MPW frequently found itself having to 
redraft urban projects due to “excessive” and unexpected urbanization.437 As a result, 
urban planning had been piecemeal and illegal settlements sprung up quicker than GVN 
planners could respond.  
Saigon tended to function best where it was not in the hands of the city 
government. In the absence of a working public transport system and in spite of the 
opposition of the local government, “a vast, informal, private mass transit network” of 
4,000 three-wheeled Lambretta taxis had sprung up in Saigon, providing an estimated 
360,000 one-way trips per day. In District 5, otherwise known as Cho Lon and 
historically home to Saigon’s ethnic Chinese population, housing, roads, and canals 
were in much better condition thanks to the efforts of numerous Chinese associations.438 
Part of the problem was the low status the GVN assigned to urban planning. The 
MPW was also responsible for the construction and maintenance of highways, roads, 
canals, and airports. It is perhaps not surprising that in a wartime environment in which 
guaranteeing communications and supply was an issue of national security, that the 
MPW placed more emphasis on these areas. The ministry tended to justify this focus by 
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suggesting that such work would lay the ground for post-war economic development. 
This was in spite of the fact that operations prioritised military goals such as roads for 
heavy equipment, rather than secondary farm to market roads. Urban problems were 
also exacerbated by the failure of the GVN to understand the permanence of the changes 
that were occurring. The 1964-65 Doxiadis’ report recommended, among other things, a 
long-term, 35 year housing construction programme for the Saigon area. Officials in the 
Ministry of Public Works, however, believed that it was not possible in 1965 to estimate 
Saigon’s future growth or national role. The GVN had not decided whether Saigon 
would continue as capital, or whether it would become a tourist, port or industrial town. 
The directorate also contested Doxiadis’ projection of 4% population growth in Saigon. 
When peace returned, the director wrote, the population of Saigon might decrease and 
some people would return to the villages to farm or would be attracted to other, 
industrial regions.439  
By 1967 however, it had become clear to planners in the MPW that many of 
these refugees did not intend to return to the countryside. Even where security had been 
restored, planners now noted, only a small number of people wished to return to their 
villages because the majority had become familiar with urban life.440  Interviewers 
discovered that 48% of rural-urban migrants cited better security as the reason why they 
preferred urban life but 62% of non-native urban dwellers said they planned to stay once 
the war ended, and only 15% planned to return to villages once peace was restored. 
Thus many may have moved to the cities for security but they planned to stay for 
economic opportunities.  
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To build a sense of community in the cities, government officials saw the need 
to impose both physical and moral order. By 1967 squatter settlements were “choked to 
bursting point” and planners were particularly reviled by the “disorder” of the swampy, 
“sinuous alleyways”.441 Thieu’s concerns lay more in the behavioural realm. 
Immediately upon assuming the presidency he expressed an interest in addressing what 
he perceived as South Vietnam’s urban problems. But rather than highlighting the plight 
of South Vietnam’s urban poor, in his inaugural address on 31 October 1967, Thieu 
outlined his vision for a more regimented, moral urban society.  He called upon the 
people of the cities to make greater sacrifices. “A strong rear force must be organised to 
protect cities” and to relieve the burden on the rural population. Thieu spoke of a 
“shocking contrast between the rural and urban areas” and the need for sacrifice on a 
more equal basis. Thieu also demanded “national order and discipline”.442  
Under the national policy launched in November 1967, the GVN placed the 
rebuilding of South Vietnam’s cities on par with rural reconstruction, social 
improvement, and industrial development.443 To deal with the housing crisis, a 
Directorate General of Housing was established at the end of 1967 and launched a four-
year housing construction programme.444 At a MPW seminar on the development of 
Saigon and its surroundings in January 1968, attendees recommended the establishment 
of a government agency to deal with Saigon’s development problems. Delegates also 
called for expanded social infrastructure, affordable housing, the installation of utilities 
and widening of roads to boost economic development.445 Such ambitious plans existed 
                                                
441 ‘General Directorate of Urban Construction and Design’s Urban Development Program’ 
442 ‘Address to the Nation by the President of the Republic of Vietnam at the Presidential Inauguration 
Ceremony October 31, 1967’, 31 October 1967, Folder 14, Box 09, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 02 – 
Military Operations, TTU-VVA, Item No.: 2130914132. 
443 Pike, The Bunker Papers, vol. 1, 237. 
444 ‘Reconstruction and building’, [Tái thiết và xây dựng], Bộ Công Chánh và Giao Thông Vận Tải 
[Ministry of Public Works and Transport], 1 February 1969, folder 110, PTTDNCH-TTLTQGII. 
445 ‘Seminar on the renewal of the capital and surroundings, Tuesday 9th to Saturday 13th January 1968’, 
[Hội thảo chỉnh trang đô thành và vùng phụ cận, từ thứ ba 9/01/68 đến thứ bảy 13/1/1968], 13 January 
1968, folder 2254, PTTDNCH-TTLTQGII. 
209 
 
solely on paper, however, and would soon be placed on hold because the Tet Offensive 
presented the government with a much greater and immediate set of problems. 
Although the war clearly shaped Saigon economically, physically and socially, 
the city had remained largely spared from violence prior to the Tet Offensive. 
Nonetheless, the enemy threat to the capital had always been very real. In the mid-
1960s, the NLF maintained a presence in over a hundred hamlets in suburban Gia Dinh 
province, many of which “were really part of the city”. Indeed in 1964-65 the United 
States had compelled the GVN to launch Hop Tac [Cooperation], an attempt to pacify 
the provinces around Saigon, which failed to achieve its goals.446 In the following years, 
the NLF continued to use the suburban areas surrounding Saigon as sources of food and 
supplies and as staging posts for attacks on and infiltration of the capital.447 
Party leaders in Hanoi were well aware of the revolution’s strengths and the 
Saigon regime’s weaknesses in urban areas. At its 9th Plenum in November 1963, the 
party formally adopted its strategy of “General Offensive, General Uprising” the 
ultimate goal of which was to spark a popular insurrection in South Vietnam’s cities. 
But during the following years, debates raged in Hanoi about the relative merits of 
protracted guerrilla warfare versus urban-based, conventional war. In time it would 
become clearer that urban crises had the potential to bring down the Saigon regime. The 
Buddhist and student anti-government “Struggle Movement” in the cities in the north of 
South Vietnam in the spring and summer of 1966 crippled Danang and Hue for months. 
For Le Duan the I Corps uprisings served as “proof that cities were still crucial to the 
war in the South and advocated the need to strengthen proletarian leadership over the 
revolution”. Many in Hanoi were sceptical about chances of an urban-based effort.448 
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But purges in 1967 targeted the subordinates of those opposed to a general uprising and 
by July Le Duan and Van Tien Dung had settled on a means for implementing the 
“General Offensive, General Uprising”: main forces would drag U.S. units away from 
urban centres while large-scale attacks on the cities would inspire political 
insurrection.449  
On January 30th and 31st 1968, People’s Army of Vietnam and PLAF units 
launched coordinated attacks on major urban centres and American and ARVN military 
and government installations in South Vietnam. Within days, the revolutionary forces 
had attacked many of South Vietnam’s urban areas, fighting their way into Quang Tri, 
Danang and Hue in I Corps, Nha Trang, Qui Nhon, Kontum, and Ban Me Thuot in II 
Corps, Saigon in III Corps, and My Tho, Can Tho and Ben Tre in IV Corps. There 
would be further waves of attacks and renewed offensives in May and August 1968 but 
in most areas American and ARVN units drove out communist forces within a few days 
of the initial offensive. In Saigon the fighting lasted for a week, while in Hue 
communist forces held out for a month.  
In preparation for the Tet Offensive, the NLF had been able to use its base areas 
around Saigon to smuggle guns and personnel into the city with ease.450 In the early 
morning hours of January 31, thousands of guerrillas emerged from hiding in Saigon 
and brought government and military installations under small arms and mortar fire. 
NLF guerrillas attacked the U.S. embassy, the heart of American power in Vietnam. 
Thousands more troops attacked the capital from outside in the following days. Days of 
house-to-house fighting followed. In response, and as they would again during “mini-
Tet” in May, ARVN and American forces evacuated some parts of the cities and 
employed overwhelming force, including aerial bombing and napalm, to dislodge 
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communist forces and attacked them as they retreated. The damage done to South 
Vietnam’s urban areas was immense.451  
In May and again in August the NLF continued its attacks and suffered massive 
casualties.452 The south and south-western fringes of Saigon, particularly Districts 6 and 
8, were badly damaged. In total, more than 105,000 homes were destroyed or damaged 
nationwide, with 39,000 in Saigon-Gia Dinh alone.453 Electricity and water supplies 
were disrupted and sanitation services came to a standstill. For a state that had 
previously failed to adequately house its urban population and to deal with its other 
urban problems, repairing the damage presented an overwhelming task. 
Sensing that an adequate response to the crisis would afford the GVN a 
psychological victory, Ambassador Bunker advised Thieu to set up a joint U.S.-GVN 
Central Recovery Committee to deal with dislocation and destruction in urban areas. 
The Committee established refugee centres for evacuees in Saigon and other cities, 
ordered the distribution of rice, and laid out plans for urban reconstruction. Thousands 
of rural development cadres were moved into Saigon to help with the clean-up, 
alongside youth and student organizations The United States and the GVN also focused 
on reopening key roads. The offensive disrupted supply to the cities, generating price 
rises which the MPW believed undermined the people’s confidence in the 
government.454 With continued assaults and rocket attacks on Saigon throughout the 
first eight months of 1968 however, the magnitude of the task was enormous. South 
Vietnam’s already enormous urban problems were thus compounded by the 1968 
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offensives and under such conditions, the immediate GVN and U.S. effort focused on 
relief rather than development. 
 
Breaking down the Anarchy, Isolation and Selfishness of Urban Life: 
Creating Community in urban South Vietnam 
GVN leaders saw the psychological impact of the Tet Offensive as an 
opportunity to organize and arm the population. During the offensive, the urban 
population had not risen up as leaders in Hanoi had hoped. Although initially shaken by 
the government’s inability to protect the cities from attack, Tet challenged urban 
dwellers political identities like never before and even if people did not become 
committed followers of the GVN, they were often horrified by the actions of the NLF 
and PAVN. Many even passed on intelligence about NLF units operating in their 
neighbourhoods.455 Almost immediately in the wake of the Tet Offensive, the GVN 
therefore reinvigorated its effort to organize urban and rural citizens into civil defence 
groups. Such neighbourhood groups would stand guard, raise alarms, and “eradicate… 
hostile elements”.456 In the years after Tet, Saigon and other urban centres would 
become as militarized as the country’s villages.  
The regime first began by training civil servants and following the General 
Mobilization Law in June 1968 all males aged 16-17 and 39-50 had to enrol in the 
People’s Self-Defence Forces. At the U.S. embassy’s suggestion, in August 1968, the 
GVN launched “self-defence month” and the ARVN released more than 50,000 
weapons to arm civilian self-defence units in rural hamlets and cities. Urban citizens’ 
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militias nicely complemented Thieu’s desire for a more regimented urban society. At a 
ceremony launching the campaign in Saigon Thieu claimed that “the foundation of 
democracy and freedom must be organization, and a people which cannot organize 
themselves effectively are not a nation”.457  
The PSDF was less important as a military force than as a mechanism for 
regulating urban dwellers’ behaviour and political identities. Militarily the PSDF proved 
quite unremarkable and rarely engaged with the enemy. By the end of 1969 the Danang 
PSDF could claim to have killed or captured eight suspected NLF members, while the 
Saigon forces had not killed or captured any. This was hardly because the NLF was no 
longer operating in the cities. Despite its hardships after the Tet Offensive, 
revolutionary forces could still plant bombs and collect supplies in urban areas. The real 
power to deal with urban insurgency lay with the national police which ran the Phoenix 
programme in the cities and claimed to have apprehended 1,000 suspects in 1969. The 
goal of the PSDF then, was not military, but political and psychological. It committed 
its members to the defence of the regime and drove home the notion that the nation was 
on a full war footing to which everyone had to contribute. Members attended lectures in 
current affairs and served as an important source of available labour to contribute to 
community development projects. In the event of future electoral competition with the 
Communists, the GVN also hoped that service in the PSDF would provide its members 
with a clearer political identity. Participation in the PSDF would turn members into 
“enlightened voters” whose “ballot will be cast for the Nationalist camp”.458 
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The results in the psychological realm were, however, ambiguous. Interviews of 
Saigon residents indicated that many more people were listed on PSDF rolls than 
actively participated. Some members avoided duty by paying about VN$100 (US$0.80) 
per month and this money was then pooled to pay those who stood guard and patrolled 
at night. Interviewees believed that, as the GVN had established the PSDF, it was the 
government’s rather than people’s responsibility to maintain the force and that, aside 
from some initial GVN enthusiasm, the people had received little information about the 
functions and purpose of the PSDF. Furthermore, while some saw the value of the 
PSDF as an auxiliary police force, most believed that in the event of contact with the 
enemy PSDF would fire their weapons in warning before making a “hasty retreat”.459 
Militarizing the urban population would not by itself ensure political loyalty. 
The GVN also needed to deliver the fruits of modernity to deprived urban and suburban 
areas. While emphasis on physical infrastructure and utilities was an important pillar of 
the GVN’s pacification and urban development policy, top-down planning would do 
little to create a sense of community. This could only be achieved by involving the 
population in development projects. Both the GVN and U.S. officials felt that the sense 
of community was particularly absent in urban areas. In its 1970 Pacification and 
Development Plan noted that the GVN “must develop the community spirit of our urban 
population” and “try to break down the anarchy, isolation and selfishness of present 
urban life”. This goal would be achieved through the decentralization of decision-
making and “the development of a stronger community spirit”.460 The Saigon Civil 
Assistance Group, the CORDS body responsible for development of the capital, noted 
that an effort had to be made to “to widen the horizons of local Saigonese beyond 
family considerations by recognition of the long-term benefits of wider community 
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activity”.461 The key to such an effort, CORDS’ Director of Plans, Policies and 
Programs Clayton McManaway believed, was development. Not a few large projects 
chosen by city and provincial administrators and with little popular mobilization, but 
many “small community development projects benefiting as many people as possible in 
the immediate neighbourhood” and involving “as much physical participation” of 
residents as possible.462  
In this regard there were precursor programs on which the GVN and CORDS 
could draw. In the absence of a concerted urban effort by the GVN in the mid-1960s, 
student and youth organizations sought to fill the gap. The leaders of the movement 
were young men who had been called into government service by Diem’s successor 
General Duong Van ‘Big’ Minh. Through their association with various government 
ministries these young men like Vo Long Trieu, Doan Thanh Liem, and Do Ngoc Yen, 
some of whom would later become deputies in the Lower House of the National 
Assembly, began planning rural-based development projects with the goal of teaching 
the peasants the benefits of self-help and community action. This “Summer Youth 
Programme”, a kind of South Vietnamese Peace Corps, sent students into the 
countryside to build schools, infirmaries, and refugee shelters. When rural insecurity 
prevented further work in these areas, the youth leaders decided to focus on one urban 
area as a “proving ground for the revolutionary approach” they hoped to apply 
nationwide. In July 1965, they approached Premier Nguyen Cao Ky with a proposal to 
launch a pilot programme in District 8 on the edge of Saigon. The district was a 
depressed area, cut off from Saigon proper by a series of canals. D8 had been 
overwhelmed by an influx of refugees, growing from an estimated 50,000 residents in 
1963 to perhaps 150,000 or 300,000 by 1965. These were mainly unskilled labourers 
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living in makeshift shelters in “squalid conditions and suffering from “an inadequate 
diet”. Residents had few educational opportunities or social services and were “beset 
with overwhelming health and sanitation problems”. Bubonic plague and cholera were 
common and one observer estimated two-thirds of the population was afflicted with TB. 
The district experienced high crime, an effective NLF infrastructure, and an ineffective 
local government. Community bonds had broken down and parents were alienated from 
their urbane, street-savvy children.463 
Youth leaders believed that in the absence of the bonds that ordinarily held 
together village communities, they would have to create new ones among “diverse and 
uprooted people”. With financial support and material assistance from the GVN and 
USAID, trained youths moved into the neighbourhood to live with local families and 
met with locals to work out “what project the residents felt was most urgently needed”. 
The inhabitants would elect their own “hamlet development council” and work would 
begin. The New Life Development Project, as it came to be known, built a school and 
child care centre and helped establish two agricultural cooperatives which allowed poor 
local residents to supplement their incomes. The youth workers even convinced a 
company dredging a nearby river to pump silt onto the land adjoining the district to 
create more space for housing construction. The project was considered such a success 
that Ky came to dedicate the site of the first 50 houses and Vice President Humphrey 
came to inspect the district in 1966.464 This self-help housing project spread to districts 
6 and 7 and by early 1968, the movement had built 1,000 houses. 
Tet highlighted the somewhat Sisyphean nature of urban development in Saigon. 
During the offensive the good work of the New Life Movement was completely 
undone. Charles Sweet had been involved with the New Life Movement project in 
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District 8 as an International Voluntary Services worker and by 1968 as a U.S. embassy 
official. During “mini-Tet” in May 1968 he arrived at the New Life Construction 
Project headquarters in D8 where he said he was “met with frigid silence” by men with 
whom he had worked for the previous four years and with whom he was on close terms. 
Referring to the use of bombing and napalm in the D6 and 8, Doan Thanh Liem said 
“when you use these tactics, I know we are losing the war”. Lien estimated that in D8 
alone 200 civilians had been killed, 1,000 wounded, and 4,000 homes destroyed. Liem 
then insisted that Sweet drive around the district with “bao chi” (press) on his scout car 
to protect him, not from the VC, but from angry residents who correctly blamed U.S. 
planes for the destruction.465 Following the May offensive the New Life Movement, 
with GVN and U.S. financial support, once again mobilized 3,000 households in 
districts 6, 7 and 8 to plan and rebuild their homes. The programme was then extended 
on a city-wide basis.466 
 The direct links between the New Life Development Project and the Urban 
Self-Development Program (USD) are not entirely clear. William Colby, in 
Congressional testimony in March 1970, acknowledged that the USD built “in large part 
on a successful community development program” in District 8 which aimed to 
“ameliorate some of the worst conditions” in the city and to improve communication 
between local groups and the local government. Colby claimed that ensuring the 
minimum essential services in an area where the GVN had often been absent eliminated 
conditions on which the NLF thrived. 467  
Rather than acknowledging any debt to the youth group’s community 
development projects in D8, the GVN claimed to be drawing on the Village Self-
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Development (VSD) Program, discussed in previous chapters. In 1970 the GVN 
extended the VSD concept into urban areas. Given that rural development was the main 
point of reference for the urban development program, the project was put in the hands 
of the Ministry for Rural Development (MORD). Launching the programme in April 
1970 Minister Tran Thanh Phong wrote that the Village Self-Development (VSD) 
Program had familiarised peasants with democracy, allowed them to voice their 
aspirations and act in a spirit of self-sufficiency. In urban areas, Phong said, the 
program aimed to mobilize local organizations to “implement projects that bring 
practical usefulness to many people… in the spirit of self-sufficiency and voluntarism. 
The program also promotes spirit of community cooperation between people and 
between the people and the government”. Much like the VSD, local people would 
decide projects based on discussions “carried out in the spirit of democracy” and would 
then be encouraged to donate money, materials and labour. First, local notables would 
elect a development committee after which the committee would organize a meeting 
with representatives of local people’s organizations with more than 50 members, such 
as neighbourhood associations or youth groups, to consider projects. Based on these 
discussions, the committee would then post a list of potential projects on local bulletin 
board for all to see and, at a congress organised by the committee at least three weeks 
thereafter, people could decide on projects based on a majority vote. The program 
explicitly stated that in towns of over 50,000 people no project costing more than 
VN$200,000 (US$1,695) would be approved because the idea was to carry out small, 
short-term projects with usefulness to the people in the neighbourhood. The idea here 
was that more projects would mean more popular mobilization with impact on 
participants’ immediate surroundings.468  
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The program was certainly less democratic than Phong suggested and was open 
to abuse. The local development committee was, after all, elected by local chiefs and if 
the neighbourhood did not have a suitable place at which all people could gather to vote 
on projects, the regulations stated that the development committee could hold a meeting 
only with the representatives of local organizations, local PSDF representatives, and 
development cadres. If local committees could capture these organizations they could 
select projects as they pleased. Nonetheless, if the system worked, it amounted to a 
major step towards decentralization of urban decision-making and was a clear statement 
of the regime’s preference for community-based development solutions and popular 
mobilization. 
In Saigon this work would be facilitated by community development workers, of 
which the city planned to recruit and train 180 by the middle of 1970. The CD worker 
would be “a specialist in his role as human engineer” and would work with the people 
“in order to motivate them to change their attitudes and to create the desire in them to 
change and improve their lives through community effort”. The CD workers would help 
citizens form local development councils, help plan, implement, and monitor 
development projects, and organize training and information programs.469 The MORD 
began recruitment by soliciting applications from rural development cadre who lived in 
Saigon. The first 70 of these black pyjama-clad cadres would be working in Saigon’s 
districts by July 1970.470 
 In this sense, the urban self-development program in South Vietnam’s cities 
mirrored a similar process in the United States just a few years earlier. As Daniel 
Immerwahr has highlighted community development programs began in the United 
States with Department of Agriculture and War Relocation Authority projects in the 
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New Deal and World War Two eras before being exported to the villages of the Global 
South. The knowledge gleaned from this experience in the 1950s and 1960s was then 
applied to America’s deprived inner-city neighbourhoods during the War on Poverty.471 
In South Vietnam, the Ministry of Rural Development (MORD) reassigned cadres with 
experience in South Vietnam’s villages to implement similar strategies in urban areas.  
The similarities between community development in Saigon and community 
action in Detroit were not entirely lost on William Colby. In September 1970, Colby 
sent an excerpt of Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding to 
his assistant chief of staff. Moynihan had been one of the architects of the War on 
Poverty but his 1969 book was a trenchant critique of the Community Action Program 
(CAP). The excerpt related to a poll conducted in Boston which Moynihan argued 
revealed that white, middle class residents’ concerns were less to do with the problems 
identified by the War on Poverty’s authors and more to do with the power the CAP had 
put in the hands of the poor and minorities. Although he acknowledged that a very 
different set of problems existed in South Vietnam, Colby seized on the idea of polling 
which he felt “might be appropriate to discover the major concerns of the urban 
dwellers”. Colby suggested formulating questionnaires to determine how urban 
residents feel and through which channels they would like their demands to be met.472 
Although Colby was endorsing Moynihan’s argument that community developers 
needed a better handle on urban residents’ real concerns, he was also endorsing the re-
exportation of a failed strategy and citing one of that strategy’s biggest critics for 
guidance. One wonders whether Colby had read the rest of Moynihan’s book. 
Moynihan’s central complaint was that community action had radicalised American 
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inner-cities. Would it be a good idea to attempt the same in South Vietnam’s urban 
slums?  
Beginning on July 1st 1970, rural development cadre were assigned to each of 
Saigon’s eleven districts, each divided into wards [phường] and sub-wards [khóm]. 
After two months, inspectors from the Ministry of Rural Development visited the 
districts to examine the cadres’ work. Inspectors reported that cadres had had success 
helping sub-wards organize development committees, mobilizing local people to select 
projects, and helping local leaders complete paperwork and secure government funds. 
They then guided locals in construction work. Inspectors reported that people in the 
poorer wards lived in crowded, swampy alleys full of stagnant water. Therefore, most 
projects focused on paving alleyways and laying drainage pipes and thus were well 
received by locals.473 In some sub-wards locals eagerly donated money and/or labour, 
often with 20-30 families participating in carrying out a project and people’s donations 
sometimes matching GVN funding. 
However, there were obvious problems. Experienced rural cadres were 
reportedly initially disoriented by the different requirements of their new urban 
surroundings. In some instances the people did not trust cadres, having been made 
unfulfilled promises by the government before. Furthermore, in working class sub-
wards people were too busy working to attend meetings or volunteer their labour, while 
in others people were too poor to make monetary contributions. Often only 30-50 
people attended meetings in sub-wards of 2-4,000 people, while monetary contributions 
amounted to 5-25% of the GVN contribution rather the 50% the government hoped for. 
In addition, cadres sometimes could not meet the felt needs of the population. In 
Districts 2 and 4, people requested schools for their children but in these crowded 
neighbourhoods there was no public land available, not to mention few qualified 
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teachers. More problematically, it was clear that in some sub-wards, the local chief 
selected projects himself and then went to the neighbourhood to mobilize the people to 
carry it out. While there were certainly some flaws in conception, it appears that the 
greatest single problem facing the urban development program was the shortage of 
cadres. Reports indicated that people living in the immediate vicinity of the projects 
were often happy with the results. Others, however, were indifferent because they didn’t 
understand the cadres’ role. Cadres had to focus on paperwork and project 
implementation and had no time for promoting the basic principles of the programme 
among the people.474 But before this could remedied, American development officials 
began pushing for a new approach. 
The GVN’s 1971 Community Development and Local Defense Plan noted that 
building a spirit of community participation “is one of the most necessary elements in 
construction and development” and required local authorities to create opportunities for 
people to regularly meet, discuss and implement projects of public interest.475 But the 
program came in for increasing criticism from CORDS officials, many of whom felt 
that adopting the VSD concept wholesale and applying it to Vietnam’s urban centres 
had proved inappropriate. Dennis Rondinelli of CORDS Community Development 
Directorate (CDD) argued the conditions that made VSD successful in the countryside 
simply did not exist in urban areas. Unlike peasant farmers, who could work on 
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development projects in between short bouts of intensive agricultural labour, urban 
dwellers in poor districts had to work long hours and “rarely have the time or inclination 
to participate” in self-help projects. Where communities did build their own streets or 
drainage systems it let local government off the hook and only added to the 
disorderliness of city planning.476 Another member of the CDD complained that the 
urban committees that had been set up were not attended by the people and merely 
served as a “rubber stamp” for projects that the Province Chief or committee members 
had already decided upon. There was little popular participation and sometimes 
contractors were used instead. In practice there was widespread misuse of funds and 
deviation from the self-help concept.477  
This critique coincided with a larger shift against small-scale urban 
development. To CORDS observers, it seemed that the USD had not strengthened local 
institutions, had not increased local self-sufficiency and autonomy, and had failed to 
attack the infrastructure development problems of the city. A reinvigorated Urban 
Development Program would allocate more capital toward infrastructural development. 
CORDS now stressed that these projects should be larger in scale and had to conform to 
overall city plans or, where no such plan yet existed, with overall planning goals. By 
requiring that projects conform to an overall plan, CORDS hoped to use USD funds as a 
stimulus for more planning by the city governments, while a matching funds formula 
would “almost force” cities to improve the tax collection. The desired outcome of the 
new approach was the strengthening of urban administration, a better statistical base, 
and infrastructure development and urban improvement plans reflecting future 
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economic and social needs.478 GVN officials endorsed these ideas in a meeting at the 
Ministry of Public Works in April 1972. Mayors and other city representatives 
recommended that, in light of the lessons of 1969-71, fewer and larger urban projects be 
carried out. Lt. Gen. Cao Hao Hon, deputy chief of the CPDC, also said that in view of 
South Vietnam’s increasing urban problems the GVN must begin projecting future 
urban population growth and planning the infrastructure, industry, utilities and services 
to meet it.479  
This new approach was in direct contrast to the initial goals of the urban self-
development program which sought to mobilize as many people as possible through 
small projects. While the revised program did not lose its rhetorical emphasis on the 
democracy and communitarianism of development, the new approach meant that a 
community’s felt needs were no longer relevant if they did not conform to a larger plan. 
Unlike the earlier projects with impact on the immediate surroundings of those 
involved, projects now focused on road and bridge building, power, and dispensaries.480 
This was the step away from bottom-up, decentralized and community-based 
development projects towards a top-down, centralized approach which would come to 
dominate urban development in the final year or so of the American advisory effort. It 
represented a move away from an emphasis on counter-insurgency and forging a sense 
of national community to an emphasis of future economic development. The GVN and 
its American advisors now turned away from practical, community-based schemes to 
top-down projects such as land use forecasting models and comprehensive urban 
development plans.  
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The Poverty of Ideas: Urban Planning for Economic Development 
In January 1970, Clayton McManaway, CORDS’ Director of Plans, Policies and 
Programs, passed a report on urban planning in Vietnam to CORDS’ Assistant Chief of 
Staff George Jacobsen. McManaway noted that past GVN efforts in urban planning had 
focused too narrowly on land use and street plans and programs of easement and 
construction, most of which went unenforced. Both USAID and the GVN, McManaway 
noted, acknowledged the need for more comprehensive planning which would integrate 
the economic and social development of South Vietnam’s urban areas into broader 
national planning, taking account of political and military considerations. Such an 
approach would cover “all elements of the ‘ekistics’ of an urban area”.481   
McManaway’s choice of terms was illuminating. Developed by the Greek 
architect and urban planner Constantinos Doxiadis, ekistics was a high modernist 
“science of human settlement”. Doxiadis had an unbounded belief in the potential 
omniscience of planning but only if the planner adopted a comprehensive social 
scientific approach to “the totality of human settlement”. By combining anthropology, 
systems theory, ecology, architecture, and more, ekistics aimed at nothing short of 
forecasting the future of humanity’s relationship with the earth. This would restore 
order and turn the “inhuman city” into an entopia, “a real place for humans to live in 
harmony with themselves and nature”.482  
American officials in Vietnam knew Doxiadis for his 1964-65 study of Saigon. 
In citing ekistics it is quite possible that McManaway did not realise the scale of 
ambition that such an approach would entail in Vietnam. Yet, in the years after 1968 
and especially after American officials grew disenchanted with the USD programme, 
the South Vietnamese and American effort in urban development moved toward 
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comprehensive city planning as the solution to Vietnam’s urban crisis. This was in spite 
of both American and Vietnamese officials’ acknowledgement of the very limited 
resources and technical expertise available in the country as well as skepticism about 
the value of such an effort. In addition, there were disagreements between the South 
Vietnamese and the United States on how to proceed. The GVN preferred a strategy of 
satellite towns and deurbanizing the primate city of Saigon. American officials doubted 
the feasibility or political desirability of this approach. Instead, they believed that 
urbanization was an irreversible trend in Vietnam and it could be best dealt with 
through comprehensive urban planning. Both Vietnamese and American ideas and 
debates reflected shifting notions about Third World urban planning within social 
science and global development networks in the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
As McManaway noted, the GVN’s Ministry of Public Works did have a 
reasonably clear vision for urban development, if extremely meagre means to carry it 
out. Prior to Tet, the GVN’s approach to urban planning had been piecemeal. As noted 
above, MPW’s urban plans rarely kept pace with urbanization or socioeconomic and 
physical change in the cities. After the Tet Offensive, the GVN strengthened the MPW 
organization responsible for urban planning, the Directorate General of Reconstruction 
and Urban Planning. In October 1968 the MPW laid out guiding principles for urban 
development which aimed to “correct local differences”, reduce class disparities and 
develop the entire country rather than a few select urban areas. The Director General of 
Reconstruction and Urban Planning Nguyen Xuan Duc suggested that, given Vietnam’s 
inadequate resources, “in order for a city to function normally” the population should be 
under 200,000 or it would give rise to housing shortages, inadequate sanitation and 
congestion, with unknown consequences. Urban plans would guide the expansion of 
cities but in some cases the government would limit further expansion to avoid social 
problems created by excessive growth. In particular, plans would guide the growth and 
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activities of towns in economically advantageous areas and stress the special character 
of towns whether in industry, services or tourism.483 To encourage regional and national 
economic growth, the MPW divided towns and cities based on their function as cultural, 
commercial or agricultural towns and began researching plans for building and 
easement, reconstruction of slum areas, and the extension of utilities.484  
Bui Huu Tuan, a long-term senior civil servant in the MPW, first as Inspector 
General and later as Director of the Cabinet, had attended the 1967 Pacific Urban 
Development Seminar. In pursuit of more balanced urban growth, in October 1969 
Tuan sent a memo to the MPW’s subordinate agencies with which many Global South 
delegates to the Honolulu conference would have heartily approved. Tuan noted that 
experience had shown that building housing on urban fringes did not bring desired 
results because it left residents far from economic opportunities in areas with few 
transport links. Given Saigon’s excessive growth, chronic housing shortages and 
scarcity of land the MPW would instead establish a series of satellite towns around the 
capital. In cooperation with the private sector, the government would build houses and 
link the satellite towns to Saigon by an inter-city electric tram system. To attract people 
to the satellite towns the MPW would install utilities like water and electricity, construct 
markets, schools, and hospitals. Tuan suggested that these efforts would be prioritized 
in satellite towns rather than Saigon’s fringes.485 
There were obvious obstacles to such plans. The MPW acknowledged the need 
for more specialists, better data, higher private savings and investment, and better 
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coordination between responsible agencies.486 The October 1969 austerity tax hugely 
compounded these problems, as it lead to a 32% increase in the cost of MPW operations 
and a 50% increase in investment costs, forcing the MPW to reduce its housing 
construction operations for the forthcoming year.487 As such, these plans rarely left the 
drawing board. In addition, urban plans sometimes clashed with military and political 
goals. Following the rural pacification campaigns of late 1968 and early 1969, the GVN 
turned its attention to pacification in urban areas. The Central Pacification and 
Development Council noted that, as government forces pushed the NLF out of rural 
areas, the enemy would attempt to form new base areas in the suburban belts. These 
areas were “a richer source of men and material” and were home to “poorly educated 
labourers, all too gullible, and an easy prey to guile”. The NLF could take advantage of 
people in areas with poor roads, poor sanitation and shortages of water, electricity, and 
schools, inciting them to “cause confusion in the cities and make trouble for the local 
government”. To meet this plot, the CPDC noted, the GVN must “implement an 
effective urban development plan”.488 As with all other ministries in South Vietnam, the 
work of the MPW and its autonomous organizations was linked to pacification and 
development. Documents highlight that even the Saigon Water Department was 
required to send information to the CPDC about lengths of piper laid, water clocks 
installed etc. The government believed its technological edge over the NLF had the 
potential to subdue an otherwise restive urban population. Delivering potable water to 
Saigon’s suburban fringes and working class neighbourhoods thus became part of the 
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pacification enterprise.489 As such, these areas received priority over the installation of 
infrastructure in Tuan’s proposed satellite towns. 
Despite the obstacles operating against the MPW, American observers described 
1969 as “banner year” for urban planning in Vietnam. In comparison with the 10 city 
plans that the government had completed between 1959 and 1968, it had completed 5 
and initiated 14 in 1969. This was in part due to administrative changes in 1968 and 
1969 which had given urban planning a greater status within the MPW. Nonetheless, the 
directorate was still understaffed. Depleted by the draft and more lucrative private 
sector wages, the Urban Planning service had only 37 of a desired 73 staff members and 
few trained urban planners.490 Challenging as it was for an under-staffed and under-
resourced organization to keep pace with South Vietnam’s rapidly changing urban 
conditions, U.S. advisers wished to see an even more comprehensive effort and one that 
better complemented pacification plans. 
Two years later the MPW was still determined that some cities should be 
allowed to expand, while others contracted, in accordance with economic potential. This 
would also avoid the issue of resettling migrants in some rural areas where the GVN felt 
too many people were engaged in agriculture, instead taking advantage of manpower 
concentrated in cities. This was notably the case in the north of the country where high 
population densities meant that peasants merely eked out a living. The MPW had also 
begun researching the establishment of an alternative capital as a means of limiting 
Saigon’s growth. The MPW identified Di An, located about 20km from the capital 
between the Saigon and Dong Nai Rivers in Binh Duong province, as the most suitable 
area. The ministry proposed calling the town “New Saigon” [Tân Sài Gòn] and 
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assigning it administrative and diplomatic responsibilities. New Saigon would be 
connected to old Saigon which would maintain its commercial and port role, as well as 
to the Bien Hoa industrial zone and to Thu Duc university area.491  
By late 1971 however, American officials were quite sure that a strategy limiting 
Saigon and Danang’s growth in favour of counter-magnets, desirable as that might be, 
was impracticable and amounted to “paddling upstream against natural social forces”. 
One senior CORDS officer even wondered whether GVN political instincts, regardless 
of MPW plans to the contrary, might be to encourage the growth of Saigon ahead of 
regional growth and argued that as far as the growth of Saigon ensured political stability 
the United States should support it. The solution, CORDS decided, was to help those 
cities like Saigon and Danang to plan “for systematic expansion of their infrastructure in 
anticipation of greater future demands”. “Comprehensive city plans” seemed like “a 
practicable and realizable objective” for achieving this, suggested CORDS Assistant 
Chief of Staff James Herbert, despite acknowledging that there was a dearth of CORDS 
staff who could assist with such an effort.492 In light of the apparently diminished threat 
to South Vietnam’s cities in late 1971 and early 1972, these U.S. officials believed that 
the advisory effort should focus, not on counter-insurgency and community 
development, but on long-term economic development and they evidently believed that 
there was time to train Vietnamese to take over these roles. 
The combination of disappointment with the Urban Self-Development Program 
noted above and this desire for comprehensive city planning fed into the 1972-75 
Community Defence and Local Development Plan. The plan continued to place 
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rhetorical emphasis on community and participation but now the plan called for cities to 
establish a comprehensive urban development plan of which the urban self-development 
program was just one aspect. Cities were required to gather and analyse data relating to 
a host of factors in their localities such as land use, demography, social services and 
economics. City governments would then use this information to create plans outlining 
present and future development needs for the next 5 years, a construction program, and 
land use regulations. Such plans should offer “realistic solutions” to issues like 
sanitation, slum clearance, housing, industrial development, and illegal land uses. To 
support this effort, the GVN planned to establish a city and regional planning 
curriculum in Vietnamese universities in which promising urban development cadres 
would receive training. These trained cadres would then be assigned to local urban 
governments.493 
There were plenty of critics of this new approach on the American side. Thomas 
Thorsen, a USAID official in Vietnam, argued that experience had shown that the many 
heavy studies “bowing our bookshelves” from the Doxiadis to the Lilienthal report had 
paid little attention to “the paucity of resources”, while “the ‘new and better’ pencil 
lines” ignored the reality of impossible to resolve conflicts of area, economic status, 
family, location and heritage. Comprehensive city planning could make “little headway 
in the face of these conflicts”. While Thorsen’s critique was valid, his solution once 
again demonstrated the poverty of ideas for grappling with Vietnam’s urban problems. 
Thorsen argued that the United States and GVN had to overcome the void between the 
“ubiquitous villages and parasitic large cities” through the development of small market 
towns geared toward investment in agricultural technology and processing. These towns 
would stall further rural-urban migration by acting “as so many dams holding up the 
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flood of people into Saigon and other large cities”.494 Such was the scepticism of the 
new approach, that AID Vietnam initially refused to fund the new CORDS proposal 
noting that it was “overly ambitious” given the GVN’s institutional capacity and 
“meagrely resourced” given the complexity of the problems.495 At a meeting in 
Washington in late April, senior USAID officials overruled and agreed to fund the 
programme primarily as a vehicle “to improve the administrative and planning 
capabilities of selected urban areas to solve identified urban problems”.496 
Cities would follow a process similar to that which had begun in Saigon in 1969. 
Between August 1969 and April 1972 Frank Pavich, a USAID urban planner attached to 
the MPW, led a team of 21 Vietnamese land surveyors in carrying out a detailed land 
use survey of Saigon Metropolitan Area. The exercise resulted in a series of minutely 
detailed maps with colour coding indicating land use and numerical coding indicating 
subcategories. Casting an eye over the maps, one could see that an orange area with 
code 3096 was where one might find the local astrologer, code 3073 the funeral attire 
shop.497 In early 1972 the MPW sent instructors around the country to train urban cadre 
in land use survey techniques in other cities. As well as land use surveys, cities were 
required to offer population projections to the year 2000, while Pavich worked on a 
model for predicting land use requirements for the next 30 years.498 Such efforts 
culminated in a series of design plans which would determine the city’s future 
development.499  
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Better urban data might have provided comforting evidence for those charged 
with solving Vietnam’s urban problems that they had some kind of handle on the issue. 
But American and Vietnamese urban development goals for Vietnam’s cities were 
becoming more, not less, ambitious as the United States wound down its commitment. 
To understand why, in the twilight of the American war in Vietnam, American officials 
opted for such a long-range approach, one has to look to global trends in urban 
development in the early 1970s. 
 
Conclusion 
In the early 1970s the major development agencies commenced investigations of 
Third World urbanization. The 1972 USAID report, based on discussions with social 
scientists and visits to 16 countries in Asia, Africa and Latin American highlights the 
degree to which U.S. officials in South Vietnam were not implementing a set of policies 
geared toward the specific problems of South Vietnam’s cities. Instead, they held a set 
of assumptions about the urbanization process and a belief in the efficacy of certain 
solutions that U.S. development experts held about Third World urban development 
more generally.  
The report concluded that cities offered favourable economies of scale and acted 
as “a vehicle for the rapid diffusion of knowledge, social standards, and new lifestyles”, 
echoing the shibboleths of American social scientists dating back to the 1920s. Despite 
acknowledging little social science on which to draw, the “severe lack of exportable 
models”, and little knowledge of the urbanization process, the review concluded that 
cities played a positive role in development. The report condemned Third World urban 
master planning for focusing too much on the physical, ignoring the economic, social, 
and political aspects of urban development, as well as failing to conceive the 
relationship of the city to its hinterland and other cities. Due to their anti-urban bias 
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Third World leaders had attempted to “keep them down on the farm” or to divert growth 
to satellite and new towns. The authors were sceptical of such ad hoc approaches. 
Instead, regional development, alternative growth poles and the integration of urban 
development into national planning were all to be encouraged. Representatives from all 
the countries contacted in the course of the review expressed concern about shortages of 
skilled manpower, resources and data so the authors quixotically recommended that 
external technical assistance focus training, information, and research. This would, in 
turn, help overcome problems of planning and administrative capacity, as well as 
guiding the development of policy, legislation and institutions. South Vietnam, one of 
the countries visited, came in for particular praise for its emerging system of 
management and institutional support for urban affairs.500  
The solutions that U.S. urbanists offered in South Vietnam in the early 1970s 
simply reflected new ways of thinking about Third World urban development on a 
global scale but if these were difficult to implement in most postcolonial nations the 
obstacles to such an approach in South Vietnam were immense. By late 1972, however, 
South Vietnam’s urban areas faced more critical and immediate problems. The 
American withdrawal had precipitated a perilous drop in employment opportunities in 
the cities. In the months after the Paris Agreements the GVN’s efforts in urban areas 
focused on remedying the country’s economic and urban unemployment crisis through 
labour-intensive public works schemes. The urban development plans of 1971 and 1972 
would prove of very little assistance in this endeavour. 
U.S. efforts in Vietnam may well be one of the last times USAID placed such an 
emphasis on urban planning during the Cold War. Although USAID formalised the 
1972 report in a guidance statement the following year, in 1973 the U.S. Congress 
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passed the “new directions” legislation which instructed the agency to focus less on 
economic growth and more on the basic needs of the world’s poor. Eric Chetwyn, one 
of the authors of the 1972 report noted that in the early 1970s AID’s leaders had felt that 
urban development would be “the leading initiative… around the corner” but had later 
chosen to interpret the new directions legislation as relating to the rural, rather than 
urban poor. Although AID and Ford helped sound the alarm about urban development 
in the early 1970s, it was the World Bank which took up the challenge and its lending to 
urban development projects rose considerably throughout the decade.501 Perhaps more 
tellingly, Chetwyn noted that “the Agency felt somewhat overwhelmed by the urban 
problem. The problems of the cities were so severe, it seemed that resources needed to 
overcome them were so great, that we were really afraid we might be [sic] a Pandora’s 
Box, a bottomless pit”.502   
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Conclusion 
 
In the years between the Tet Offensive in 1968 and the 1972 Spring Offensive 
the Thieu regime decentralized governance and development in an attempt to gain 
legitimacy in the eyes of a war weary and uncommitted population. Rather than relying 
on a political party to mobilize support, Thieu believed that the bureaucracy and 
military establishment as well as those who had benefitted from development projects 
would be his key source of support in 1971 elections and in contest against the 
Communists. As the situation became more desperate after Hanoi’s invasion and the 
signing of the Paris Peace Agreements in January 1973, the regime attempted to once 
again centralize governance and development. Thieu abandoned his earlier effort to 
create mobilized, depoliticized villages and turned instead to organising a secretive 
political party. The RVN would also receive considerably less economic aid in 1973 
and 1974 than anticipated, the planners’ reaction to which was to turn the economy 
inwards and concentrate more economic power in the hands of the state. As far as Thieu 
was concerned, there could be no talk of elections until the North Vietnamese army 
withdrew its troops from the South. In light of these changes, the logic for development 
was less about gaining legitimacy in the eyes the people, and more a simple matter of 
survival. 
In reversing the GVN’s pacification gains since late 1968, Hanoi’s 1972 
offensive raised the possibility that Communist agents and sympathizers might emerge 
and take control of hamlet and village councils, a dangerous proposition given the 
possibility of a post-ceasefire election. In July 1972, in response to the offensive, Thieu 
requested and gained emergency powers for 6 months from the National Assembly. The 
following month the GVN issued a decree which cancelled local elections and 
authorized province chiefs to appoint most village and hamlet officials, backtracking on 
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the trend toward decentralization since 1968 and significantly reducing the legitimacy 
of local government. As Thieu’s powers were coming to an end in late December, he 
issued a decree setting new and, given the limited geographical base of most political 
parties, impossibly high standards for parties to stand in national and even local 
elections. At the same time Thieu moved to create his own political party, the Dan Chu 
(Democracy) Party. By the time the deadline for filing applications passed only Thieu’s 
party qualified. To avoid allegations that Thieu was creating a one party state, the GVN 
granted temporary operating permission to two blocs. Thieu claimed that he was trying 
to consolidate South Vietnam’s non-Communist parties for the post-ceasefire 
competition with the Communists. But the move was equally aimed at enfeebling the 
neutralists who would occupy the space between the GVN and the Communists on the 
National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord, the body charged with 
implementing the ceasefire and overseeing elections. Both the attempt to gain greater 
control at the village level and eliminating the “Third Force” as a political entity would 
continue until the fall of Saigon.503 
Careerist civil servants and military officers joined the Dan Chu, allowing Thieu 
to use the GVN machinery to get out the vote. Nguyen Van Ngai, one of the principal 
party organizers, was appointed Minister for Rural Development in March 1973 and 
used RD cadres to spread the party’s message. Village elections were now reinstated 
and by early July 1973 Dan Chu candidates had won 90% of seats in almost one 
thousand village elections, while opposition parties could rarely field a candidate. 
Further laws regulating the October elections to the Senate¸ the only constitutional body 
still capable of challenging Thieu, lead most of the non-Communist opposition to 
boycott it. The election gave Thieu and Dan Chu a two-thirds majority in the National 
Assembly, enough to pass constitutional amendments, including the addition of a third 
                                                
503 Fallaci, Interview with History, 67-68; Brooks Richards to Sir Alec Douglas-Home, ‘The Partial 
Senate Election in South Vietnam, 1973’, 11 September 1973, FCO 15/1809, UKNA. 
238 
 
presidential term. The opposition newspaper Dien Tin noted that the only outlet for the 
non-Communist opposition now was to “turn to extra-parliamentary activities”. 
Administration supporters used development as the primary public explanation for 
Thieu’s amendment to the constitution. The party’s eponymous news daily Dan Chu 
editorialized that Thieu had not yet had enough time to implement “his large-scale and 
long-term plans and projects”.504 
 The language of decentralization and democracy continued but the reality 
betrayed Thieu’s fear of Communist and Third Force infiltration of the villages and his 
desire to concentrate more power in Saigon. He spoke of an “administrative revolution” 
which would send urban-based civil servants into the countryside. But the U.S. embassy 
noted that power was moving away from the villages and back into the hands of the 
central government. The 1974 Community Security and Local Development plan 
continued to speak of the importance of village autonomy in the field development. In 
practice, however, Saigon maintained control by assigning RD cadres to assist in the 
design and implementation of development plans. In addition, rather than allowing 
popularly-elected village chiefs to control the territorial forces and PSDF, junior ARVN 
officers were despatched to the villages to command these forces. While the elected 
village chiefs had hardly been immune to pressure from above, many of these officials 
showed a considerable degree of independence from their district and province 
superiors and often acted in what they perceived to be the interests of their 
communities. Indeed, some had proven too independent and others, it turned out, had 
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been members of the old line nationalist political parties like the Dai Viet and the 
VNQDD.505 
Against this backdrop of growing centralization and continued fighting in the 
countryside after the Paris agreements, the GVN hoped to implement a programme of 
reconstruction and development. However, it found itself battling against several factors 
largely beyond its control. Hanoi’s 1972 invasion had compounded the South’s refugee 
crisis, damaged towns and industries, and compelled Saigon to spend more on defence 
and refugee resettlement. The impact of the U.S. withdrawal began to be felt most 
severely in the towns and cities. As a result, the government faced a growing budget 
deficit, unemployment and a decline foreign exchange reserves, raising the prospect of 
grave inflation in 1973. As such there was little public money for reconstruction. At a 
meeting with Nixon at San Clemente in April 1973, the President assured Thieu that he 
would work to get South Vietnam as much economic assistance as possible but also 
recommended that Saigon look to the World Bank for support.506 
The GVN launched an Eight Year plan in May 1973 which would focus on 
recovery followed by a second phase of public and private investment in agriculture 
and, indicating the degree of optimism in Saigon in early 1973, in tourism. At the same 
time however, Thieu went to every length to publicly condemn Hanoi’s violations of the 
Paris Agreement. This caused considerable frustration for some technocrats, one of 
whom argued that it would complicate the effort to mobilize international support 
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because it might “create the impression that reconstruction and development are simply 
still impossible in Vietnam”.507 
Such concerns were not assuaged by the continuing violence in rural areas and 
the escalating battle between Saigon and the Communists for control of the country’s 
rice crop. Following a sharp rise in rice prices in early July, a group of senior officials 
including Thieu’s assistant Hoang Duc Nha, Minister Le Tuan Anh, and a number of 
senior military and security officials moved against the liberalizers Ngoc and Trung to 
assert stronger control over the economy. They wished to instituted price controls and 
rationing, restrictions on foreign investment, and an economic blockade of enemy 
territory. These men were supported by South Vietnamese intelligence reports the 
following month which indicated that Hanoi was moving large quantities of money into 
South Vietnam to buy food for its troops and to destabilize the southern economy. The 
GVN’s Economic and Social Council noted that the price of food for a family now 
exceeded the salary of an average civil servant. The “only solution”, the Council noted, 
“is government intervention, guidance, and support to implement the procurement, 
storage, and processing system”. By the end of the year, the liberalizers Ngoc and Trung 
had been ousted, the GVN had launched its blockade and put control of the rice market 
in the hands of the National Food Administration.508 
The RVN’s economic problems were compounded in 1973 by less than 
anticipated private investment and international assistance, as well as the global rise in 
prices and the “oil shock”. Inflation reached its highest levels since 1966 and foreign 
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exchange reserves dropped dramatically. In 1974 only 7% of national budget could be 
dedicated to development. In light of this crisis situation, self-sufficiency and the 
mobilization of manpower, rather than public investment, were essential. 
The deteriorating economic situation compounded the unemployment crisis in 
South Vietnam’s cities which started to suffer particularly badly from the U.S. 
withdrawal in 1972. The greater Da Nang area had been especially dependent on 
employment generated by the U.S. presence and by late 1972 U.S. officials described 
the economic situation there as “acute, urgent and potentially explosive”.509 In light of 
this crisis, CORDS’ recommendations for more comprehensive urban planning in 1971 
and 1972 turned out to be particularly misguided and even redundant. Instead the 
GVN’s focus shifted to immediate efforts to relieve the situation. In March 1973 the 
Agency for the Development of the Da Nang Area began a labour-intensive public 
works program and within a few months 4,000 unemployed, unskilled migrants and 
refugees had been put to work building sidewalks, whitewashing buildings, paving 
alleys, and cleaning up drainage ditches and beaches.510 Saigon City Hall launched a 
city beautification program for six months beginning in October 1973, followed by the 
establishment of the Agency for the Development of the Saigon Area which soon hired 
7,000 workers. The GVN planned to continue the program into 1975 hoping to employ 
40,000 workers nationwide by April 1975.511 
These public works scheme were crash programs with limited budgets and could 
only offer temporary relief. They could not resolve the cities’ chronic unemployment 
problems. Between 1973 and 1975 the Ministry of Public Works therefore pushed its 
“population policy” [sách lược dân cư]. The ministry noted that Communists could 
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easily exploit urban unemployment and poverty in the cities, while statistics suggested a 
link between poverty and insecurity in a number of densely populated rural areas. The 
ministry proposed that, as part of the Land Clearing and Hamlet Building Program, the 
government move people from these insecure areas to other zones of unexploited land. 
Under the Land Development and Hamlet Building programme thousands of 
demobilized soldiers, disabled veterans, refugees and urban peasants were resettled on 
virgin or abandoned lands for the economic development and security of the country.512 
Demography, food production, and security were intimately linked in the eyes of 
many policymakers. Questions about how and where to resettle surplus, unemployed or 
refugee populations, how to boost agricultural output, and whether to curb population 
growth or depend on manpower for economic growth and security were central to post-
Paris policy debates. These issues came to the fore at a Seminar on Population, hosted 
in Saigon in February 1974 and attended by GVN officials, academics, and 
representatives of Vietnamese and international NGOs. Although population planning 
would not have national security implications for 15-20 years, the idea of reducing 
population growth played on the anxieties of many planners. Several GVN public health 
officials voiced opposition to population control. Some felt that the RVN needed men in 
the military and tilling the land. One speaker condemned population control as “a sham 
issue”, imposed on developing countries by “foreign nations” while members of the 
Catholic clergy, drawing on Pope Paul VI’s writings, called instead for “self-
mastery”.513 
By the end of 1974, there were 138 clinics in operation, with 75 at the district 
level, far short of the Ministry of Health’s goal of one per 257 districts but a 
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considerable increase in four years nonetheless. The government adopted a permissive 
attitude to family planning in the acknowledgement that there was a population problem 
but the failure to repeal the bill was due to strong opposition from political elites. In 
1974, the Ministry of Health official most closely associated population planning, 
Truong Minh Cac, noted that the number of new “acceptors”, just 26,000, was far below 
the target set by the National Population Council. Much like the Family Happiness 
Protection Association, Cac attributed this to “adverse propaganda”.514 
Economically, the GVN was in crisis management mode. To deal with its 
growing balance of payments problems, in 1974 the GVN repeatedly devalued the 
piaster until it was worth about a quarter of its 1970 value. The government constantly 
adjusted the price of domestic and imported rice, expanded agricultural credit and 
continued to subsidise fertilizer. Each step sought to boost production and encourage the 
flow of rice to the urban centres but they placed a massive strain on the already 
overburdened state coffers. Meanwhile the rural sector, including rice production, 
continued to grow, and agricultural exports rose to $75m in 1974. The fact that 
unemployment rates were now as high in the countryside as they were in the cities 
further suggests that this growth primarily benefitted only one segment of rural 
society.515 
With rising world prices, the real value of U.S. economic assistance declined, 
making the effort to mobilize third party and multilateral assistance all the more urgent. 
But disagreement among potential donor countries about the nature of assistance to 
Indochina, as well as uncertainty about U.S. Congressional commitment to international 
development and the impact of the energy crisis, combined to delay action. Meanwhile, 
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the IMF moved from modest approval of the GVN’s economic programmes between 
1970 and 1973 to disapproval for its dirigiste policies in 1974. In early 1975 an IMF 
delegation reported that GVN policies did not inspire enough confidence to qualify for 
an IMF loan.516 
As the economy spiralled and unemployment grew, Thieu’s urban base began to 
come apart at the seams. Throughout 1974 the GVN faced growing protest from ARVN 
veterans, urban-based labour unions and anti-corruption movements led by - his once 
most reliable constituency- Catholic priests and their followers. In a two-hour address in 
October, Thieu defended himself against charges of corruption and dictatorship. He 
pointed to his development programs, particularly hamlet rebuilding and urban 
improvement schemes, as the key pillars of his plan for economic recovery and jobs 
creation.517  
With Hanoi’s forces closing in, policymakers in Washington and Saigon 
continued to hope for economic take-offs, including Taiwanese-inspired Export-
Processing Zones and oil strikes in the South China Sea. In February 1975, U.S. 
Ambassador Graham Martin told President Gerald Ford “on the economic side, we 
could see the kind of advance Taiwan and Korea had”. By the following month, 
however, the U.S. embassy warned that the RVN’s economic prospects were bleak and 
if economic assistance was not forthcoming, it would threaten the survival of the 
regime.518 Ultimately, the RVN collapsed from the top-down. It was Thieu’s order to 
withdraw from the Central Highlands, and particularly the disastrous way in which this 
was executed, which sealed Saigon’s immediate fate. But even had the RVN survived 
Hanoi’s final onslaught, the combination of U.S. domestic politics, the volatile global 
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economy and opposition to Thieu’s growing authoritarian rule indicate that the RVN 
would have fared increasingly badly as the 1970s progressed. 
 
 
The period between 1968 and 1973 is a nebulous one in the literature on the 
United States and international development. U.S. liberalism had entered a period of 
crisis, the post-war modernization consensus had imploded and the Bretton Woods 
system came apart, yet alternative paradigms such as “basic needs” and neoliberalism 
had yet to stake a firm claim in the minds of development professionals and 
postcolonial leaders. The absence of a dominant paradigm accounts for the diverse 
approaches to development adopted by various groups operating in South Vietnam 
during this period. The United States and the GVN pursued land reform, community 
development, market-oriented and export-led growth, and top-down modernization to 
address a variety of social, political and economic problems. While Americans and 
Vietnamese debated the relative suitability of these approaches, they saw little 
contradiction in implementing them simultaneously. Ultimately, each approach aimed to 
strengthen the regime economically and politically.  
The fact that U.S. officials were beginning to question the very premise of U.S. 
development efforts in the postcolonial world in the late 1960s and 1970s, and in large 
part as a result of the experience in Vietnam, led to divergences of opinion about the 
best strategies to pursue. Some development practitioners and U.S. policymakers 
continued to see the need for state planning and particularly for the state’s role in rural 
social engineering. On the other hand, some had clearly started to question the pre-
eminent role of the postcolonial state in economic development and saw instead the 
need for market-driven solutions. Elsewhere the collapse of the development consensus 
had an uneven impact. Even as development professionals turned their attention to 
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Third World urbanization they struggled to develop new modes of thinking and instead 
fell back on the old watchwords of the social sciences. There were no obvious solutions. 
U.S. officials’ uncertainty as to the benefits of various development approaches 
created space for Vietnamese actors to shape the trajectory of these projects. In 
searching for solutions to its political, economic and social problems, the GVN drew on 
U.S. theories of modernization, community development and land reform but U.S. 
models did not dominate. For every problem encountered, whether land tenure relations, 
economic planning, or population control, the GVN tried to learn how other anti-
Communist states had grappled with and resolved these issues. Looking to other 
regional anti-Communist states allowed South Vietnamese technocrats to assert their 
independence vis a vis their U.S. counterparts but it also allowed them to implement a 
programme of authoritarian governance and development. The GVN’s U.S. or Western-
trained technocrats such as Pham Kim Ngoc, Ha Xuan Trung, Cao Van Than, and Tran 
Quang Minh, admired Taiwanese, South Korean, and Singaporean forms of political 
and economic organization far more than those put forth in the social science texts they 
read as graduate students. As a result, South-South exchanges were as important as 
U.S.-South Vietnamese encounters in determining development’s arc. 
Examining these projects in South Vietnam in the late 1960s and 1970s, it is 
possible to begin speaking of a distinctly East Asian model of anti-Communist 
governance and development in which the United States facilitated exchange and 
offered advice but often did not play the dominant role. With their higher levels of 
growth, Taiwan and South Korea provided the key models for replication. It was not 
only Thieu’s South Vietnam, but also Suharto’s Indonesia and Ferdinand Marcos’ 
Philippines that turned to these model states for inspiration. In the late 1960s and early 
1970s Indonesia and the Philippines, along with South Vietnam, attempted to duplicate 
Taiwan and South Korea’s export-led growth model, each even setting up their first 
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Export-Processing Zones on the Taiwanese and Korean pattern. But the major appeal of 
this model, more Taiwanese than Korean, was the ways in which it allowed the state to 
use development to co-opt the support of a depoliticised peasantry. Encouraging 
peasants to express their aspirations through development projects served as an 
alternative to political activity that might threaten the power of the regime. Despite the 
difference among them, there were striking similarities in how these East Asian states 
tried to achieve this objective. By the early 1970s, each state had a strong central 
executive or one-party regime and a weak civil society, and employed some 
combination of counter-insurgency, transmigration and resettlement schemes, village-
level mobilization, Green Revolution technologies, land reform, and population 
control.519  
The GVN’s strategy during the final years of the war synthesized these East 
Asian anti-Communist developmental ideas. Yet scholars continue to understand South 
Vietnam entirely in terms of its bilateral relationship with the United States. By 
situating South Vietnam within the wider frame of decolonization and international 
development, it is possible to treat the GVN as a postcolonial regime instead of a mere 
appendage of American empire. There was no South Vietnamese exceptionalism as is 
implied in much of the literature. Rather, South Vietnam was a failed version of these 
more successful, authoritarian East Asian states. 
The GVN development plans in the years after the Tet Offensive therefore 
suggest that historians of development might further examine the transnational flow of 
ideas about economic development among actors in the Global South during the Cold 
War. Development was not simply something that the Global North imposed on the 
Global South. Rather, it is clear that actors in the Global South looked to and learned 
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from one another’s development experiences. Nonetheless, South Vietnamese planners 
did not slavishly follow a Taiwanese or Korean development model, in part because 
they disputed what that model meant. Instead they appropriated elements of other East 
Asian models and adapted them to Vietnamese conditions or deployed those models in 
bureaucratic struggles.  
An examination of the contestations over development in the Second Republic 
brings into question the flat caricature of the RVN’s leaders presented in many accounts 
of the war and restores the pluralism of South Vietnamese politics. Americanist 
historians all too often reduce the South Vietnamese regime to a small cabal consisting 
of Thieu and his close advisers, interested only in military affairs and the negotiations in 
Paris. This dissertation, however, suggests the following. Firstly, historians must 
acknowledge that Thieu viewed development as crucial to the successful outcome of the 
war. But secondly, and more importantly, historians must widen the cast of characters 
they examine. Development policy was designed and implemented by ministers and 
bureaucrats who are completely absent from accounts of the war.  
Authoritarian governance appealed to many of these technocrats because it 
appeared to offer the quickest route to economic growth. It seemed to require none of 
the compromises and contestations of political pluralism that might jeopardize 
development plans. Thieu and his technocrats had no time for those who did not share 
their vision of South Vietnam’s future, whether Buddhist and student protestors, 
National Assembly members, or peasants. 
In practice, however, authoritarian rule proved less easy to implement. The 
Thieu regime was weaker than its leaders and technocrats would have liked, in large 
part because it had to be mindful of its American constituency, particularly the U.S. 
Congress. Development was contested both within the executive branch, and between 
the executive branch and the weak though still very vocal National Assembly, the 
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relatively free press, and some civil society groups like the FHPA. Projects including 
economic policy, land reform, and population planning, were each challenged, watered 
down, revised or completely undermined by opposition politicians. The picture that 
emerges from these contestations over development is that of a postcolonial society 
ruled by anti-Communist regime which for all its terrible flaws, including political 
repression, corruption and the violence it delivered on its people, battled over ideas 
about modernity that would enable it to build a postcolonial nation in opposition to its 
Communist competitors. 
Between 1968 and 1973, the South Vietnamese state attempted to use the limited 
resources at its disposal to create a sense of anti-Communist identity in the country’s 
villages and urban slums. GVN leaders encouraged grassroots democracy and 
participation at the village level but only in so far as it served their larger goals of social 
engineering. The ultimate goal was self-governing, self-developing, and self-sufficient 
communities able to resist the Communists. The Village and Urban Self-Development 
Programmes, agricultural modernization, land reform and the PSDF all highlight the 
degree to which GVN leaders believed that properly organized village society and urban 
neighbourhoods could become a source of anti-Communist solidarity, stability and 
economic growth. This was not a benevolent goal but an attractive strategy for a regime 
that needed the support of its people, was critically dependent on foreign aid and short 
of resources. In this sense, even supposedly democratic and participatory community 
development projects were part of a larger attempt to shape political identities and draw 
people into a positive relationship with the state. Nonetheless, a real redistribution of 
power and wealth occurred in these years in the form of village elections, the Village 
and Urban Self-Development programmes, and land reform. Although these 
programmes were never as radical as the NLF’s policies in its earlier years, by the early 
1970s the GVN was able to offer far greater material incentives to the peasantry than 
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the forces of the revolution. While it is impossible to measure degrees of support for the 
GVN and NLF at this time, it is very likely that the government enjoyed far wider 
support than historians have suggested.  
Yet the state could never balance these incentives with its use of coercion. The 
GVN delivered enormous violence on its people, whether in the form of military 
operations, forced recruitment into citizens’ militias, or cultural violence in the form of 
modernization projects which erased long-standing rural practices. The state used 
violence to achieve its goals not because it was strong but because it was weak in 
imposing its authority and creating the identity it desired in peasant farmers and urban 
dwellers. GVN leaders were not alone, as far as postcolonial states went, in thinking 
that violence could clear the way for development and that the outcome would justify 
the means.  
 The inability to balance incentives and coercion was just one of the reasons for 
GVN failure, however. Resources for development were always critically deficient 
because the state diverted the vast majority of both its manpower and material wealth to 
national defence.  As such the pursuit of self-sufficiency was an attractive but elusive 
goal. The examples of the Sanitary Hamlet Programme and Village Self-Development 
projects demonstrate that GVN programmes often created structures in the countryside 
that peasants and village governments could not maintain without continued assistance. 
But perhaps the biggest reason for the failure of the GVN strategy and therefore 
the failure of the South Vietnamese state was that it did not prepare Saigon for the new 
challenges it would face between 1973 and 1975. Firstly, U.S. and GVN officials were 
uncertain as to the meaning and goals of development in South Vietnam after the Tet 
Offensive. There was significant disagreement among various U.S. and South 
Vietnamese constituencies as to whether goals were best served by long-term 
development or short-term stabilization. The result was often a compromise between the 
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two. Ultimately, U.S. officials and GVN leaders did not help prepare South Vietnam for 
economic self-sufficiency during the period of Vietnamization because they did not 
anticipate how quickly they needed to achieve this goal. Both GVN and U.S. officials 
expected that South Vietnam would continue to receive large infusions of U.S. and 
international aid for several years to come. Based on this assumption, substantial 
progress was made toward eventual self-sufficiency prior to the Spring Offensive and 
the Paris Agreements. However, the economic impact of the offensive and continued 
high defence expenditures after 1973, combined with global economic shocks and a 
drop in U.S. aid, placed the South Vietnamese economy in dire straits. In this sense, the 
death spiral of South Vietnam began in 1972, not in 1968 as historians often suggest.  
Secondly, between 1968 and 1972, the GVN worked toward goals which were 
fundamentally undermined by those negotiating the peace agreement. The GVN 
strategy after the Tet Offensive was geared toward a future electoral competition with 
the NLF. Elections would only occur once North Vietnamese troops had withdrawn 
from the South. By allowing North Vietnamese troops to remain in the South and by 
offering the “Third Force” a significant role in the political process after 1973, the Paris 
Agreements contained provisions which destroyed the logic for pacification and 
development of the four previous years. 
Historians have long argued that South Vietnam served as a development 
laboratory for the Kennedy and Johnson administrations in the 1960s. However, 
scholars have overlooked the significance of U.S development projects in South 
Vietnam in the Nixon era. The programmes that U.S. development officials advocated 
during this latter period reflected both continuity and change with regard to post-war 
development theory and practice. Development in South Vietnam in these years saw 
both the culmination of post-war projects like land reform and the Green Revolution, 
and the emergence of new modes of thinking such as flexible exchange rates and a new 
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focus on urban development. It saw the climax of U.S. efforts to use development as a 
tool to fight wars of national liberation but also prefigured shifts in international 
development in the 1970s. 
Although Nixon was eager to withdraw U.S. troops from Vietnam and focused 
primarily on high diplomacy and conventional military force, the administration 
continued to view development as crucial to the persistence of a stable regime in 
Saigon. In the early 1970s South Vietnam still experienced the largest American 
presence of any country in the Global South. It should therefore come as no surprise 
that South Vietnam remained a laboratory for American developmental ideas until the 
United States withdrew. In fact, many U.S. officials in both Vietnam and Washington 
believed that the projects and reforms conducted during the final years of the war were 
actually more development-oriented than those which had focused primarily on 
stabilization during the Johnson era. In this sense, historians’ focus on the Kennedy and 
Johnson administrations’ development policies to the neglect of the Nixon 
administration presents us with an inaccurate picture of U.S. development efforts during 
the Cold War. 
Yet scant attention has been paid to the ways in which these projects in Vietnam 
after the 1968 Tet Offensive foreshadowed shifting U.S and international development 
priorities in the 1970s. Debates between U.S. and South Vietnamese officials as well as 
within the South Vietnamese and U.S. governments preceded broader, global 
transformations in thinking about economic development that would occur in the social 
sciences, in international development institutions, and in the Global South later in the 
1970s. Issues debated in Vietnam included the role of the state versus the private sector, 
the participation of multilateral and non-government organisations, structural 
adjustment programs, the merits of population planning, and a growing focus on urban 
development. 
253 
 
For Nixon, one of the lessons of Vietnam was that direct U.S. involvement in 
Third World development had implicated the United States too heavily in the domestic 
politics of foreign nations. But Nixon did not completely reject the need for postcolonial 
development. Although he and Kissinger believed that the United States was no longer 
responsible for providing the intellectual blueprints for postcolonial development, they 
believed in the alternative solutions of private investment, export-led growth, and 
multilateral and third party aid. In this sense, South Vietnam became a test case for the 
Nixon administration’s approach to development on a global scale. While the United 
States could hardly hope to avoid involvement in the domestic political scene in South 
Vietnam in the late 1960s and 1970s, the emphasis on private investment, export-led 
growth, and the mobilization of international aid each sought to help the United States 
disengage economically from Vietnam. This might leave behind a viable economy just 
as Vietnamization might leave behind a viable military. Whereas these development 
strategies aimed at promoting disengagement from Vietnam, elsewhere in the Global 
South they would help the United States avoid direct involvement and compensate for 
growing Congressional disillusionment on foreign aid.  
In the 1970s as U.S. economic assistance to the Global South declined, many 
U.S. client states looked beyond the United States for both the intellectual and material 
support for their development projects. South Vietnam was one of the earliest of many 
nations which sought to harness the supposed lessons and emulate the achievements of 
Taiwan and South Korea. The shift from endogenous growth models to export-led 
growth and foreign investment that occurred in South Vietnam would become one of 
the principal development strategies in the anti-Communist Global South, particularly in 
Southeast Asia and Latin America later in the 1970s. This transformation considerably 
undermined Third World solidarity in the call for a New International Economic Order 
which was based on import-substitution and other forms of economic sovereignty. 
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 The legacies of U.S. and GVN development continue to resound in Vietnam. As 
Hanoi’s leaders attempted to collectivize agriculture in the south in the late 1970s, they 
found IRRI rice varieties both a blessing and a curse. On the one hand, miracle rice’s 
more labour intensive requirements allowed the state to use these varieties to force 
wealthier farmers to share their fields with the land poor. However, the Mekong Delta 
proved the most difficult region to collectivize largely as a result of the socio-economic 
changes that occurred there during the American War. This was a major factor in 
Hanoi’s turn to more market-oriented solutions to the country’s agricultural crisis in the 
mid-1980s. Today farmers in the Mekong Delta grow dozens of IRRI rice varieties and 
Vietnam is now one of the third largest rice exporters in the world, though at significant 
cost to the nation’s environment. The legacies of urban development are evident in 
Saigon too. In 1996 Vietnam opened its first export-processing zone in Saigon’s Tan 
Thuan Dong, on the same site that the GVN- with Taiwanese assistance- began to 
construct an export-processing zone in 1974. Thu Thiem district, which Constantinos 
Doxiadis identified as a promising area for housing development in the mid-1960s, is 
now touted as Saigon’s next “new urban area”. The influence of other East Asian 
nations in the economic development of Vietnam also continues. In the late 1980s, as 
the Vietnamese Communist Party was searching for solutions to its economic crisis, its 
leaders looked to Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore as useful models of one party rule 
and state-led growth. Today these three countries are among the top five biggest sources 
of foreign direct investment in Vietnam. 
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